751G.00/5–1054
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Burma Affairs (Blancké)
Subject:
- Southeast Asia and the Geneva Discussions
Participants:
- James Barrington, Ambassador of Burma
- Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
- W. Wendell Blancké, PSA
Mr. Murphy invited Ambassador Barrington in for an exchange of views on the problems of the Geneva Conference and the situation in Southeast Asia as a result of developments in Indochina. During the half-hour interview the following topics were discussed.
Five-Power Meetings
In opening Mr. Murphy noted that press stories on “five-power meetings” had been rife, and that many of these had been inaccurate. We wished to assure the Burmese Government that there had been no meetings of the five-power group in connection with recent Asian events, nor was there any intention on the part of that group to decide the destiny of Southeast Asia without reference to the governments of the area. In preparation for Geneva there had, of course, been exchanges of views at the strictly military staff level, for example at Singapore, but these had been operational discussions and in no way superseded the Secretary’s idea of united action. This we wished to emphasize.
Partition: Coalition: United Action
Mr. Murphy went on to say that the French, in their eagerness to reach a solution for Vietnam, may not now fully realize the hard realities of the Communist position, which position will unfold in time. Sooner or later, however, the French will have to face certain brutal facts. In our view the two alternatives of the moment appear to be partition or coalition.
Partition concerns the Vietnamese themselves, and any solution on such lines must conform to their aspirations. Even recognizing that the exploitation of Vietnamese nationalism by the Communists has confused the picture, we doubt that the Vietnamese desire partition. As for coalition, we are under no illusions but that that would lead to Communist domination of Vietnam, wherefore we question whether the French would accept it.
Thus, when France comes to grips with the realities of the situation, we may still have to seek united action grouping. The Secretary has been talking to chiefs of mission from the area—among them those of Thailand and the Philippines—with the idea of exploring further some form of grouping of the Southeast Asian countries concerned. Since Burma is one of these countries, we should like some light on official Burmese thinking.
General Burmese Views on Indochina: Independence
Begging leave to speak frankly, Ambassador Barrington said the general feeling in Burma is that the war in Indochina is, or was until recently, a colonialist struggle; and that now, to put it bluntly, it is a struggle between two imperialisms—the French and the Chinese.
[Page 471]Mr. Murphy interposed that what we want to get away from, is the idea that the U.S. is associated in a fight for colonialism. Our record clearly shows our anti-colonialist position—for example, in the Philippines, and in our support of Indonesian independence. But, we are also affected by larger strategic considerations—in Europe—and must deal with the other powers as they are, including France. We approve of France’s fight against the Communists, but that does not mean we approve the way they have administered the situation in Indochina.
Barrington replied that of course he and responsible Burmese officials appreciate that, but he had been presenting the general view of his countrymen. The Burmese attitude in general is that it would not want to see Indochina exchange one imperialism for another, or go from the frying pan into the fire. What Burma wants is to see full independence for Indochina.
Mr. Murphy assured the Ambassador that that is our view, without reservation; and he added that, as Barrington knew, the Chinese type of imperialism did not stop with limited objectives. Barrington wryly replied that Burma well realized that.
Later in the conversation Mr. Murphy emphasized that we want the Burmese Government to understand that we are doing our best to insure complete independence for Indochina. Naturally, the French dominate the internal situation and we have been in no position to dictate, but we are trying to work things out. Our position is based on complete independence, and to prevent the exchange of one colonialism for another.
Burma’s Position on United Action
Ambassador Barrington asserted that it would be very difficult for his Government to join any contemplated grouping, for three principal reasons:
- a.
- Internal Situation: Barrington referred to Burma’s recent history with its native Communist insurgency, and said that while his Government now had the upper hand it was still militarily and economically weak, and needed time to set its own house in order. That was one reason why it would hardly be interested in joining any “grouping.” And if it did join, Burma could make no military contribution.
- b.
Frontier with China: Also, and most importantly, Burma had to take into account its approximately 1000–mile common frontier with Red China. Mr. Murphy interposed: is it better to stand alone?—to which Barrington replied that his country was in no position to provoke Red China.
