Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/4–1654

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Jones)

confidential

[Washington,] April 16, 1954.

Subject:

• Secretary’s Efforts to Develop Collective Defense Measures in Southeast Asia.

Participants:

• Ambassador Yang, Korean Embassy
• Philip Han, Counselor, Korean Embassy
• Mr. Drumright, FE
• Mr. Jones, NA

Ambassador Yang stated that he had seen the press communiqués on results of the Secretary’s visit to London and Paris in an effort to develop collective Southeast Asian Defense arrangements.¹ Ambassador Yang stated he had come in on his own initiative and not on governmental instructions. The ROK, he said, had long advocated a Pacific Defense Pact but the United States had not supported this idea. He was very much disturbed that the Republic of Korea and the Chinese Nationalists were being “by-passed” in the arrangements the Secretary was apparently working out. He found it difficult to understand why the French and British who he alleged had not shown real anti-Communist determination should be participants in these arrangements while Korea, whose anti-Communist stand was unquestionable, was being excluded. These recent developments, he asserted, constituted “appeasement” of the British and the French, with Korea and the Chinese Nationalists excluded in order to avoid offending the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador believed that Korea must be considered first in any collective measures of an anti-Communist nature in Asia and expressed the feeling that the exclusion of Korea was an indication that the United States believed Indochina to be more important than Korea. In his opinion, the problem of meeting the threat of Communism was a world-wide problem and he felt it a great mistake to deal with the problem in a piecemeal fashion. He did not believe the American public would understand the “by-passing” of Korea and the Chinese Nationalists in these arrangements and this was evidenced in the large number of queries he had already received. He was so disturbed about these developments that he didn’t believe the ROK would gain anything by going to Geneva where it might be affected by “four power politics” and a further “by-passing” of ROK interests.

Mr. Drumright² emphasized to Ambassador Yang that the development of collective measures in Southeast Asia was only in an exploratory stage, and they had had their genesis in the special crisis in Indochina. These developments did not reflect U.S. judgment with respect to the importance of the Korean problem at Geneva but they did reflect a special urgency with respect to the crisis in Indochina. Thus far, the Secretary had confined his attention only to countries in Southeast Asia. In the long run, however, Korea was not necessarily excluded from participation. Contrary to being an appeasement of the British and French, who had fought in Korea, Mr. Drumright emphasized that the Secretary’s actions were an effort to enlist British and French interests for the first time in such collective measures. In this connection, the Secretary had been most gratified with the results of his visit to London and Paris, and the communiqués have reflected a much wider area of agreement than had heretofore existed.

Mr. Drumright suggested to Ambassador Yang that the Republic of Korea ought to repose more confidence in the United States. In a recent message to President Rhee the Secretary had urged the Republic of Korea to come to Geneva to consult on the problems confronting us there.³ We believed that the focal point at this moment was at Geneva and the great importance of attendance of the Republic of Korea at the Geneva Conference in connection with the crisis in Indochina as well as the Korean problem could not be overemphasized. Mr. Drumright informed Ambassador Yang that a meeting may shortly be called of ten powers involved in Southeast Asia with a view to getting a position lined up before the Geneva Conference.

In connection with the Korean feeling that they should be party to any collective defense measures being developed in Asia, Mr. Drumright pointed out that this would be much easier to work out if Korea could improve its relations with Japan. There were many problems between the countries of Asia which needed to be resolved. He was glad to see that Japan and the Philippines had apparently agreed upon a reparation settlement. It was important to build up step-by-step the friendly relations between the Asian countries in every possible way.

Ambassador Yang stated that he was having his third conversation with Ambassador Iguchi⁴ that afternoon. President Rhee had agreed that all that was necessary to reopen Japanese-ROK negotiations was a statement from the Japanese side that they would withdraw the five points made by Kubota and state that they would abide by the articles of the Japanese Peace Treaty.⁵ Furthermore, President Rhee had told Ambassador Yang that in forming any Pacific Pact if the majority of the countries involved desired Japan’s participation, Korea would go along with this view without question.

1. Regarding documentary treatment of this subject, see the editorial note, p. 400.
2. Everett F. Drumright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.
3. For documentation on the Geneva Conference, see vol. xvi, pp. 1 ff.
4. Sadao Iguchi, Ambassador of Japan.
5. For documentation, see volume xiv.