Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Thursday, January 21, 19541
[Extracts]
Present at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. The Vice President did not attend the meeting because of his absence from the city. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 6); Mr. Morrison for the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Under Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of the Army and Adm. Duncan for the Secretary of the Navy (for Item 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Bolte for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (for Item 4); Judge Barnes, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Department of State (for Item 6); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler and C.D. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; [Page 382] the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
. . . . . . .
4. United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 5405;2 NSC Actions Nos. 1005–d and 1011–b)3
At the beginning of the discussion of this item, Mr. Cutler pointed out that some confusion existed as to who was responsible for carrying out NSC Actions Nos. 1005–d and 1011–b. In the first instance, the Council decided to refer to the same high-level committee both the problem of further feasible steps to assist in achieving the objectives of the “Laniel-Navarre” Plan (NSC Action No. 1005–d) and the problem of longer-range plans for the contingency of a French defeat or abandonment of Indochina. (NSC Action No. 1011–b). Mr. Cutler then requested the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make his oral report on possible further measures to assist in achieving the success of the Laniel-Navarre Plan which had been worked out during the past week with the Director of Central Intelligence.
Before referring to his report, Admiral Radford said that he had a point which bore on the problem which he would like to present to the Council. He then said that some three years ago, when he was CINCPAC, he had been ordered to make contact with General DeLattre and to talk over with him plans to cover U.S. assistance in the evacuation of the French Union forces from the Tonkin delta in the event that they were forced to abandon this position. DeLattre had at that time observed that in his opinion it was preposterous to talk about an evacuation of French Union forces from Tonkin. Before they could ever get out, they and their Vietnamese friends would all have been massacred. Admiral Radford stated that General DeLattre’s position was sound, and that there was very little point in talking about a French abandonment of Indochina.
With regard to the report on further measures to assist the Navarre Plan, Admiral Radford stated that the JCS paper had been written in collaboration with the CIA and had been very hurriedly formulated. If it were possible for the Council to extend the time, the contents of the report could be greatly improved. It was his understanding that Secretary Kyes4 did not agree with all the measures [Page 383] suggested. Moreover, General O’Daniel would soon be in Indo-china, and it would be very valuable to have a report at once from him on what further steps might usefully be taken.
Admiral Radford pointed out that certain measures of further assistance are already in train. He felt that it was probable that we could mount a “Flying Tiger” operation, as discussed at last week’s Council meeting, though this would be a very expensive undertaking. Also, Admiral Radford wanted to urge the French to step up their efforts in guerrilla warfare.
Finally, Admiral Radford said he wished to submit any report on further measures to assist the French, to the new high-level committee for its views prior to final Council action upon it.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that he understood that the new high-level committee had been set up to deal with the problems of Southeast Asia as a whole. He greatly regretted the possibility that steps which needed to be taken promptly with specific regard to Indochina should necessarily be held up while the new committee deliberated on the whole Southeast Asia area. He reported that the CIA had a team all ready to go out to Indochina and tackle the guerrilla warfare problem. …
Mr. Cutler said that he did not understand that there was any need for delay, and the President said he did not want any delay, indicating that he was anxious that the new high-level committee convene at once in order to figure out additional measures to assist the French. Above all, Indochina, the President insisted, must not be allowed to go by default.
Mr. Cutler pointed out that there was no need for the new high-level committee to report its findings to the Council, since it would be concerned with operational questions rather than policy guidance. Accordingly, the committee could proceed to carry out its own agreed additional measures.
Admiral Radford stated that so far as psychological measures and unconventional warfare were concerned, he would be glad to have the Director of Central Intelligence proceed with his plans . … What concerned him most, continued Admiral Radford, was just how much time we have. He was inclined to feel that the press had exaggerated the emergency in French Indochina, and that things were not as bad as they were represented. He proposed to have General O’Daniel report on this question just as soon as feasible.
Mr. Allen Dulles reminded the members of the Council that psychological operations and the training of guerrillas were long-term operations which required lengthy advance preparation.
Secretary Smith then referred to Premier Laniel’s letter to the President, which had just been received in the State Department, and which requested 35 additional B–26 planes, the continued loan [Page 384] of the C–119 planes, and some 400 repair and maintenance personnel, all to be delivered prior to March 1. Secretary Smith noted that a reply to this letter would have to be prepared promptly.5
The President, turning to General Twining, inquired whether it would cause much trouble to respond favorably to the French request. The President presumed that we could, without undue difficulty, find 400 maintenance personnel from our own Air Force.
General Twining and Admiral Radford pointed out, however, that we could not use personnel of our own Air Force, but would have to hire civilians, a process which might be difficult and time-consuming.
Secretary Smith also questioned the wisdom of substituting American personnel in NATO in order to relieve the French and permit them to send their own maintenance crews to Indochina. This course of action would require heavy pressure on the French by General Gruenther,6 and might result in the grounding of a considerable number of French planes in Europe.
The President expressed his view that we should at least provide the French with some supervisors, though not with the maintenance personnel. If we provided a group of 25 or 26 supervisors and gave the French 35 B–26 planes, the French ought to be able to dig up 400 additional mechanics.
In reply to the President’s suggestion, Secretary Smith said that he and Admiral Radford would get together on a reply to Laniel on Saturday.
Admiral Radford indicated his desire to have a little more time to consider the whole matter of further measures to assist the French in securing the objectives of the Navarre Plan. Not least of these considerations, said Admiral Radford, was the possibility of getting a useful quid pro quo from the French in return for fulfilling this most recent request. The President said he was agreeable to this solution, but he wanted the planes made ready to go when the decision was made.
The President went on to criticize French military strategy in Indochina in view of the large number of battalions immobilized in the Tonkin delta at the moment that the French strongpoint at Dien Bien Phu was heavily invested by the Vietminh.
Mr. Allen Dulles heartily endorsed the idea of a quid pro quo from the French in return for the new equipment,. … The President expressed agreement with Mr. Dulles’ point.
[Page 385]The National Security Council:7
Noted that the President had directed a Special Committee, consisting of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence:
- a.
- To determine urgently further feasible steps to assist in achieving the success of the “Laniel-Navarre” Plan in accordance with NSC 5405, including consideration of the report prepared by the Department of Defense in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency pursuant to NSC Action No. 1005–d. (The Committee will utilize the facilities of and report to the Operations Coordinating Board on this assignment.)
- b.
- To develop longer-range plans for possible future contingencies in Southeast Asia not covered by NSC 5405, including those suggested by the Secretary of State and previously assigned to the director of Central Intelligence by NSC Action No. 1011–b. (The Committee will utilize the facilities of the Operations Coordinating Board and report to the National Security Council on this assignment.)
Note: The above action subsequently transmitted8 to the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Central Intelligence for appropriate implementation.
- Gleason drafted this memorandum on Jan. 22.↩
- Supra.↩
- See footnote 6, p. 365.↩
- Roger M. Kyes, Acting Secretary of Defense.↩
- For text of Laniel’s letter, see telegram 2668 from Paris, Jan. 19, vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 983.↩
- Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, since July 11, 1953.↩
- The following paragraph and its lettered subsections constitute NSC Action No. 1019. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)↩
- On Jan. 25.↩