Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

690D.91/10–252: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State¹

secret

New Delhi, October 2, 1952—7 p.m.

1408. In last two days fol my talks Sheikh Abdullah Sringar, have had two talks with Ayyangar and two talks Pak High Comm lasting total several hours.

1. Ayyangar stated were two major roadblocks at Geneva which made agreement this stage impossible.

a. Unwillingness GOP accept what GOI believes be its legal position Kashmir, i.e., Kashmir legally acceded to Ind in Oct 1947; Pak committed act of clear aggression in first allowing invasion by tribesmen and later invasion of Pak troops. According Ayyangar Graham seemed clearly aware problem but GOP insists on language which wld jeopardize GOI moral position and which Ind cannot accept.

b. Situation made doubly difficult by Graham’s unwillingness depart in even slightest degree from strict wording of his terms of ref, i.e., discussion of dev is based on assumption of plebiscite covering all Kashmir and Jammu.

2. Ayyangar stated his first talk with Zafrullah had been most encouraging and he felt he making substantial progress in arriving at agreement on principles which might later have been translated into more specific terms. Ayyangar reported that during his two-day absence from Geneva to visit GOI Min at Bern, Zafrullah’s attitude changed sharply presumably on instruction his govt.

3. Ayyangar stated had made two attempts broaden basis for discussions and open possible channels for agreement. First occasion in gen mtg [garble] quickly picked up Ayyangar’s suggestion of broadening of discussions but Graham stated flatly his terms of ref clear and was only one question he was prepared discuss, i.e., quantum forces, etc, on basis of overall plebiscite.

Second occasion, according Ayyangar, was in private discussion with Graham. Graham stated he deeply disappointed find that his mission appeared be headed for failure. Ayyangar reported he told Graham his “failure” was only in very narrow field, i.e., effort secure agreement on restricted basis prescribed by SC, and that broader effort might be more successful.

According Ayyangar, Graham asked how he felt problem shld be approached. Ayyangar answered Graham shld ask each party list in brief memo every possible approach solution which it felt worthy discussion. Stated that he, Ayyangar, cld immed list at least four or five possibilities. Said if he were Graham’s place wld then compare two lists, select proposal on which seemed be widest agreement and explore that fully with both parties. If this failed wld then move on to next possibility.

According Ayyangar, Graham said unfortunately he cld not open up broader discussion subject because felt conscientiously bound stick tightly within instructions from SC.

Ayyangar stated he hoped Graham wld ask for authority make another attempt negot agreement with no limitations. Graham stated that while wld not like to see his whole effort end failure, he most reluctant seem appear anxious hang on to his job.

4. I asked Ayyangar if wld care list “four or five possible solutions” which had in mind. Offered only Indian adaptation old Dixon proposal for partition wld give Azad–Kashmir to Pak, Jammu to Ind and limit plebiscite to valley. He stated emphatically that in his opinion this by far most practical approach to whole question. I asked him tell how he felt this wld ease argument on mil forces, pointing out that even if plebiscite were limited in scope, GOP wld inevitably question number of troops that GOI wld want maintain in valley.

Ayyangar replied that this approach wld immed do away with old argument on ratios which implied that two nations had equal right in Kashmir and which therefore created insurmountable problems for GOI. He also reminded me that Nehru had stated on two or three occasions that wld be willing to go below 21,000 plus 6,000 militia if conditions enough justify such reduction.

I said that in my talks with people in Kashmir, I had been told conditions were far easier than at any previous time, that there was no sign of trouble between two armies on cease-fire line and in gen seemed me atmosphere was now such that GOI shld be prepared make whatever reductions it had in mind.

Ayyangar did not reply directly but went on point out that cld be no valid objection to GOI troops in valley if they did not influence vote and any possibility of influence cld be eliminated thru plebiscite admin right to place these troops wherever he wished. He wld obviously place them in mts, well out of valley.

Ayyangar did not outline other proposals he said he had in mind.

5. I asked Ayyangar if was sure Ind wld win plebiscite in valley. He replied that since agreement with Sheikh Abdullah, there was no doubt in his mind. I asked if it not likely that Sheikh Abdullah’s influence now at its peak. I said that reforms which Sheikh had put thru for cultivators had won him strong support but also pointed out gratitude rarely lasted for any length time and even tho people were somewhat better off, there was likely be steady growth opposition to any govt. I stated that longer disagreement continues, more restless people in Srinagar, who are dependent on deflated tourist industry, are likely become. I added that bitterness against Pak raiders for their excesses wld probably grow less and less as time progressed, and suggested that from Ind’s point of view, the sooner pleb occurred the stronger its position might be. Ayyangar was non-committal but did not disagree.

The GOI position in Kashmir is, of course, very complex and I disagree with those who oversimplify problem by stating situation based solely on Ind intransigence and desire avoid pleb and maintain status quo. Ind is by no means in a comfortable position. Is under considerable pressure from Kashmir govt and is most sensitive to our opinion and that of other nations.

