Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 187th Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Thursday, March 4, 19541
[Extracts]
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The following were present at the 187th NSC meeting: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Morrison for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Commissioner Campbell, AEC; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler and Mr. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
5. Report by the Director, Foreign Operations Administration2
Governor Stassen, at the outset of his report, distributed a written outline of his remarks (copy filed in the Minutes of the meeting), and emphasized that he was not going to suggest mature conclusions, but merely ideas which he had picked up in the course of [Page 394] his journey and which might be of value to the Planning Board in its preparation of papers in the future.
Turning to Japan, Governor Stassen referred to anxiety expressed by the Council with regard to the Japanese economy. Actually, he thought, Japan was holding back until she could be assured of reparations settlements with her World War II enemies. We should accordingly urge these nations to reach reasonable settlements with Japan. After that, Governor Stassen predicted, Japan would rebound vigorously. Governor Stassen pointed out that Japan was on the verge of reviving an air force and an aircraft industry, and he thought it might be advantageous for the United States to tie in with this development instead of letting it grow independently of any U.S. guidance.
Turning to Formosa, Governor Stassen said that United States policy there must choose between three alternatives. One, to tell the Chinese Nationalists that they cannot go back to the mainland. Two, to tell them that we will try to build them up to a point where at some future date they could try to reconquer the mainland. Three, to tell them that if a real opportunity arises, such as the outbreak of war or revolution in Communist China, we would look favorably on an attempt to go back to the mainland. Of these three alternatives, Governor Stassen felt that the third was the best. If you tell the Nationalists that they can never go back, the morale and power of the Nationalist Government will inevitably deteriorate. If, on the other hand, you agree to some hypothetical date when they are going to make an attempt to regain control of mainland China, you set for the United States the very heavy task of building the Chinese Nationalists up to the level of power sufficient to enable them to achieve their objectives. But if you agree that they can go back in the event that a civil war in China, for instance, provides a reasonable opportunity, you provide a basis on which the United States can develop the level of forces and the kind of forces required to exploit such an opportunity. Governor Stassen then indicated the type of forces which would be required in such a contingency.
With regard to Indochina, Governor Stassen said that he returned with a strong feeling that the military situation in that area was a great deal better than we had imagined. Indeed, he had found the French actually hoping for a major enemy attack because they were so confident that they could crush it. Of course, it was extremely unfortunate that in the present kind of warfare so many French officers and non-coms were being killed, particularly by the savage mine warfare. He believed that the United States had available shoes which would prevent the maiming of soldiers [Page 395] as a result of the explosion of plastic mines which could not be detected.
Governor Stassen said that General Navarre continued to look forward to the opening of his big offensive on October 1. He did not feel, however, that he had on hand as yet all the supplies he needed to mount this offensive. These supplies would have to be on hand by August 1, and Governor Stassen felt that the United States had most of the needed items in supply in Japan and Okinawa. Accordingly, our logistical back-up of the Navarre offensive should be based on Japan and Okinawa rather than on the round-about line from the United States itself.
Governor Stassen also found a need for a more adequate French military government organization to move in and accomplish the pacification of areas taken away from the enemy in the fighting.
Most significant of all, said Governor Stassen, was the recent conviction of the French that it was really possible to create an effective fighting force out of the Vietnamese natives. The French had now come to believe that their early failures to achieve this objective were chiefly to be explained by the premature use of the native battalions, and they were now being provided with more thorough training.
With respect to U.S. personnel, both military and civilian, Governor Stassen recommended that no individual stay longer there than a period of two years. This was a front line operation.
Of the Emperor Bao Dai, Governor Stassen said he received a very poor impression of an individual who was weak physically and lacking in courage. Nevertheless, his new government contained some very promising officials. Moreover, Governor Stassen thought highly of the King of Cambodia, and believed the situation in that state very hopeful.
Turning to the Philippines, Governor Stassen said that President Magsaysay impressed him most favorably, and he recommended that the United States give the new Philippine President all-out backing. In order to do this it was absolutely essential to defer the date for the imposition of tariffs on Philippine goods scheduled to begin next July 1. If this date could be deferred a year, sufficient time could be given for a complete renegotiation of the Philippine trade agreement.
Governor Stassen believed that things were coming along quite well in Korea. In particular, our Armed Forces Reconstruction Program for rebuilding roads, schools, and hospitals was doing nicely. On the other hand, more must be done to speed up the industrial development of South Korea. The bulk of Korea’s industry had been located in North Korea, and this fact was one reason why so [Page 396] many South Koreans now feel that their country cannot survive without the complementary economy of North Korea.
With regard to Indonesia, Governor Stassen recommended that the United States support the build-up of the police force, which was not as yet Communist-dominated. With regard to the Indonesian economy, Governor Stassen said he had the feeling that it could be built up without resort to heavy expenditures by the United States provided a reparations settlement could be achieved and trade between Indonesia and Japan restored. Japan should have a prominent but not a dominant position in the economy of Indonesia. It was also desirable to secure British, French and Dutch cooperation to facilitate the revival and expansion of regional trade in this whole area.
With regard to the military posture which the United States should assume in the Far East, Governor Stassen recommended that we concentrate on becoming stronger in the air and on the sea. Not only should we develop the strength of our Air Force and Navy in the Far East, but we should demonstrate this strength by frequent showing of the flag in the waters and air space of the Far East. Governor Stassen pointed out that every one of the countries which he visited was eager to build up a jet air force. We might, he thought, consider giving to each of them a squadron or so of jet aircraft, largely for psychological purposes. Our real military strength in the Far East, however, must continue to be the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy. The Asian nations should be urged to concentrate on the development of indigenous land forces. By and large, concluded Governor Stassen, if we continue to show determination, strength and stability (and this did not necessarily mean constant financial aid), he was sure that the Far Eastern area would move along the path we desired.
At the conclusion of Governor Stassen’s report, the President referred to Governor Stassen’s allusion to building up Japan as an industrial nation, as Germany was building itself up in Europe. He did not believe that such a build-up was possible if the present relationship between Japan and Communist China continued. Where was Japan to get the iron and coal which it had formerly got from Manchuria and North China?
Governor Stassen pointed out that there were deposits of coal in Korea, the Philippines and Australia, most of which had scarcely even been explored.
The President nevertheless remained convinced that the Japanese would have to get their coking coal from North China, and Secretary Humphrey said that certainly the basic difficulty was to determine where the Japanese were to secure the raw materials required to feed their industry.
[Page 397]After further discussion of the availability of markets and resources, Governor Stassen pointed out that many Japanese businessmen had expressed to him their fear of reviving the dependence on Manchurian coal and iron. Since these supplies could be cut off by the Chinese Communists without warning, these businessmen expressed a preference for trade connections in South Asia.
The National Security Council:3
Noted and discussed an oral report (based on a written report circulated at the meeting) by the Director, Foreign Operations Administration, on his recent trip to the Far East.
- Drafted by Gleason on Mar. 5.↩
- Stassen had left Washington, Feb. 12, for a tour of the Far East and had arrived back in Washington late in February after stops in Japan, Korea, the Republic of China, Indochina, and the Philippines. While in Manila, he had attended a regional conference with FOA Mission Chiefs in the East Asia-Pacific area. The conference was held Feb. 22–26 (Manila time); see supra.↩
- The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1053. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)↩