Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 163

United States Minutes of the Second Meeting, ANZUS Council: Fourth Session

secret
WAM M–4

Washington, September 10, 1953—3:15 p.m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (30).]

Agenda Item 4—Military Questions

The Secretary welcomed Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was present in a consultative capacity at this session by invitation of the Council. The Secretary referred to Admiral Radford’s close association with ANZUS in terms of his having been the U.S. Military Representative accredited to the Council and expressed satisfaction, from the ANZUS viewpoint, of having as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff an officer so intimately informed about the Pacific in general and about ANZUS in particular.

Admiral Radford expressed his pleasure in being present and emphasized his continuing interest in ANZUS.

The Secretary welcomed Admiral Felix Stump, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, who was appointed in July 1953 as U.S. Military Representative accredited to the Council to succeed Admiral Radford. Admiral Stump had come on from Pearl Harbor to attend the Council meeting and was accompanied by Rear Admiral C.C. Smith, Assistant Chief of Staff for Joint Plans and Operations, CINCPAC.

The Secretary referred to the meeting of September 3–4 which had been held at Pearl Harbor by the Military Representatives (Admiral Stump, General Rowell, and General Gentry) and requested Admiral Stump to report to the Council concerning the meeting and the general activities of the Military Representatives.

Admiral Stump then submitted to the Council the Military Representatives’ Report of September 4, 1953¹ (which is attached as Annex F to the Agreed Record of Proceedings of the second ANZUS Council meeting).

Admiral Stump read from Annex C of the Military Representatives’ Report² the following paragraph concerning the position of the United States with respect to the status of ANZUS military planning:

“The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the report. They consider that it is consistent with their intent that studies of the Military Representatives to the ANZUS Council be used as background material in development of national plans. Further, appropriate parts of the report should be used in connection with further Five-Power coordination. It was observed that no comment had been made by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on the paper submitted by the Australian Military Representatives at the First meeting of the ANZUS MilRep entitled ‘Recognition of the Status of the ANZAM Region as a Possible Theater of War’.”

General Rowell then read from the same Report the following paragraph concerning the Australian position with respect to the status of ANZUS military planning:

“The objective stated in the ANZUS Staff Planner’s Report of associating United Kingdom and France with the course of action recommended has been achieved by the development of the Five-Power Planning Studies which have largely undertaken and absorbed the proposals in the former. Therefore, no further action is now necessary on Report Number One by the ANZUS Staff Planners which, however, provided a most valuable basis for the Five-Power Planning Studies subsequently developed and demonstrated the efficacy and value of the ANZUS military machinery as a joint planning agency.”

General Gentry then read from the same report the following paragraph concerning the New Zealand position toward the status of ANZUS military planning:

“The Report was considered by the Chiefs of Staff who supported the thought that every effort should be made to obtain agreement and recommended support for Five-Power discussions which might lead to an agreed policy regarding action to be taken to counter further Chinese Communist aggression. However, the Chiefs of Staff recommended that the course of action in the ANZUS Report should not be adopted as the basis of ANZUS military policy on the grounds that the ANZUS military organization did not provide a suitable forum for the consideration of Southeast Asian problems when the United Kingdom and France who were intimately concerned were excluded.”

Admiral Stump referred to the joint recommendation to the Council from the three Military Representatives (paragraph C (1) (b)) which reads as follows:

“No other military studies on measures which might be taken to increase mutual assistance and self-help, looking to the improvement of the defense of Australia and New Zealand and their territories as related to the overall strategic defense in the Pacific be undertaken at the present time.”

Admiral Stump said he wished to make it clear that the Military Representatives did not mean that no further studies should ever be undertaken but only that no new studies should be launched now.

Admiral Radford described in detail the achievement of the ANZUS Staff Planners during the past year and emphasized its importance and value not only for the three ANZUS partners but also as the basis for the work of the Five-Power Military Group, which included representatives of the U.K. and France. He wanted to emphasize to the Council that the Planners had been extremely busy since their appointment by the Military Representatives in September 1952 and had done an impressive amount of work. They have taken full advantage of the authority given them and he thought the Council could be proud of them. A further meeting of the Planners was scheduled for September 21 at Pearl Harbor.³ As to their future work, he thought that in three or four months the stage may have been reached where they will have gone as far as they can without further political guidance from the Council.