Mr. Murphy explained that the U.S. no longer believes in the avoidance of provocation as a policy. We now realize we are dealing with chess players, and if the Communists want war they will create the necessary incidents without respect to provocation. Our [Page 472] policy, therefore, is now to minimize worry about provocation and do what we consider right and necessary; otherwise we should be paralyzed, which is what the Communists want. We should be sitting ducks, to be picked off one by one.
- c.
Chinese Aggression not Clear-cut: The third factor influencing Burmese thinking was that there was no Chinese aggression in the strict sense, yet. The line between clear-cut aggression and subversive infiltration was not clear, nor was it clear just who—China or France—was grabbing what. The difference between subversion and manifest invasion tended to confuse Burmese thinking: Burma would not want to see another Communist government in the area, but the distinction became harder when the method was subversion rather than clear aggression.
Barrington noted that in 1950, on the Korean issue, Burma had come in for collective security even though its native Communists were on the rampage at home and there was risk in doing so. This was because the Burmese Government, and the man in the street, could clearly see there was a case of [North Korean]1 aggression. If there were an attack on Thailand, Burma’s reaction would also be different to that on Indochina, as aggression would be clear. But even there, if the method were subversion, the issue would be “fuzzed.” And to Burma, there was no clear-cut issue in Vietnam.
These three factors—Burma’s internal situation, its frontier with Red China, and the question of unclear aggression—made the problem very difficult for Burma, Barrington said.
Laos and Cambodia: Dramatizing Independence
In discussing the complexity of the situation Mr. Murphy remarked that the problems in Laos and Cambodia seemed separate from those of Vietnam, and might call for a separate solution and a different approach. In this respect we were speculating whether United Nations action might not be usefully taken—for example, a Peace Observation Commission. We had been giving this some thought, in any case.
Barrington did not comment at the time but he later spoke of the need to dramatize any further gestures of independence—in Laos and Cambodia, and in Vietnam as well. The present French method of “nibbling” did not make any real impression; the French had missed the boat in Vietnam. As an example of what he meant Barrington cited the manner in which Burma had dramatized its independence in 1948: the handing-over had taken place at 4:20 in the morning, the hour picked by the astrologers. The idea of bringing in astrologers, while it might be amusing to the Western mind, had successfully clinched the bona fides of independence with the villagers, who knew that this had been a custom in the time of the Burmese kings and realized that the British would never have [Page 473] thought of such a move, or held the ceremony at such an outlandish hour. The latest move from Paris regarding Indochina’s independence, on the other hand, had lacked any drama whatsoever and would have no real impact in Southeast Asia.
Mr. Murphy asserted that independence was indeed the key issue, and he asked if Ambassador Barrington thought a dramatic gesture, say in Laos, would still be effective. Barrington thought it would, and added that if something spectacular were not done soon the poison of Vietnam might spread to Laos and Cambodia.
Burma’s Lesson
Barrington went on to say that Burma had learned that where there was real independence Communism faded out: India and the Philippines were examples, and Thailand too, where Communism was no real problem. The Burmese independence movement had grown out of the wartime Resistance, in which of course Communists participated. When the British returned after the war and tried to reestablish their rule, the resistance continued. As a result, the first Burmese Government had Communists in it. But not only the Government but the people soon saw through the ends these people served, and they kicked them out [into insurgency].2 Barrington stressed that it was the people who had done this: the Government could not have got rid of the Communists if the people themselves had not seen through them.
Closing Note
In closing Barrington said he well realized the difficulties of the U.S. position, and Mr. Murphy noted that the tie-in with Europe complicated things. On rising Mr. Murphy thanked Barrington for his frank views and said we must keep in touch with the Ambassador to make sure his Government knew and understood our position. We hoped Burma would not close the door against further study of some form of united action.
Brief Press Contact
After the interview Ambassador Barrington was approached by several newsmen. They first asked if the Colombo Conference had been discussed, to which the answer was no. Barrington said the Deputy Under Secretary had merely wished to fill him in on the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. The only other question was: had Burma been invited to participate in united action? Barrington said it had not.3