033.46E11/12–254
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
(Byroade) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, December 2, 1954.
Subject:
- Talk with Ceylonese Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala
I. Attached as Tab A1
is a chronology of the Kotelawala talks. Attached for your signature as Tab
B2 is a memorandum
for the President on the Kotelawala visit. Before his appointment with you at
4:30 p.m., December 7, the Prime Minister will have talked with the
President. Sir John’s
meeting with you, which might last for forty-five minutes to an
hour, is his only talk in the Department.
The Defense Department has had a long-standing interest in base
facilities in Ceylon. Currently Defense requirements are understood
to be communications facilities for the Army and Navy and, possibly,
for the Air Force; the Air Force also desires landing and transit
rights at three Ceylon air fields. We have not so far deemed
circumstances propitious for negotiating with the Ceylon Government
in this matter. Until Ceylon is prepared to adhere to the Manila
Pact, it is unlikely to favor American bases in Ceylon. However, the
Defense Department is not disposed to allocate funds for obtaining
these facilities beyond the actual cost of construction. Attached as
Tab C2 is a memorandum
on Defense requirements in Ceylon.
II. Possible points for your meeting with Sir John follow:
A. General International
Situation
The Prime Minister will be interested in knowing your personal views
on the general international situation with emphasis on Indochina
and Southeast Asia.
B. Recommended United States
Position–Regional South Asian Conferences
- 1.
- We appreciate … Sir
John’s efforts to impress on some of his
colleagues the realities of the Communist threat in Southeast
Asia. We were gratified that the Conference did not take any
action which made the Geneva talks on Indochina more
difficult.
- 2.
- Very little is known about plans for a so-called “Afro-Asian”
Conference which may be held in Djakarta in the spring. We
understand that the Government of Ceylon is not especially
enthusiastic about such a Conference. We wonder whether the
proposed Conference
[Page 1627]
can accomplish much of a constructive nature in view of the
diverse interests and differences of view among the possible
participants. If, as seems possible, the Conference finds common
agreement only on such matters as European colonialism or
racism, the results would not contribute to the solidarity of
the free nations. We hope Sir
John will exercise a moderating influence on the
deliberations of the Conference if it is held.
Anticipated Ceylon Position
Sir John may be expected to
express understanding of our views as to the dangers of such a
conference. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that he would be inclined
to oppose the Conference when it comes up for discussion at the next
meeting of the “Colombo Powers” in Djakarta in December.
C. Ceylon’s Desire for United
States Economic Assistance—(If Sir John raises the question,
which is expected.)
Recommended United States Position
- 1.
- We would be sympathetic to assistance to Ceylon if Ceylon’s
course were to be consonant with the objectives of the Battle
Act. At this time, however, Ceylon’s present rubber trade with
Communist China stands as a bar to American help to Ceylon, and
whether or not developments will be such as to permit us to
offer aid to Ceylon cannot now be forecast. Nevertheless, in
view of our sympathy for Sir
John’s problem, we shall be glad to have another
examination of Ceylon’s difficulties.
- 2.
- If Sir John contrasts
the application of the Battle Act to Ceylon with its application
to other countries trading with the Soviet bloc, we may point
out that the difference is that Ceylon’s trade is with Communist
China (as contrasted with trade controls on the European Soviet
bloc) and on a regular contractual basis in large quantities,
rather than on a spot basis as has been the case of other
countries.
Anticipated Ceylon Position
While Sir John is well aware
of the situation as regards the Battle Act, he desires American aid
and may wish to explore means whereby Ceylon might become eligible
for it. He might suggest that substantial American aid extending
over a period of years would be sufficient to allow the Government
of Ceylon, from both the political and economic points of view, to
decide to abandon the Chinese rubber trade.
D. The Manila Pact
Recommended United States Position
1. We hope that Ceylon eventually will associate itself with the
Manila Pact. We understand, however, that public opinion in Ceylon
presently does not favor adherence to the Pact. We would not wish
Ceylon to adhere to the Pact if such action would lead to Sir John’s dismissal as Prime
Minister.
Anticipated Ceylon Position
Sir John has informed us that
he personally favors the Manila Pact in principle but that public
opinion is opposed. The Ceylon Government has not made a final
decision on the question of adherence. Last September it was
particularly interested in the possible economic benefits which
Ceylon might derive from adherence. Sir
John might take the position that Ceylon public
opinion could be won over to adherence
[Page 1628]
if he could hold out to the public the
prospect of substantial economic benefits in the form of foreign aid
and an assured alternative market for Ceylon’s rubber. He may also
mention the problem which India’s opposition to the Manila Pact
poses for Ceylon.
[Tab B]
Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the
President3
secret
Washington, December 4,
1954.
Subject:
- Your Talk with the Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, 12:30
p.m., December 6, 1954
The Prime Minister will be accompanied by Ambassador Crowe and Acting Assistant
Secretary Jernegan, as
well as by Mr. R. S. S. Gunewardene, the Ambassador of Ceylon
and Mr. Gunasena de Soyza, Permanent Secretary of the Ceylon
Ministry of External Affairs.
Sir John heads the United
National Party, is personally strongly anti-Communist, and has
been Prime Minister since October 1953. Sir John told Ambassador
Crowe that he would
like to talk to you “about Communism”. You might ask him for his
views on the communist threat in Asia and his ideas on how best
to meet it.
I shall see Sir John in
the afternoon of December 7. I expect he will want to discuss
the general international situation particularly in Southeast
Asia, and to explore the question of American economic
assistance to Ceylon. While we would be sympathetic to
assistance to Ceylon if Ceylon’s course were to be consonant
with the objectives of the Battle Act, Ceylon’s present trade in
rubber with Communist China which it has been carrying on since
soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea makes Ceylon
ineligible to receive American financial or economic assistance.