Admiral Radford referred to the importance, from the point of view of the over-all political situation in the Pacific area, of having minimum publicity with regard to the Five-Power Military Group.

Admiral Stump referred to his satisfaction in the association he now enjoyed with General Rowell and General Gentry. It was gratifying to know one’s opposite numbers on such a basis and to be able to communicate with them freely and with complete confidence.

The Secretary expressed his satisfaction over the relationships established among the Military Representatives and their Staff Planners; such relationships meant that emergency problems could be dealt with far more satisfactorily.

Mr. Casey expressed gratification over the reports from Admiral Radford and the Military Representatives and over the excellent relationships they had established. A useful plan had been produced with regard to developments in the cold war which might affect ANZUS and he wondered whether the Military Representatives believed that it was practical and desirable to undertake the additional task of planning in terms of a possible hot war.

Mr. Webb expressed New Zealand’s appreciation for the work of the Military Representatives and their Planners, who had certainly paved the way for the accomplishments of the Five-Power Military Group. He was glad to join in the welcome to Admiral Radford.

Admiral Radford said that as he looked at the situation in the Pacific he felt the planning initiated in ANZUS and carried on in the Five-Power Group was not confined to the cold war. Every possible contingency of Communist aggression in the area had been covered, except for the defense of Korea and Japan. The studies which had been done were common to both a cold and a hot war. They covered the situation as it stands today. If there were a global emergency, they could serve as the basis for detailed planning. If, meanwhile, there were major changes in the political alignment, the planners would have to go to work again.

Ambassador Spender expounded at some length the view that there was insufficient planning, coordination, and understanding among the ANZUS partners with respect to the contingency of global war. Australia had certain forces and certain industrial resources. She did not know, however, how she would be expected to use these in global war. Much time and effort had been lost in 1942 because of the lack of understanding and coordination which existed at that time. More specifically, he wondered whether plans should not be undertaken with regard to Australia’s role on the side of supplies and logistics.

Admiral Radford said that the Military Representatives and their Staff Planners had neither the terms of reference nor the staff support to enable them to undertake studies along this line. He did not know what the situation in Australia might be, but in the United States such studies, if he understood Ambassador Spender correctly, would be more within the province of the Office of Defense Mobilization than of the Department of Defense. Moreover, he thought that the problem was one for handling at the government-to-government level rather than at the military level. He would like to hear the views of General Rowell and General Gentry.

General Rowell agreed that the problem was not one which could be handled by the Military Representatives and their Planners, who had neither the authority nor the staff for such an enterprise.

General Gentry concurred in this view.

Mr. Casey said that Australia had an office comparable to the U.S. Office of Defense Mobilization, although not so highly developed as the latter. Australia’s capacity to produce military items exceeds the power to finance them. Moreover, it can produce quantities in excess of its own military needs. His Government could supply a list of categories of the military items in question.

Admiral Radford said that such a list would be useful and that he thought the Office of Defense Mobilization would be interested in having it.

Mr. Casey referred to the question of standardization. It had been a problem with respect to the Australian offer of assistance to the French in Indochina.

It was the consensus that there should be consideration through direct diplomatic channels of the Australian proposal directed toward the most effective use, in the common effort, of the production capacity of Australia and New Zealand in the field of defense supplies.

Agenda Item 5—Possible Broadening of ANZUS Relationships

Ambassador Munro said he understood the relationship between ANZUS and the Five-Power Liaison Group but could not visualize the relationship betwen ANZAM and ANZUS. He would be interested to hear Admiral Radford’s views on this.

Admiral Radford recalled that ANZAM is the British Commonwealth’s relationship for mutual defense matters between Australia, New Zealand, and the U.K. Military relationships between CINCPAC and ANZAM had been taken care of by the naval liaison arrangements worked out in the Collins-Radford Conference. The necessary liaison between ANZAM and ANZUS stemmed from Australian and New Zealand membership in both organizations. Ambassador Munro said he would be satisfied if Admiral Radford thought that there was sufficient liaison under present arrangements.

Ambassador Spender said that it might be helpful to meet the British views, if the U.S. did not object by having a U.K. staff officer participate in discussions by the Australian Defense machinery of ANZUS preparations and reports on military aspects.