Dept will make profound mistake if underestimates Ind honest and fundamental conviction that she legally and morally right and Pak legally and morally wrong. Regardless our own judgments this matter, Ind feel deeply on this point and will steadfastly refuse allow their position be undermined in any way. Ayyangar discussed this point with some feeling with Tom Finletter and me on courtesy call last week. He underlined it again in talk with me yesterday. With utmost emphasis he said if Pak had any honest legal position in Kashmir, it wld have long since taken its case to World Court. Stated he wld be delighted to present Ind’s case before Court if Ind was challenged and that had no doubt whatsoever of outcome. Is clear, of course, that GOI not anxious to hold pleb until it reasonably confident of winning in spite of my effort to persuade they undoubtedly feel that year from today their position will be stronger than today.

I do not know whether they are sincere on question of partition, pleb or not. I can only report that this subject comes into every conversation and hence wld appear most difficult for Ind to back away from this concept if were proposed on reasonable basis. You will note that Ayyangar’s suggestion that each nation be asked to write down on paper whatever proposals it feels might lead to settlement is identical with Abdullah’s suggestion to me in Srinagar ten days ago.

Obviously Abdullah borrowed the idea from Ayyangar with whom he talked at the Indo Red Conf.

My two talks with Pak High Com Mohammed Ismail, who is about leave Ind, were interesting and may possibly be constructive. Mohammed Ismail is man of integrity and good friend of ours. He is also good friend of Ind and told me over and over again of his ardent desire for Kashmir settlement and his desire do everything possible contribute toward agreement. In our two conversations fol points emerged.

1. I brought up possibility of partition without in any way crediting it to Indians, but simply based on my reading of Dixon report. Mohammed Ismail stated unequivocally that in his opinion partition along lines we had previously discussed offered by far best opportunity for settlement. Stated that some time ago question of partition had been discussed on most confidential basis between him and unnamed GOI Cabinet Minister. He said Dixon picked up idea and was in process of putting it into form for discussion when leak occurred and both govts were immed placed under heavy pressure.

He stated that provision that Sheikh Abdullah’s govt shld turn over power to UN six months before pleb was fruitless effort ease problems of GOP, but he added that background was such that no agreement was possible at that time. He pointed out that at that time fighting was still going on and situation is much more favorable today for reexamination of possibility.

I stated I thought at one time Ind Govt had seemed favorable to this approach but they seemed hesitant because their feeling it might not be acceptable to GOP and Graham had been unable take it up because his terms of ref. Mohammed Ismail stated he thought this unfortunate and hoped some way wld be found bring this approach into open.

2. Mohammed Ismail then asked for my frank blunt evaluation of GOP position and what specifically I wld do if I were responsible for GOP policy. I stated in my personal opinion GOI had taken rather legalistic approach all along and they wld undoubtedly continue maintain their legal rights in Kashmir and resent any challenge to this position.

I added my opinion that GOP foolish attempt to outdo GOI in this area.

Emphasized that GOI position on question their primary legal right in Kashmir was adamant; no arguments cld change this; wisest thing do was avoid this issue and concentrate on guts of problem i.e. how cld GOP get fair, honest pleb without further loss of time.

I suggested that GOP had every practical reason for holding pleb soonest. Pointed out longer Abdullah Govt remained in power, stronger GOI position likely get. Reminded him of rupees 10 croces five year economic program for Kashmir on which Ind Govt about embark and stated this wld undoubtedly tend improve Ind position (I added that we making no contribution whatever this economic program).

I said since he asked me talk frankly, I wld suggest GOP forego legal arguments and technicalities and take whatever forthright steps necessary bring about agreement on pleb. Added that as practical matter, I did not see why mattered GOP whether GOI had 10,000 troops in valley or 30,000 provided they were definitely out of sight and in no position influence pleb directly or indirectly.

I stated that GOP shld concentrate on making sure plebiscite wld be fair without advantage either side and that fair pleb wld depend not only on ability and courage Admiral Nimitz or whoever is established as pleb admin but also to previous agreement between two parties.

I stated I fervently hoped wld never be war between Pak and Ind and that such war wld be catastrophic not only for nations involved but for whole free world. Added if war shld come, Pak as practical matter had nothing lose if large number Ind troops cooped up in valley of Kashmir. Stated the serious fighting wld obviously be in totally different area and GOI troops in valley wld be largely immoblized.

I pointed out that GOP had every reason want honest pleb and I was sure GOI wld accept results of such pleb; in any event whatever country lost wld be forced abide by results, because of overwhelming power of world opinion.

I stated these views totally my own and I had given them to him in complete confidence only because had urged me over and over again speak frankly.

Mohammed Ismail seemed intensely interested in viewpoint I presented to him and I thought rather inclined accept it.

I believe we shld take fol position in SC; (1) commend Graham for his continued patient efforts which near success; (2) request Graham carry on efforts reach de-militarization settlement but also give him specific authority explore additional channels, find settlement.

I strongly feel we shld keep patience and avoid any action which condemns or criticizes either party for continued stalemate. I wld advise SC not to pass any resolution calling on either or both parties to take this or that specific step toward settlement but leave it to mediator to continue negots. It is crystal clear GOI will accept no resolution with which it does not agree. Passage by SC of resolution unacceptable to GOI might result in complete rupture of negots—a development we shld avoid at all costs.

Bowles

1. This telegram was repeated for information to Karachi as telegram 49 and to London as 68.