PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Asia”
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Thai and Malayan Affairs (Landon)
Subject:
- United Action in Southeast Asia.
Participants:
- The Secretary of State
- His Excellency Pote Sarasin, Ambassador of Thailand
- Kenneth P. Landon, PSA
The Thai Ambassador, Pote Sarasin, called at the invitation of the Secretary who referred to his recent speech in New York in which he had made the statement that the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community and that this threat “should be met by united action.”
The Secretary then outlined what he meant by united action. By “united” he meant that the nations in the area of Southeast Asia should unite and should be prepared to use whatever means available to prevent the imposition of Communism on Southeast Asia. He named particularly the three Associated States, Thailand, France, Great Britain, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. He added then that, although not in the area, the United States was actively interested and would contribute in an appropriate fashion. He commented that if nations in the area held back it would be difficult to persuade the American public to contribute.
By “action” the Secretary explained that he meant initially political action by the creation of a community of nations in the area who would make the political decision to act in whatever way they could unitedly against Communism. This might include military means or any other means. The Secretary then invited the Thai Ambassador to ask him any questions.
The Thai Ambassador asked whether this would involve military action primarily. The Secretary said that initially he visualized political agreement to act which might lead on and probably would lead on to the establishment of a military commission representing all of the nations, where they would be able to discuss what military means would be available from each nation according to its ability to oppose Communist aggression.
The Thai Ambassador asked whether the Secretary felt it essential to have this arrangement agreed upon before the Geneva Conference.
[Page 403]The Secretary replied that he hoped there could be political decision and agreement before the Geneva Conference.
The Thai Ambassador then referred to the present status of the three Associated States and the attitude of France on this proposal. The Secretary replied that Thailand was one of the first nations to be approached on this question; that it was his belief, which he had expressed to the French Ambassador, that before the Geneva Conference, if possible, France should make a public declaration of the complete independence of the three Associated States in order that the Governments of those states and their people might feel that they had a real part to play in the situation and would be prepared to make every possible military contribution as well, having something to fight for. The Secretary added that his thinking on many practical aspects of the problems of united action was tentative at this time and that he hoped that after securing agreement in principle to the idea of united action among the free peoples in South-east Asia they could then meet together and work out the practical details.
The Thai Ambassador asked for the Secretary’s views regarding Thailand’s place at the Geneva Conference in respect to the Indochina aspects of the conference, stating that his Government wished to be present at least in an observer status as they were deeply concerned with developments in Indochina. The Secretary replied that he most certainly desired to have a representative of Thailand available at the Geneva Conference for consultation inasmuch as Thailand was most directly concerned with any solution and that he agreed with the idea that Thailand should be present although he re-affirmed the fact that the details of the arrangement of the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference were not yet settled but were under consideration. He added that France will formulate its ideas on the Indochina aspects of the conference beginning on April 12 at Paris. He said further that Thailand was less interested, in his view, in the Korean aspects of the conference except perhaps to be present as a matter of principle, but that it was directly concerned with the Indochina aspects of the conference as Indochina was in Thailand’s back yard. He added again that whatever the status of Thailand’s representative at the Geneva Conference he wanted to be sure to have the benefit of Thailand’s advice at that conference. Just as he was departing the Thai Ambassador remarked that he believed his Government would be agreeable to this concept.
The Thai Ambassador made a final comment that in his view it would be a great mistake if France were to negotiate at Geneva with Ho Chi Minh because any decisions arrived at favorable to Ho Chi Minh would tend to make him a hero in Vietnam and would [Page 404] discount the Governments of the Associated States in the eyes of the Vietnamese people. Ho Chi Minh would then become the savior of their nation. He believed that any negotiations with Ho Chi Minh should be carried on by the Government of Vietnam.