790.5/4–1754: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Netherlands1
1235. Netherlands Ambassador called on the Acting Secretary April 16 under instructions to make inquiry with regard to SE Asian defense organization.… Netherlands’ interest based upon NATO membership and therefore in any developments likely lead to conflict, as well as upon Netherlands’ position as “Pacific power.” Also Netherlands had previously offered use New Guinea as base case of necessity which “he had no doubt still held good” and Netherlands had previously requested be kept fully informed of any contemplated enlargement ANZUS. … Stated Government’s request was not that Netherlands should necessarily participate in any SE Asia organization but that the Netherlands be kept completely informed so that government can “define its own position” and answer parliamentary questions.
Acting Secretary assured Ambassador of our desire to keep his Government fully informed.
Acting Secretary stated U.S. had been confronted with a very urgent situation caused by number of requests from French for increased assistance in Indochina which would have involved larger and more direct measure U.S. participation. In consulting Congressional leaders became clear that while they were quite willing face up responsibilities U.S. should assume in the area, could only be done if nations in area most directly concerned willing show their intent also face up responsibilities and participate with us. We very much felt that unless our intention declared we faced possibility having free world position everywhere eroded bit by bit. Massive retaliation was not entire answer particularly in Asia and situations such as that in Indochina. Declaration of intent prevent further Communist expansion in SE Asia would itself have deterrent effect. This does not mean ultimatum to Communist China, although if Chinese Communists intervene as in Korea we would be confronted by difficult situation.
[Page 429]Response had been encouraging, although U.K. and France had not gone as far as Australia, New Zealand and Thailand. New Zealand and Australia were much concerned and had stoutly faced up to situation.
The Ambassador was informed Secretary was going to have meeting with Ambassadors participating countries before leaving for Geneva in which he hopes at least to set up framework for an ad hoc group to come up with some kind of proposal. No time now for formal treaty procedure, which might come later. In U.S. view this is not extension ANZUS Pact. U.S. satisfied position for Geneva already strengthened. Reply Ambassador’s questions Acting Secretary stated we did not think there was solution short of complete victory, and any compromise would entail grave and increased risk in long term. Also pointed out dangers of solution which would lower French prestige and effects this would have on France’s position in Europe and North Africa. Disappointed that French thus far seemed be offering appearance without substance of independence to Vietnamese. Ambassador expressed view Indochina much less ready prepared independence than Indonesia but recognized Vietnamese would not fight without assurance independence.
With respect Geneva, Acting Secretary stressed importance of allies not compromising selves out of bargaining position prior to beginning negotiations with Communists and thus of “having no place to go.”
- Repeated for information to Djakarta.↩