Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 163
United States Minutes of the Second Meeting, ANZUS Council: First Session
WAM M–1
[Here follows a list of persons present (29). The Australian Delegation, led by Casey, included Ambassador Spender and Lieutenant General Rowell. Webb headed the New Zealand Delegation, which included Ambassador Munro and Major General Gentry. Dulles’ aides included Livingston Merchant, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Robertson; and Admiral Stump.]
[Page 341]Part I: Open Session
Secretary Dulles, joined by Foreign Minister Casey and Foreign Minister Webb, convened the Second ANZUS Council Meeting in the diplomatic reception room. The Secretary, Mr. Webb and Mr. Casey made brief welcoming statements before the television, newsreel, radio and press representatives.1
Part II: Executive Session
The Secretary took the chair as host and asked if the provisional agenda were acceptable. Both visiting Ministers answered in the affirmative.
[Here follows discussion of Item 1 of the agenda, “Administrative Details”.]
Agenda Item 2—Survey of World Situation Soviet Aims and Intentions
The Secretary asked who would like to start the survey and Mr. Webb said that he and Mr. Casey had thought that it should be the Secretary.
The Secretary said that all our international thinking revolves around the estimate of the intentions of Soviet Russia and the Soviet Communist Party. The Government and the Party are not quite the same thing. They are motivated by the same purposes but their procedures are different.
The Party is the real source of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union itself, but the interplay between the two is close. Soviet intentions cannot be deduced solely from a study of Soviet foreign policy declarations. One cannot place reliance solely on decisions made by the Government. The commitments made by Litvinoff to President Roosevelt, such as not to carry on subversive activities, were made by the Soviet Government and contained many fine promises which were never lived up to. The excuse later was that the failure to live up to them was due to activities conducted by the Party and not the Government. This duality is difficult to deal with and it is difficult to know where confidence can be placed.
We feel that recent developments as reflected in the “peace offensive” probably do not indicate any change in basic policy or in the creed of the Party. But one cannot always be certain and must always hope that in the course of time there will be changes in the basic creed of the Soviet Communist Party. The Secretary said he felt there was no change now except in tactics. Stalin’s death created internal fissures and jealousies which have made it convenient to relax external pressure in order to strengthen the internal situation. [Page 342] Evidently the Soviets feel it is wise to relax tensions while concentrating on overtaking the atomic supremacy of the free world. The Russians are making considerable progress in this field, although they are still behind the free world. The Secretary said we cannot tell to what extent they have developed atomic “know-how” themselves, or to what extent they have obtained it through leakages of our own “know-how”. We make a mistake if we minimize the fact that within the Soviet Union there is a high degree of technical skill. This is partly native but they possess also the top skill of the German scientists in both atomic weapons and guided missiles. They probably hope to develop skill in non-conventional weapons so as to attain a de facto standoff in this field in order to allow them to pursue other measures with greater confidence than at present. In this area, the Secretary stressed, a point is reached where one must be guided by absolutes rather than by comparatives.
One must also bear in mind the fact that the doctrine of occasional withdrawal and relief of tensions is a basic part of Communist theory. The tactic of retreat, they hold, can be just as important as the tactic of advance since you thereby demoralize the enemy and make it possible to advance more effectively. While change is always possible, we must recognize that what is going on is always consistent with the creed of the Soviet Communist Party, i.e. with the belief that “peaceful co-existence” is impossible in the long run and with the objective of believing [achieving?] a single world “Socialist State”.
The major “peaceful” action—which we do not believe is necessarily indicative of any basic change of approach is the armistice in Korea. The Secretary was not certain if the armistice had come about due to a greater desire for “peaceful co-existence” or because the war had reached the point of diminishing returns through increased strains on the Chinese and the Russians. It could be a desire to relax tensions temporarily or simply a military situation on which they thought it in their best interests to liquidate. Other tests will be available in Germany and Austria and perhaps in Indochina.
[Here follows discussion of developments in Europe, the Middle East, and Korea.]
- These statements are printed in Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 28, 1953, p. 415.↩