337.AB/3–2452: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
niact
937. Re Kashmir. Re niact Deptels to Karachi as 936, London as 4688, Mar 23. You are requested to convey to Graham fol views Dept for his consideration:
- 1.
- Unless he has already done so, can he not make specific suggestions to both parties re precise number and nature troops or ratio troops remaining each side demilitarization line? Is it too late for him to make new specific suggestions even if both parties have rejected previous specific suggestions? We believe Graham report to SC wld be materially weakened if it does not discuss specific proposals re number or ratio of troops remaining each side demilitarization line made to both parties and their replies. If SC is to take any constructive action on basis Graham’s report it must have clearest indication limits area of disagreement. It wld be difficult for SC effectively to act upon mere comments that parties cld not agree on quantum or ratio of troops.
- 2.
Re number of troops, fol possible alternatives occur to Dept: a) Without indicating numbers based on ratio of troops at time Jan 1, 1949 cease fire, maximum troops at end of demilitarization period mght be 18 thousand troops on Ind side (to include State forces, line of communication, supply, signal corps everything) and 11 thousand troops on Pak side cease fire line (to be composed generally as indicated in third phase Devers’ plan). Neither party shld have artillery with remaining troops on either side cease-fire line by end of demilitarization period. Figures cited based on fol considerations: GOI has indicated to Graham that their figure of 21 thousand troops cld be reduced as low as 16 thousand. Accordingly, 18 thousand gives Indian median figure allowing for line of communication of troops. 11 thousand figure for GOP based on slight up-raising ultimate figures suggested by Devers as constituting minimum security force for Pak-controlled Kashmir. b) Basing number of troops on polit decision, suggestion of ratio has obvious merit for quick decision from two govts. Ratio of troops at time of cease fire was 5 to 3 in favor GOI. That ratio [Page 1205] has since apparently been widened to 2½ to 1 in favor of GOI. Suggest ratio might well be restored to 5 to 3, or be 2 to 1, or 3 to 2 in favor GOI. Uunderstanding being no artillery by end of demilitarization period and maximum figure to include all necessary service troops.
The precise number of troops remaining and staging of withdrawals presumably wld be worked out under para 9 of Graham’s proposals.
Along with either alternative above, Graham mght suggest to parties point 7 of 12 point program be amended by adding fol:
“and further agree that if either govt believes that adjustments in the level of troops on their side of the cease fire line shld be made in the interest of internal security of the area under their control they may at the end of the demilitarization period, but not prior to carrying out the other provisions of this para, request the UN Rep for India and Pak to undertake the negot of such an adjustment with the other govt or to request the PlebAd to undertake the negot of such an adjustment pursuant to para 8 of the Jan 5, 1949 res”.
In making this suggestion we believe the important thing is agreement on number troops at end of demilitarization, and performance of agreement. This amendment will have advantage of allowing both sides feeling that security requirements of portion of state under their control can be reconsidered fol demonstration their bona fides in complying with demilitarization provisions. We feel reasonably sure that if fol actual reduction of forces in area threat to internal security of state arose either from Commie neighbors or from Abdullah Govt UN Rep cld negot new level of troops with both parties cooperating.
- 3.
- We believe Graham might well take present opportunity to go back to Delhi to press GOI agree to appointment PlebAd. Unless or until number of troops can be decided 12 point program not binding on either party. Agreement now of GOI to appoint PlebAd all in GOI favor in forthcoming SC debate.
In presenting these views, indicate to Graham we prepared to give such parallel diplomatic support in Karachi and New Delhi as he may believe wise and we fully prepared to take necessary steps to discourage early consideration Graham report in April if further negots possible on subcontinent now.
- This telegram was repeated to London and for information to New York and New Delhi; subsequently repeated by the Department to Geneva.↩