357.AB/3–1754: Telegram
The Deputy United States Representative at the United Nations (Wadsworth) to the Department of State
509. Re US observers in Kashmir. Cordier called on me this noon at his request on Kashmir observer question. Dayal has asked to see [Page 1348] Hammarskjold immediately on latter’s return Saturday morning and appointment has been arranged. Subsequently, Menon, planning to leave this weekend, also has requested to see Hammarskjold, among other things to express his personal views on same point.
Cordier anxious to have fullest possible expression US views in order brief Hammarskjold for these meetings.
First question Cordier raised on “strictly confidential” basis was whether consideration should be given to any “face-saving” formula for Nehru, for example reducing number American observers to 10. On objections raised by us he did not press this point.
He thought it not impossible Dayal may present formal request Saturday. More likely, Cordier thought, question of travel document might be pressed as means of determining whether observer personnel is US or UN. Laissez-passer would not be appropriate, said Cordier, but he referred to possibility using “travel form” such as used by Bennike and previously by Bernadotte for observer teams in Palestine. We indicated we did not like this idea. He asked us to get definitive comment which we said we would do.
Cordier said he had information indicating that if Nehru cannot win on principle he will do so by bringing charges against individuals. In this regard Cordier said that some observers had made free use of UN radio system in area for personal messages but nothing derogatory to India contained therein. Also “irresponsible letters” had been written charging some observer personnel with partisan political activity. However, Cordier said there was no sound evidence to support such charges.
I pointed out that we could make no concession that American observer personnel was in any way unneutral. Cordier indicated that Secretariat will strongly maintain this position.
Exploring means of dealing with situation, Cordier said at Hammarskjold’s request Nimmo had been queried on possibility deploying American observers in manner to avoid Indian contact. Nimmo had replied observer functions carried out on team basis and no conspicuous changes could be made. Cordier question whether, depending in part on US attitude toward “travel form,” SYG should press for issuance visas for pending replacements. He asked for our views on this point.
Cordier thought it would be desirable proceed if possible with replacement USAF plane by RAF plane, pointing out this question had been raised by Nimmo about two months ago (before Nehru’s statement) because lack servicing facilities US plane in area.
Re American personnel still in Kashmir Cordier uninformed concerning continuity validity (e.g. expiration date) present visas these people. Asked if we could get this information as pertinent in Saturday’s discussion. I said we would try.
In course discussion we made clear our agreement Cordier’s view that [Page 1349] compliance with Nehru’s request would tend break down whole observer system, not only Kashmir but elsewhere.
Comment: Thus far Hammarskjold and Cordier have taken strong stand against Nehru’s attitude. I assured Cordier that we wanted to back up the SYG and be as helpful to him as we could. In this connection it seems most desirable keep ball on Nehru’s side of net rather than putting Hammarskjold in position having to force issue with Nehru. This would probably occur if Hammarskjold insists on visas for pending replacements. On other hand, if Hammarskjold does not so insist, any further initiative will have to be taken by Nehru.
Answers to specific inquiries above and any additional Department comments would be appreciated for communication Cordier before arrival Hammarskjold early Saturday morning.