Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

751J.00/5–753: Telegram

The Consul General at Singapore (Baldwin) to the Department of State¹

secret

Singapore, May 7, 1953—7 p.m.

1111. Mytel 1104, May 6.² Seen from here, Laos invasion³ obviously upsets security and stability of rest of SEA and will presumably if successful, lead to series increasingly climatic tests in even wider area. If invasion part of larger Communist plan, as seems likely, it is first post-Korean challenge of determination and ability of free world to oppose Communist aggression in SEA. While generally recognition of this may be momentarily obscured in SE Asian minds by anti-colonialism, Asian leaders here and probably elsewhere in SEA will understand its significance. Firm and effective military resistance to Viet Minh in Laos by French with US and other Western assistance will, by demonstrating the willingness and ability anti-Communist forces led by West to check Communist incursions, bolster will of Asians to resist. Conversely, if Viet Minh consolidate position in Laos thus strengthening base for further aggression, fellow-travelers and Communist parties will take heart and convert waverers while indigenous opposition fades.

Tendency in SEA to attribute some “pure nationalism” to Viet Minh aims will make more difficult characterization of invasion as “naked aggression.” Failure to argue convincingly, in intensive, well-coordinated psychological offensive that invaders are not rebel Nationalists asserting right to self-determination but instruments of Communist aggression would strengthen Communist hand wherever anti-colonial sentiment strong in SEA. Such psychological offensive would be particularly necessary if extent or nature of military assistance to oppose invasion aroused fears or suspicions of timorous or ultra-nationalistic Asians.

Urgent need to restore waning British confidence in France suggests desirability of closest tripartite high level coordination with view to reaching agreement on immediate steps, including political moves, to meet present threat.

Deterioration of Thai situation would, of course, have most damaging effect here and immensely complicate problem of saving Malaya from Communism.

Baldwin

1. Repeated for information to London, Paris, Bangkok, Saigon, Kuala Lumpur, and Penang.
2. Not printed.
3. For documentation on the invasion of Laos by Viet Minh forces in the spring of 1953, see vol. xiii, Part 1, pp. 468 ff.