Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

690D.91/6–2152: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret
priority

Washington, June 21, 1952—5:29 p.m.

6836.…

Dept officers made fol pts in answer to Belcher:

a) Proposed meeting is not procedural expedient but logical step by Graham designed to shift discussions from lower level to highest level and thus exhaust all possible avenues open to Graham. Unless he proposed PM’s meeting Graham will not be able to say he has done everything possible. His negotiations in NY provide the lead-up and the proposed UK–US representations to both parties plus Graham’s own arrangements with parties re agenda etc wld provide necessary spade work. If meeting fails it will be clear that failure due to parties and not to Graham and UN.

b) If PM’s meeting held now India wld be under pressure of impending unknown SC action which wld immediately follow failure of such meeting. Such pressure might be more effective than pressure which wld theoretically be created by SC res.

c) Graham has not explored with parties solutions other than demilitarization and state wide plebiscite. Steps proposed by Dept would give him what might be his only chance for such exploration. At this time he cld undertake such exploration without public admission of failure.

d) GOP will not be satisfied with any res which does not pt finger directly at India. Past experience indicates res of this sort not effective and might only cause GOI harden its position. It is likely that both parties will be dissatisfied with res SC wld pass. It wld therefore be helpful avoid res if progress cld be made in PM meeting now.

e) USSR may veto SC res which wld make subsequent PM meeting more difficult.

f) Failure of PM meeting held now wld not exclude such meeting in the future. Such second meeting presumably wld be held in response to new SC res which wld provide new context.

g) We do not believe GOP adverse reaction to proposal of mtg now wld be as strong as indicated by FonOff. PM meeting wld cause only a brief postponement of SC discussion and might open new avenue for solution or at least test sincerity of alleged India desire for exploring new approaches for a solution.

h) Graham’s preliminary reaction to suggestions in ref Deptel was favorable. Bowles and Warren also reacted favorably.

Request Emb urge FonOff and CRO review their objections in light above Dept arguments. USUN discuss above with UK Del.

Acheson

1. This telegram was repeated to New York (priority).