357.AB/5–552: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Bowles) to the Department of State
4072. Deeply appreciate Deptel 24311 with complete discussion Kashmir problem. Earnestly wish we cld discuss this around table as there several points where we seem be talking cross purposes but am sure we wld quickly come together with all facts.
For instance, you state Graham fully briefed Jan as to my views presumably on partition and yet here in Delhi he claimed had had no discussion whatsoever this subj. Also implication Graham willing discuss partition if either party brought it up. Inds did bring it up in formal way in answer Graham’s request their views on how settlement might be reached, but Graham felt unable pick up suggestion because his terms ref.
[Page 1244]Finally, when Graham left here he and his asst both seemed fully agreed partition offered best hope eventual settlement provided of course, GOP cld be induced discuss this possibility.
Wld like add fol suggestions:
- 1.
- GOI has basic deep conflict between desire maintain status quo which already gives them best parts Kashmir, and their desire live up their internatl commitments. In addition, Bajpai wld dearly like end career Foreign Ministry with solution Kashmir problem. Therefore he much more inclined really think problem through than Nehru.
- 2.
According best info I cld get GOI and GOP stalled on quantum of forces under present terms ref in neighborhood 4000 Azad Kashmiris to roughly 16,000 Ind arm troops without armor.
Conceivably GOI might go somewhat further but do not believe much further than three to one ratio which everyone assumes not sufficient secure Pak agrmt even though pleb administrator has control their placement. GOI argument continues be there many passes to valley from Pak side but only one from Ind side.
- 3.
- Bajpai’s statement
as to why he favors partition as fols:
- a.
- If Ind won overall pleb she doesn’t want rule over bitter relentless minority in Azad Kashmir nor does she want face new shifts population.
- b.
- By confining pleb to valley essential question which must be solved, i.e., quantum mil forces, becomes much easier. Bajpai states GOI troops cld be reduced substantially.
- 4.
- No one knows whether GOI position sincere or as you seem suspect, simply delaying tactic, nor to what extent Bajpai represents views of GOI. If GOI object is simply delay, then this opening up of partition approach wld quickly estab this fact.
- 5.
- PriMin was certainly not enthusiastic about Kashmir when I saw him Sat. When I asked him if their was anything he wanted say about Kashmir, he said glad continue Graham discussion long as any hope for settlement, that GOI earnestly wanted pleb and that Ind glad discuss question partition, but no sense talking details on latter subj unless Pak willing open up question. He added Sheikh Abdullah not making situation easier, then changed subj abruptly.
- 6.
- Later, Bajpai, who had asked me come his office fol talk with Nehru, told me again GOI had definitely not thought through its position as sharply and specifically as it shld, and that he had sent long detailed memo to PriMin that day stating it essential GOI clarify own mind as to just what it wld agree do on Kashmir and what it cld not do. He said wld call me soon as he had heard further from PriMin.
Except for my talks with Graham, I have acted only as messenger on this question of partition. My positive statements to GOI have been consistently along lines they carried very real responsibility working towards settlement, their position not strong before world as long as they insisted on three or four to one advantage in quantum of troops, that Nehru had great chance eliminate at least one world sore point, etc. I will continue along these lines and hope for best unless you have further ideas.