357.AB/3–2552: Telegram
The Ambassador in Pakistan (Warren) to the Department of State1
1076.1. Yesterday Graham had lunch with the GovGen, Zafrulla, and [Page 1206] Mohammad Ali. He came to see me immed afterwards. At Australian FonMin Casey’s request, I arranged an interview for him with Graham. Then Casey went to see Zafrulla. He is very anxious to be helpful but Graham told me later that he did not feel he cld speak freely with him. Graham came to see me at 4:30 to say goodbye. His plane was due to leave for Geneva at 6:00 but it was delayed and he did not get away until 9:30 this a.m.
The Dept’s 936 of Mar 23, 6 p.m. did not reach me until 3:45 a.m. this morning. Immed after its receipt, I saw Graham and tried to prevail on him as I had yesterday afternoon to reverse his decision to depart for Geneva. He said that he appreciates thoroughly the seriousness and gravity of the present situation arising from the Pak attitude towards his mission, but he has concluded that the best thing for him to do at this time is to prepare his report and get it before the SC. He indicated the report will include ref to troop quantum discussions he was unable to tell the Paks because of possible violation of Ind confidence.
2. He had drafted a short statement to give the Pak press at the airport when he left last night. It was probably as favorable in its language as truth and the circumstances permitted. It included a note of hope based on Graham’s conviction that some progress had been made during his present stay in the subcontinent. The press statement was not to be issued, however, until he actually went aboard the plane. The Paks took advantage of his delay by leaking to the local English language press their impression of the failure of his mission so that he lost the initiative in the issuance of the press statement. In a separate tel I am forwarding a general summary of the press which coincides with the Cabinet attitude towards Graham as of today, together with Graham’s release. I have asked to see Zafrulla but he will not see me until tomorrow on account of illness. He has also declined to see the UK HC who today received instructions similar to mine.
3. I regret deeply Graham decision to leave at this time. The Paks appear convinced that he did not make specific proposal to GOI on the minimum troops that Ind wld accept in the demilitarization program. They resent what they believe is abandonment of Devers formula without substitution. Zafrulla has been informed in rather intimate details of alleged differences between Graham, Schmidt, and Devers, and believe that the Devers ratio was not utilized in discussions during this visit. While I have no facts that I may cite to support my opinion, I am strongly inclined to believe that the Pak Cabinet is out of hand and that Zafrulla having been voted down by his colleagues has now joined up with them and that the decision for war is either in the making or may possibly already have been taken. I realize the seriousness of such an expression, but I wld be failing in my duty if I did not voice it at this time. Notwithstanding the words [Page 1207] of caution that have been addressed to the PriMin and to the FonMin by my Brit colleague and myself separately and almost continuously over the past few days, I believe they have fallen on deaf ears. The newspapers today show it. Some of my closest friends in the govt are now avoiding me and I believe it is being done under instructions. I do know in the almost continuous Cabinet mtgs which lasted the last few days until midnight that feelings have run high. It is no longer in my opinion desirable for the Pres either alone or with Churchill to appeal to the two PriMins to reconcile their differences. Such an appeal I believe cld be made only at the time Graham may submit his report and time may have run out then. I hope the Dept may prevail upon Graham to reconsider his departure and to return here and attempt to obtain from GOI a statement that wld at least keep the door open. With Graham’s final departure from the sub-continent, I think the Paks consider that the link with the SC has in effect been broken and that they find themselves alone in the world without a friend and in a position so desperate with respect to their own people that the most catastrophic decision can be entertained without appreciation of disaster that may overtake the area. I realize there may be elements of bluff in this situation to impress the UK and US but I discount them. I do not think the Cabinet has the courage of Liaquat to face a fanatic and disappointed people and call for patience in slow progress. The PriMin last night in a reception to the Colombo plan conf wore a steel jacket under his coat. The Commander in Chief until yesterday was scheduled to come to Karachi on April 6, 7 and 8 for a conf. His orders have been changed and he will proceed from E Pak where he is inspecting, to army headquarters at Rawalpindi. Under the power of personal and collective fear, I believe their judgment may be distorted.
- This telegram was repeated by the Department to London as telegram 4748 and to New Delhi as 2004.↩