690D. 91/9–2652: Telegram
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Department of State1
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486. 1. FonMin, who on his return to Karachi last night from the Geneva conf on Kashmir, held an unspectacular press conf ref Weeka … Sept 28,2 today asked me to come see him before he reported to PriMin his conclusions and recommendations.
2. Zafrulla said Graham worked hard during the two weeks in Geneva to bring about agreement between India and Pak on the disputed issues and altogether presented four proposals: Two referring to numerical troop reductions and two presenting formulae for troop dispositions. Pak accepted all of these proposals but Indian delegation rejected them all.
3. Then it was suggested by Indian delegate Ayyangar that he and Zafrulla should meet privately to see if they could reach an understanding on disputed issues. Zafrulla said to him “Tell me what it is [Page 1288] you fear from Pak: (a) Do you fear a Pak attack on Kashmir or an attack on India, which would be suicidal; (b) Do you fear an attack by the tribesmen on Kashmir either instigated by Pak or made because GOP is unable to control tribal activities; or (c) An attack by Azad Kashmir men officially demobilized by Pak but who are actually in possession of clandestine arms?” Ayyangar replied he held no such fears. Then queried Zafrulla tell me what you propose because I have authority to consider any proposals you may make. After an hour of shilly shallying Ayyangar told Zafrulla “the truth is I have no authority to negotiate.” He said Nehru has insisted that only he could make decisions for India and that the Indian delegation had gone to Geneva to learn what offers Pak was prepared to make and what propositions Graham would offer that could be acceptable to India without requiring concessions from her.
The truth as I see it, said Zafrulla, is that India hoped to get out of the Geneva conf acquiesence by Pak in the principle that in addition to the number of troops on each side necessary to maintain internal security and insure a correct observance of the cease-fire line, there should remain also in India-held Kashmir sufficient troops to be at the disposal of the Kashmir Govt and not at the option of the plebiscite admin to offset any political risks. This, said Zafrulla, we could not agree to. We did agree to the minimum troops to be determined jointly as the number necessary to maintain internal security in India-held Kashmir and Azad Kashmir, and to preserve the integrity of the ceasefire line, if India agreed to these two conditions we were prepared also to agree that the disposal of troops on each side should be determined not absolutely by the plebiscite administrator but in consultation with local authorities. Doctor Graham had advanced the opinion that such a concession by Pak would still be in line with the terms of the resolutions on which the conf was called, but the Indians did not agree to it.
FYI only, Zafrulla then proceeded to outline to me the recommendation he intends to make to the PriMin and the Cabinet for future action by Pak.
His understanding is that the major powers, except Russia and satellites, are prepared in the forthcoming session of the Gen Assembly to hold in abeyance debates on substantive matters until after the American elections. In this three week interval he believes it may be useful for the SC to take up the Graham report, which is not a matter of substantive consideration by all the powers, and reach a decision. He will suggest to the PriMin that Pak support Doctor Graham’s report on the Geneva conf and pay tribute to his sustained efforts and strong endeavor to reach an agreement between the parties. He will then recommend in the name of Pak that the SC support the proposals either with respect to specific number of troops or the acceptance of their formulae and call on the two countries to proceed with the withdrawal of their [Page 1289] forces either by the terms of the formula or an agreed quantity in order that the appointment of the plebiscite admin can be made before the end of the year. If this should be done, then in the succeeding 90 days necessary steps could be taken that would permit the holding of the plebiscite at the end of March or the beginning of April 1953, which seasonally would be the most desirable period for this kind of political action in Kashmir.