690D.91/6–2652: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State1
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4815. En route New Delhi today I met Amb Warren at airport Karachi and discussed later Kashmiri developments with him at length. I was particularly impressed and encouraged to hear of Nazimuddin’s tentative suggestion made 48 hours previously to effect Pak might be willing abandon former 13 to 10 ratio on troops and to accept 3 to 1 ratio at around 18,000 to 6,000 as basis for direct negots between two PriMin’s under Graham auspices.
In view possibility of direct proposal along these lines by me to Nehru in New Delhi, we agreed I shld interrupt my flight and call with Warren on Nazimuddin for further discussion. Nazimuddin agreed at once to see us and in most forthright way outlined fol position:
- 1.
- Hour is very late and Pak has no real hope for anything more tangible than further heated discussion if problem is once again dumped in lap of SC. Thus situation calls for risk taking on Pak’s part if solution to be developed.
- 2.
- Speaking for himself but with strong implication Cabinet
wld fully support him at its next meeting on Friday,
Nazimuddin first
said he believed Pak wld
accept 3 to 1 ratio in valley as basis for direct
discussions under fol conditions:
- (a).
- That a pleb admin be set up without delay (Nazimuddin explained unless this were done Nehru might not get down to cases in spite of prior assurances).
- (b).
- That pleb admin shld have power place troops wherever he thought wld best serve interests of free and uninfluenced plebiscite.
- (c).
- Nazimuddin also suggested pleb admin shld have power to reduce number of troops if he felt some unnecessary, but it seemed clear he did not intend to insist on this.
- 3.
- I asked what actual figures he had in mind, Nazimuddin replied 18,000 to 6,000. I then asked if he meant to include militia now in valley in Ind figure. He replied this might add some 6,000 troops to Ind figure and leave ratio at 24,000 to 8,000.
- 4.
- After further discussion he then said he personally wld even agree to a 4 to 1 ratio and that this might mean 15,000 Ind regulars without heavy weapons and 6,000 Kashmir state militia on one side and 5250 Azad Kashmiris on other side. Both Warren and I had clear impression there was no intention to insist on Pak regulars.
- 5.
- Nazimuddin added Sheikh Abdullah position re Ind was now less clear. He said if his proposal is accepted by Cabinet and agreed to by Nehru as basis for discussion other angles of situation cld be brought out which might make Nehru’s position easier. Warren and I later agreed this seemed intended to suggest possibility of partition.
Nazimuddin made it clear he was expressing only his own views but clearly implied Cabinet wld back him up. Warren told me Abdullah out of Karachi but had stated before leaving he wld agree with whatever Nazimuddin wanted to do. Nazimuddin stated he wld immediately inform Warren of Cabinet final decision and he expressed hope I cld obtain Nehru’s agreement.
It is difficult to see how Nehru can turn down this proposal if it finally develops as outlined today. However, we all realize we are dealing with an unpredictable man in a highly emotional situation. Paks cld make their proposal directly to Graham fol action of Cabinet. However, in view of time element and advantage of talking directly and personally with Nehru about my visit to Nazimuddin over proposal cabled him from his rep in NY, Warren and I agree I shld initiate discussions here in New Delhi as soon as Warren gives word.
If Dept agrees I urge we be given green light so we can make most of this new opportunity. If Nehru goes along final arrangements for meeting of two PriMin’s shld be handled by Graham in New York. Since I expect to hear from Warren Saturday wld appreciate Dept’s reaction soonest.
I would appreciate it if Warren wld carefully check my impression of our meeting this morning, as set forth above, and immediately report to Dept and to me any points which he may feel I have not fully or accurately covered.
- This telegram was repeated for information to London and Karachi.↩