790.5/8–2153
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1
Dear Mr. Secretary: It is the purpose of this letter to request the views of the Department of Defense on the question of possible United Kingdom participation in ANZUS, perhaps at the military level. The question is likely to be raised by the Australian and New Zealand Ministers at the forthcoming meeting of the ANZUS Council, which has been tentatively set for September 9–10 in Washington.2
As the Department of Defense knows, the problem of possible United Kingdom participation in ANZUS was considered at the first meeting of the ANZUS Council at Kaneohe in August 1952. It will be recalled in this regard that Article VIII of the ANZUS Treaty authorizes the Council to establish consultative relationships with other states or regional organizations. The United Kingdom had expressed to each of the three Governments its strong desire, based on its extensive interest in the Pacific as well as on its Commonwealth ties with Australia and New Zealand, to become associated in some manner with ANZUS, at least in an observer status.
Although the Council was sympathetically inclined toward the United Kingdom position it concluded that it would be premature at this early stage in the Council’s development for it to arrange for United Kingdom participation in ANZUS or indeed to establish relationships with any other states or regional organizations. The Council had in mind that the participation of the United Kingdom in ANZUS at this time would expose the enterprise to pressures from other governments seeking to participate, notably the Philippines, France, Korea, Japan, and the Netherlands—pressures it would be very difficult to withstand. The Council considered that the irritations engendered by such pressures would militate against the growth of the general spirit of the cooperation in the Pacific which it is the fundamental purpose of ANZUS to foster. The Council also had in mind the necessity of avoiding any step carrying the possible implication that ANZUS represented in the Pacific either a revival of “western imperialism” or an instrument of “white supremacy”.
[Page 336]Nevertheless, recognizing the interest of the United Kingdom in the Pacific area and the importance of the Commonwealth ties between Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the Council agreed that there was nothing in its discussions which it would have any reason to withhold from the United Kingdom and it decided that the United Kingdom should be kept fully and currently informed of its proceedings.
The United Kingdom Government has continued to be dissatisfied by its “exclusion” from ANZUS and has made several attempts during the past year to persuade the three ANZUS Governments to reconsider their position. Prime Minister Churchill discussed the matter with President-Elect Eisenhower at New York last January and said that Prime Minister Menzies of Australia had suggested the possibility of a liaison relationship between ANZUS and ANZAM (the British-Australian-New Zealand Military Planning Organization for the defense of Malaya and Australasia).
Another suggestion (which originated with Sir Frederick Shedden, Australian Secretary of Defense)3 is that an officer of one of the United States services, other than the separate service attaches at Melbourne, might be accredited directly to the Australian Department of Defense and sit, together with the senior United Kingdom Defense representative, on the Australian Defense Committee when it considers ANZUS or ANZAM matters. Sir Frederick indicated that such an arrangement would be acceptable to his Department even without reciprocal access or accreditation of an Australian officer to the Department of Defense in Washington, which he realizes would not be acceptable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A third possibility is that advantage might be taken of the fact that high-ranking officers of the United Kingdom services are occasionally seconded to the Australian and New Zealand services; one of these officers might be designated to participate in the Military Representatives group accredited to the ANZUS Council.
These suggestions, and there might well be others, all involve some kind of United Kingdom participation in or liaison relationship with ANZUS at the military level. It is fully appreciated that they are therefore of obvious and direct concern to the Department of Defense.
For its part, the Department of State, bearing in mind not only the substantial interests of the United Kingdom in the Pacific area and the significance of the Commonwealth ties between the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand but also the importance of the Anglo-American relationship, would like to find some means to meet the United Kingdom position without risking the difficulties [Page 337] which, as noted above, influenced the Council’s decision a year ago. Apart from the fact that there would be certain advantages to the ANZUS Council in having a relationship with the United Kingdom, the adoption of some means of meeting the United Kingdom position would remove the pressures to which the three ANZUS Governments have been subjected and would eliminate the serious concern which has been felt in London over the “exclusion” of the United Kingdom from ANZUS.
In view of the imminence of the forthcoming Council meeting, the Department would appreciate receiving as soon as possible the views of the Department of Defense concerning this problem. Officers of the Department of State would of course be happy to discuss the matter with officers of your Department if that were desired.
Sincerely yours,
- Drafted in BNA and cleared with FE and G.↩
- Documents in file 790.5 for July, August, and September of 1953 indicate that the three powers had settled upon these particular dates so as to enable Casey and Webb to attend the Council meeting prior to their previously scheduled attendance at the Eighth Session of the UNGA, which opened in New York on Sept. 15.↩
- Sir Frederick was Permanent Secretary of that Department.↩