Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 180th Meeting of the National Security Council Held on Thursday, January 14, 19541
[Extracts]
Present at the 180th meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of [Page 362] the Treasury; the Acting Secretary of the Interior (for Item 1); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 3); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 3); the Under Secretary of State; the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (for Item 3); Col. Bonesteel, Mr. Lehrer and Col. Powell, Department of Defense (for Item 3); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler and C.D. Jackson, Special Assistants to the President; Richard L. Hall, NSC Special Staff; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
4. United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 177; NSC Action No. 1005;2 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 12, 1954)3
Mr. Cutler referred to the action of the Council at last week’s meeting, on NSC 177, called attention to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which had been received since the last meeting, and pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had suggested language to cover the two splits which occurred in NSC 177.
With respect to the split on page 1 of NSC 177, which read “a defeat or an abandonment of the struggle by France would diminish France’s value as a factor in free world defense [in Europe and in North Africa]”,4 Secretary Dulles said that he had a more drastic solution for the disagreement, namely, that the entire sentence, and not merely the bracketed phrase, should be deleted. There were some people who argued that France might be much stronger at home or in North Africa if it got out of French Indochina. The President indicated that the preceding sentence sufficed to cover the problem.
Secretary Dulles went on to argue that the proper focus of interest of the NSC was the effect of a French abandonment of the struggle in Indochina on U.S. security interests, and it was accordingly academic to get into an argument as to the effect of such abandonment on French security interests. After all, continued Secretary Dulles, the United States is not engaged in defending France’s vital interests; and the vital interests of the United States, [Page 363] as the President had pointed out, were adequately covered by the previous sentence.
Mr. Cutler explained and defended the Planning Board’s inclusion of this sentence, but the Secretary of State repeated his contention that it was beside the point to become involved in arguments as to the effect on France of a withdrawal from the struggle in Indochina.
Mr. Cutler observed that the Planning Board had gone down to defeat at the hands of the Council. He would accept the defeat, and turn to paragraph 46, where the next split occurred. This paragraph involved the proposal that if an invasion of Thailand by Communist China appeared imminent, among other things a defensive position should be established at the Kra Isthmus, etc., etc.
General Twining5 pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to this paragraph because they believe that it involved not a policy decision but measures to execute policy.
The President inquired whether the paragraph meant that Thailand itself was abandoned in the contingency of overt Chinese Communist aggression, and Mr. Cutler explained that this was not the case, but that the position of the Kra Isthmus was simply a secondary line of defense. He observed, however, that since this was a military matter it was perhaps appropriate to follow the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The President expressed agreement with the view of the Joint Chiefs that this was really not a policy matter but involved measures for the defense of Malaya, which he believed that the British would attend to as a routine matter. He inquired whether the issue had been taken up in the Standing Group, and whether the British would defend Malaya to the bitter end in the event of attack. General Twining replied that to the best of his knowledge this was the British intention, and the President said that the paragraph could be deleted.
Mr. C. D. Jackson said that he had some concern with regard to the section on Thailand since, except for one paragraph, 44, the remaining courses of action were largely negative in character. Mr. Cutler called Mr. Jackson’s attention to the general courses of action for the whole area of Southeast Asia, at the beginning of the report, paragraphs 11 to 20, and pointed out that these were positive in character and applied to Thailand as much as to any other of the nations of the area. Mr. Jackson expressed himself as satisfied.
[Page 364]Secretary Humphrey then referred to paragraph 45, which indicated that in the event of a serious deterioration of the situation either in Burma or Indochina, the United States would take whatever measures which might be determined as feasible to forestall an invasion of Thailand or the seizure of power by local Thai Communists. Did the phrase “whatever measures”, inquired Secretary Humphrey, include U.S. ground forces?
The President replied that he assumed that the word “feasible” took care of Secretary Humphrey’s concern. He doubted very much whether we would ever consider putting in ground forces as a feasible course of action, but he would say, he continued, that if the situation in Thailand or Burma started to go to hell in a basket, and the introduction of some U.S. ground forces would save Malaya, we would certainly have to do it.
Mr. Cutler said that paragraph 45 did not contemplate the use of U.S. ground forces in Thailand, but that paragraph 49, involving Malaya, did contemplate this possibility.
After some further discussion on this matter, the Secretary of State requested the Council’s permission to make some observations. He then said that despite everything that we do there remained a possibility that the French position in Indochina would collapse. If this happened and the French were thrown out, it would, of course, become the responsibility of the victorious Vietminh to set up a government and maintain order in Indochina. In his opinion, said Secretary Dulles, he did not believe that in this contingency this country would simply say “Too bad; we’re licked and that’s the end of it.” If we could carry on effective guerrilla operations against this new Vietminh government we should be able to make as much trouble for this government as they had made for our side and against the legitimate governments of the Associated States in recent years. Moreover, the costs would be relatively low. Accordingly, an opportunity will be open to us in Southeast Asia even if the French are finally defeated by the Communists. We can raise hell and the Communists will find it just as expensive to resist as we are now finding it. Secretary Dulles recommended that a lot more thought be given to this opportunity instead of wasting time in worrying too much about what we should do if the French were defeated in Indochina or abandoned it.
Mr. Allen Dulles said that the CIA was already working on such plans as these and, indeed, had just sent out one of its best men to survey the possibilities on the spot.
The President observed that he wished we could have done something like this after the victory of the Communists in China. Secretary Dulles answered that of course it was a grave mistake to have allowed the Communists the opportunity to consolidate their position [Page 365] in China. If we had made our plans in advance we might well have succeeded in keeping Communist China in a turmoil. In any event, the possibilities should be kept in mind for Indochina.
Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that the reason that no such suggestions had been made in this paper was the feeling of the Council and the Planning Board that NSC 177 should not even mention the possibility of a French abandonment of their responsibilities in Indochina.
The Vice President commented that while Secretary Dulles’ idea had merit, he was not clear as to where we would find the guerrillas. He predicted that the Vietnamese would not like this role. He also added the thought that the departure of the French from Indo-china might provide just what was lacking to the Vietnamese by way of the will to fight. They might therefore allow us to come in and build up their native forces and in general do for them what the French had thus far failed to do. The Vice President cautioned that this did not mean the introduction of U.S. combat forces.
The President also expressed approval of Secretary Dulles’ idea, and pointed out, apropos of it, the very great role which the Russians had informed him was played by their own guerrillas in defeating the Germans in World War II.
The National Security Council:6
- a.
- Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 177, subject to the following
changes:
- (1)
- Delete the last sentence of paragraph 1–a.
- (2)
- Delete paragraph 46, and renumber succeeding paragraphs.
- b.
- Agreed that the Director of Central Intelligence, in collaboration with other appropriate departments and agencies, should develop plans, as suggested by the Secretary of State, for certain contingencies in Indochina.
Note: NSC 177, as amended, subsequently approved by the President, circulated as NSC 5405,7 and referred to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency designated by the President. The Action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for implementation.
- Drafted by Gleason on Jan. 15.↩
- Included in the extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the NSC meeting held on Jan. 8, printed in vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 947.↩
- Supra.↩
- Brackets in the source text.↩
- Gen. Nathan F. Twining had succeeded Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg as Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, on June 30, 1953.↩
- The two lettered paragraphs that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1011. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)↩
- Infra.↩