We recognize that Ceylon’s present rubber trade to which we are
opposed is based on economic considerations and does not imply
sympathy for Communist China or communism generally.
For your information we are studying the possibility of offering
Ceylon a modest amount of aid if it on its part should take some
action which we could regard as bringing its policies into
closer conformity with the purpose of the Battle Act. At the
moment, however, it is not possible to offer aid to Ceylon, nor
desirable to discuss our present policy review with Sir John.
Sir John conceived the
idea of periodic meetings of the “Colombo Powers” (Ceylon,
India, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia). His influence at the
first conference last April was generally favorable to our
interests.… We want Ceylon to maintain an attitude friendly
toward the United States at such regional meetings including the
projected “Afro-Asian” Conference in Djakarta.
[Page 1629]
We hope Ceylon will eventually adhere to the Manila Pact,
although public opinion in Ceylon presently does not favor
adherence. Ceylon has little to contribute to area defense now
except its strategic location and facilities including the Naval
base at Trincomalee and a large air base which the United
Kingdom already uses.
Sir John once was active
in the Ceylon Light Infantry and rose to the rank of Colonel. He
might be pleased by an allusion to his military experience.
He will present a silver inkstand to you.
[Tab C]
top
secret
[Washington,] December 1,
1954.
United States Military
Requirements In Ceylon4
Since 1948, the year of Ceylon’s independence, the Department of
Defense has expressed needs, varying from time to time, for
installations in Ceylon primarily in the field of
communications. The need for Defense facilities in Ceylon will
exist as long as there is a possibility of allied strategic air
operations in that part of the world. Ceylon’s importance as a
communications link was emphasized by the airlift of French
troops to Indochina via Ceylon earlier this year, following
India’s refusal to permit the use of Indian facilities for this
operation.
In its last communication on the subject, the Department of
Defense notified the Department of State by letter dated April
16, 1954, that the United States Air Force requirement for a
heavy bomber staging base in Ceylon had been deleted because of
the delay in securing base rights in Ceylon; that the US Air
Force communication requirement was being reviewed in the light
of the doubtful prospects for obtaining rights in Ceylon; that
the Navy communication requirement in Ceylon might likewise be
modified; and that the Army communication requirement remained.
The Department of Defense stated further that in the eventuality
negotiating prospects with Ceylon improved it would desire to
reassess the military planning for that area.
The requirements as of December 1 are understood to be
communications facilities on the part of the Army and the Navy,
and possibly communications facilities on the part of the Air
Force. The Air Force has a requirement for transit and landing
rights at three existing airfields in Ceylon.
[Page 1630]
Our Ambassador in Colombo initiated informal discussion with the
Ceylonese Prime Minister (then Don
Stephen Senanayake) in January 1949 with a view
toward the establishment in Ceylon of a Navy communications
facility comprising one officer and twenty men. The Prime
Minister evaded a reply to this request, stating that he wished
to defer consideration of it until clarification and more
specific definition was given to the terms of the United
Kingdom-Ceylon Defense Agreement of 1947. Such clarification
apparently never was reached. Furthermore, the Office of the
High Commissioner for the United Kingdom at Colombo on January
29, 1954, informed the US Embassy that negotiations were
initiated in 1951 for drawing up a more detailed defense
agreement but that those negotiations were never brought to a
conclusion. The fact that the UK has been unable over a period
of years to reach a detailed agreement with Ceylon suggests that
the US would encounter even greater difficulties in bringing
negotiations to a successful conclusion; Ceylon is a member of
the Commonwealth and its ties with the UK are well recognized
and much closer than those with the US. The United States
Government did however obtain in 1949, on a secret basis and
without the use of US Navy personnel on shore, permission from
the Government of Ceylon for the lease of oil storage facilities
of the British Navy in Ceylon.
Since the original approach to the Prime Minister the Department
has from time to time queried our Embassy regarding the
prospects for favorable negotiation for Defense facilities. Each
time the answer has been that prospects were unfavorable and
that a substantial quid pro quo would be
required before they could be improved.
Major factors in an assessment of Ceylon’s attitude toward the
granting of base facilities are:
- 1.
- The defense of Ceylon is already provided for by its
Defense Agreement with the United Kingdom.
- 2.
- Ceylon desires substantial economic and financial
assistance from the US. Since 1951 US aid to Ceylon has
been suspended because of its trade in rubber with
Communist China.
- 3.
- Ceylonese public opinion favors noninvolvement in the
“cold war” or in a possible “hot war”; the US is more
closely identified with the “cold war” than is the
UK.
- 4.
- Ceylon fears the possibility of eventual domination by
India; this is balanced by a general respect for India
and fear that closer involvement with the US may make
settlement of the important question of Indians in
Ceylon even more difficult than it is now.
- 5.
- Ceylon probably considers that military involvement
with the US might force an end to its progressively less
lucrative, but still financially attractive, trade in
rubber with Communist China. Ceylon is loath to give up
this trade unless it receives comparable financial
benefits.
Ceylon’s failure to attend the Manila conference last September
and its failure since then to adhere to the Manila Pact leave
little doubt
[Page 1631]
that
Ceylon is not prepared at this time to grant facilities for
United States defense installations in Ceylon without a
substantial quid pro quo. Ceylon’s
official attitude on the Manila Pact is, however, that it “is
prepared to maintain an open mind on the subject”. The Prime
Minister informed our Ambassador on September 16 that the
Cabinet had agreed with him not to make a decision regarding the
Manila Pact until after the Prime Minister’s return from his
visit to the United States.5