Admiral Radford said he saw no objection to this procedure, although he thought the argument was academic because the U.K. was already working in the Five-Power Liaison Group, and he assumed that any such participation in the planning stage was acceptable.

Mr. Casey asked if there were any link that could be created to satisfy the U.K.

Admiral Radford did not feel that there was a good case for this. The problem arose from the interest of others who have a perhaps greater right to inclusion in such arrangements than do the British. U.K. interests are largely taken care of in that part of the world through ANZAM, and U.S., Australian and New Zealand interests by ANZUS. In regard to the Five-Power Group, it had been agreed that the Commanders-in-Chief would meet later, perhaps in Singapore or Saigon, but this may arouse Philippine sensibilities. To date we have done very well in avoiding the accusation of setting up a white NATO in the Pacific. In conclusion, Admiral Radford thought that U.K. interests are so well taken care of through membership in the Five-Power Liaison Group and ANZAM that they would have nothing to gain in having a formal relationship with ANZUS.

Mr. Casey said it had been decided that the present membership for ANZUS is final, but that this did not stop embarrassing questions being asked.

Ambassador Spender said there was agreement on the substance of the question but that words must be found to diminish or stop the public argument.

Admiral Radford said he felt that if the U.K. would understand our situation in the Pacific area he believed these irritations could be stopped at the source. The longer limited membership is retained, the better.

Mr. Webb said he had cabled his Government to ask if he could make a categorical turn down on the question of U.K. participation since it would be impossible to equivocate on the question of whether it had been proposed. He would like to be able to state that for various good reasons ANZUS cannot be enlarged.

Ambassador Spender agreed that ANZUS was most effective as” it is now and that, to the extent that it is enlarged, its effectiveness would be diminished.

Admiral Radford said he expected to visit Europe in the fall and would talk to the British Chiefs very frankly in an effort to gain their support. He believed that the First Lord of the Admiralty already accepted our position.

The Secretary said he was anxious not to do anything that would indicate any semblance of discord between the U.S. and U.K. It was not going to help U.S.-U.K. relations if the impression were created that the U.S. was the principal obstacle to U.K. admission, as sometimes suggested in England. The question of British participation was originally raised when we were thinking of a larger treaty group. The British were consulted and said that they would not want to be party to a treaty group of that size. This raised the question of French and Dutch participation which would have made of ANZUS a white NATO. Our own Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed out the difficulties of British inclusion, if this meant that we would have assumed responsibilities with respect to Hong Kong and Malaya. The British then suggested a series of separate bilateral treaties. It must be noted the entire Pacific security system was still in process of development. If we try to go too fast, we might lose all our present assets. British inclusion would be deeply resented by our Asiatic friends. Moreover, if it was desired to go down that path, we would be willing to attempt it, but it would be against our better judgment. Any attempt to enlarge ANZUS would end in its dissolution.

Ambassador Spender agreed with this analysis. He felt however that British political pressure would continue until it was met squarely and that the ANZUS Council must speak with one voice.

Mr. Casey said he had thought earlier it would be best not to make any public reference to the U.K. membership problem, but now felt that the Council as a whole should make a statement in the name of all three members.

Mr. Webb said that he had always taken pains to emphasize that ANZUS decisions are decisions of all three members. The press would ask if British membership had been proposed and he felt it would be better to face the issue and state what had been decided.

Training Programs

Mr. Casey again mentioned the training of foreign officers in Australia and told Admiral Radford of the many applications from over a dozen countries which Australia had received. He said that his Government was of a mind to accept the applications from friendly countries and asked for Admiral Radford’s views on the subject.

Admiral Radford said that he certainly would urge that they be accepted since this was one of the most important aspects of our joint striving toward security in the area.

Communiqué

The Council agreed upon the text of a Communiqué summarizing the proceedings and conclusions of the meeting.⁴ (The Communiqué, which was issued to the press immediately following this Session, will be found in the Agreed Record of Proceedings, Annex E.)

The fourth and last session of the Second ANZUS Council Meeting was adjourned at 6:15 p.m.

1. For a portion of this Report, the Agreed Record of Proceedings, see p. 337.
2. Identical to the Report cited in footnote 1 above.
3. See footnote 1, p. 355.
4. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 28, 1953, p. 414.