689.90D/10–2954
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Pakistan—Afghanistan Affairs (Thacher)1
Subject:
- Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations
Participants:
- Mr. M. K. Ludin, Ambassador of Afghanistan
- NEA—Mr. Byroade
- SOA—Mr. Thacher
Ambassador Ludin said he believed the new cabinet in Pakistan2 served simply to strengthen what were the real governing influences in the country: the Civil Service and the Army. He expressed particular interest in the selection of Dr. Khan Sahib (pre-partition Chief Minister of NWFP who was kept in jail or detained by the Pakistan Government until a few months ago) for membership in the cabinet. The Ambassador declared that if Dr. Khan Sahib and his brother Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan (“the frontier Gandhi”) were permitted to reactivate their political machine in the Frontier Province they would soon have political control of the Pathan tribesmen in Pakistan. The Ambassador believed that these two influential leaders could be expected to take a pro-Pakistan attitude on the subject of Pushtunistan. Thus if a plebiscite were held it would probably result in a verdict against Pushtunistan and in favor of Pakistan. The Ambassador felt such a result would be accepted by Afghanistan and would represent a gracious settlement of the Pushtunistan problem.
Mr. Byroade said that plebiscites do not always bring a happy solution. There are usually hurt feelings on one side or the other. Our hope [Page 1427] is that Afghanistan and Pakistan will continue to work for steps that will bring them closer together. Prime Minister Mohammed Ali had expressed his willingness while he was here to consider definite action to bring the two countries together. He did not think it impossible to do this and he did not think that useful action need be put off forever. We believe the best way of promoting unity between the two countries is through continuation of quiet bilateral talks. However, we should like to do anything we can to promote the idea of unity between the two countries although we are not certain now exactly how we can help. But there is a lot of interest in this idea in the United States Government from the President on down. The President had in fact mentioned to Mr. Byroade his interest in the possibility of Pakistan and Afghanistan drawing together.
Ambassador Ludin asked whether any decisions had been made in the U.S. Government concerning the problems discussed by Prince Naim during his visit to this country (i.e. Afghan interest in securing military and economic assistance).3 Mr. Byroade said he regretted that the Secretary’s absence and heavy load of other duties had made it impossible for him to give thoughtful and careful attention to this problem. Mr. Byroade expressed his intention to have further discussion of Afghan problems with the Secretary, but he wanted to be sure the Secretary had an opportunity to consider them with the thoroughness they deserved.
Ambassador Ludin asked whether it might be possible for the United States to say something to the Turks which would encourage them to provide Afghanistan with further assistance in training army officers.
Mr. Byroade said that during his visit to Turkey last spring he had discussed the desirability of providing military training opportunities there for officers from armies of the other Middle East nations. In general the Turks had expressed sympathy with this idea.
The Ambassador said that whenever we had reached any decisions on the questions placed before us by the Afghans he would be glad to come in and hear our decisions, and that he would leave further initiative in discussion of these matters with Mr. Byroade.
- Initialed by Byroade, indicating his approval.↩
- On Oct. 24, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali announced a reorganization of the cabinet. The reorganization was completed on Oct. 28 with the inclusion of Dr. M. L. A. Khan Sahib, the leader of half a million members of the Khudai Khidmatgars (Servants of God). (New York Times, Oct. 25 and 29, 1954)↩
- See the memoranda of conversation by Thacher, Oct. 8, pp. 1420 and pp. 1421.↩