Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

357.AB/4–2852: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in India

secret
priority

Washington, May 3, 1952—12:31 p.m.

2431. For Amb FYI only.

1. Dept grateful report Bajpai’s frank discussions Kashmir with you contained Embtel 3976 Apr 28. We believe if it is GOI position that negots re demilitarization merely “beating of dead horse” as Bajpai says, good faith shld impel GOI so inform UNRIP in which case entirely new situation wld be created. It shld be understood that if GOI considers demilitarization plan dead, and likewise other commitments it has entered into by accepting two UNCIP res, GOP does not. Graham has indicated in his report that GOP has accepted all 12 proposals (with certain qualifications re character of forces to be withdrawn or disbanded). Paks over three year period have consistently agreed to various UN suggestions for settlement. Dept believes it wld be mistake with effects extending beyond Kashmir dispute for SC or UNRIP accept responsibility abrogation internatl agreements which shld clearly rest with that party which not now prepared implement them.

2. With foregoing in mind, and considering that Graham is for present charged with responsibility conduct negots between India and Pak, Dept believes that GOI, if it has not already done so, might form clear impression as consequence Bajpai’s discussions with you re partition, that US favors Graham opening up discussion partition at this stage, and therefore that we do not believe his 12 proposals feasible. Such an erroneous impression cld only undercut Graham and wld practically ensure failure his forthcoming talks. Dept and UK concur in Graham plan to concentrate on remaining differences this time and believe full support shld be given his efforts persuade GOI agree less troops Indian side cease-fire line.

3. Dept has at no time ruled out partition as possibly eventual solution if peaceably agreed to by both parties but is convinced that Dept and its reps shld at this time refrain from any action which might be interpreted by GOI as present encouragement of partition talk. In our view talk of partition clearly matter of timing and we feel Graham and parties are only ones who can determine proper moment for initiating such talk. Accordingly, we believe your conversations with GOI, which can most advantageously occur only as result their initiative, shld be limited to objectives: (a) avoiding any situation which might lead GOI not pursue negots along lines Graham indicates he intends pursue; and (b) not discouraging GOI from initiating any sincere steps of alternative nature which have genuine possibilities leading to peaceful settlement with GOP.

4. Bajpai’s statements to you, which we believe probably represent GOI policy, may well be interpreted as meaning that while GOI does not intend fol through its commitment under UNCIP ress, in order not take onus for scrapping them, it prepared talk around them indefinitely. While conceivable GOI may genuinely desire settlement now even at risk of seeing part of the state go to Pakistan, it must be remembered that Bajpai’s emphasis on desirability of partition may be merely a device to negate efforts so laboriously made by Graham within present terms of ref. Introduction of partition proposal wld provide GOI with additional excuses for obstructing settlement as they have in past.

5. Re possible discussion of partition we have indicated to Graham our belief it unnecessary for SC broaden his terms of ref as we believe his authority under Mar 30 res is sufficient authority him make any proposals he deems necessary toward solution Kashmir question. Mar 30 res appointed Graham successor Dixon and as such he has all Dixon’s authority. However, as Graham understands obligation to SC he is bound as matter of priority make every effort arrange for demilitarization of area pursuant UNCIP res. While he fully briefed in Wash Jan your views (see para B2[5b] reftel) he has indicated repeatedly he does not propose raise matter of partition with parties. Although we can assume he understands logic of arguments for partition, as negotiator we believe he knows that were he to raise matter of partition not only wld all his work of past year on demilitarization be scrapped, but GOP which already unfavorably inclined toward him wld probably refuse to negot any further. Graham has indicated several occasions that if both parties indicate willingness discuss partition he will assist in mediating role. He has further indicated that if one party wishes him to be messenger re partition proposal he will convey message to other party but initiative on partition must be with parties and not with him. In absence something solid from GOI he apparently not prepared as matter negot strategy initiate new proposals which involve extremely difficult problems. It will be recalled that Dixon’s discussion of partition with parties ended when he concluded that there was no possibility GOI agreeing to conditions in limited plebiscite area which in Dixon’s view were minimum required to assure fairness of vote to which Pak had agreed.

5 [6]. Dept understands Graham does not propose return sub-continent but plans remain in NY for next phase negots unless parties suggest agreed alternative place.

Acheson