357.AB/4–1252: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State
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700. Re Kashmir. Pursuant to Dept’s telephone instructions, USUN called on Graham this afternoon to convey substance of Deptel 386 repeating New Delhi 3732.1 Marin and Jackson of Graham’s staff were present. Graham said he did not understand reason for different interpretations put upon Indian reply to his aide-mémoire by himself and Bowles. He read first para of Indian reply which indicated GOI acceptance of continued negotiations. Graham interprets this as acceptance also of condition implicit in his own aide-mémoire—that PlebAd would be associated with him in further negotiations.
Graham said he was giving Indian Rep this afternoon aide-mémoire in response to Indian request for clarification of PlebAd’s role. After some discussion with staff, he gave us copy. (Text in immediately fol tel).2 He suggested Dept might wish send text to New Delhi. He said he would not wish to comment beyond this on Bowles’ conversation with Bajpai, saying “I think we had better not take any cognizance of that”.
Despite this diplomatic reticence, it was apparent Graham and staff were much concerned about conversation. Marin said Karachi would have heard of it already, since everything that happened in one FonOff was somehow immediately transmitted to other. Graham said there should be no talk of partition now as it would only make possible agreement on demilitarization and plebiscite more difficult to reach. He noted Bowles’ statement that his suggestion to Bajpai of Graham’s intention was “guess-work” and implied he hoped Bajpai would be guided by this word.
Marin said association of PlebAd might in fact result in his finding at some future time that conditions for plebiscite did not exist. He suggested possibility that after month or 6 weeks of negotiation in New York Graham might ask PlebAd to visit Kashmir and report to him on steps needed to complete preparations for plebiscite. Graham cut him off, saying it was not useful to talk about future contingencies now.
We expressed Dept’s concern about clarifying memorandum, and pointed out danger Indians might delay resumption of negotiations by requesting further clarifications or obstruct possible future progress by quibbling over details of new aide-mémoire. Graham said they were aware of these dangers and had tried to keep memoire simple so as to avoid pitfalls. We questioned first sentence in fourth para of [Page 1230] new aide-mémoire saying that PlebAd “should not take part in negotiations”. Graham said this was precisely what he meant: He was the negotiator and simply wanted PlebAd’s advice when necessary at this stage.
In response to question, Graham said he had not given Pak aide-mémoire to Indians. He hopes for more favorable Pak reply as result of UK–US approaches in Karachi. If more favorable response not forthcoming on Monday he will probably delay submission of report. His proposal on PlebAd is contained in report, so he wants acceptance by parties, before submitting it.
His general approach at moment is to try to avoid definite “no” from either party on proposal, interpret their replies in most favorable way, and thus move into further negotiations without SC wrangle. He thinks it will be easier to associate Nimitz with next round of negotiations in New York than on subcontinent. In connection with this, Bajpai told Marin he would come to New York if negotiations continued.