Office of the Historian

357.AB/4–1352: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations

secret
priority
Washington, April 13, 1952—5:18 p.m.

388. Re Kashmir.

1.
After consultation with UKDel you shld convey to Graham substance Karachi’s 1178 of April 12.
2.
Our comments on reftel, which you may pass on to Graham, are as follows:
A.
Re Graham’s report GOP seems assume no mention will be made of intended association of PlebAd with further negots, and that there will be no indication whether Graham intends pursue further efforts obtain agreement parties to quantum of troops, etc. We suspect GOP believes report will merely narrate lack of progress in last negots on subcontinent, but will include general indication by Graham he believes troop withdrawals by both sides create atmosphere conducive to further negots of no indicated nature.
B.
If this estimate GOP guess on report correct, we hazard suggestion GOP, fearing Graham has no intention press GOI further on any points his program, will be prepared reject, if necessary in SC, any further negots involving UNRIP. Such rejection, whether or not followed by GOP demand (which wld probably fail obtain SC support) for SC action recommending parties carry out plebiscite per UNCIP res forthwith, wld probably serve publicly to justify GOP “taking matters into their own hands”.
C.
It seems to us Pak FonSecy either not sure of his facts re PlebAd, or is using his ostensibly distorted impressions re PlebAd to attempt obtain from Graham, via us, clarification Nimitz precise role in future [Page 1231] negots. In view of fact that Nimitz has already been approved for PlebAd by both GOI and GOP, has been designated PlebAd by UNSYG per UNCIP res, and fact that only GOI may arrange for installation PlebAd, FonSecy’s quibbling over whether Nimitz to be named PlebAd or PlebAd-Designate strengthens our belief clarification to GOP re Nimitz role desirable. We assume such clarification, if given, wld be identical with that given GOI.
D.
FonSecy’s comments lead us to believe that US–UK démarche in Karachi not likely inspire new, more favorable aide-mémoire to Graham from GOP. Rather, GOP seems to intend to make no new move vis-à-vis Graham’s proposals until report made public.
E.
We suggest, therefore, that initiative by Graham vis-à-vis PakDel April 14 might be beneficial, and, while he is obviously best judge how this shld be done, we are inclined to volunteer view that PakDel be advised:
(1)
Graham planning postpone report few days in order give parties adequate time for favorable consideration his proposals.
(2)
He wishes to present to GOP clarification of PlebAd’s role.
(3)
Views he has presented re necessity bringing PlebAd into picture will be part of his report.
F.
We are becoming increasingly concerned that unless Graham’s report carefully details difficulties with either or both parties re quantum of troops (see USUN’s 684, April 8), and installation of PlebAd, report will be severely attacked by Paks as vague, and pro-GOI in view favorable mention of GOI withdrawing division of troops. GOP and we tend to view this withdrawal more as matter of strategy than good-will. Such attack on report and Graham by GOP might well make possible future negots by Graham extremely difficult.
Acheson