Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 2

690D.91/1–252: Telegram

The Ambassador in India ( Bowles ) to the Department of State ¹

secret

New Delhi , January 2, 1952—8 p.m.

2299. For Acheson from Bowles. Re urtel 1295, December 21 [31]² on Kashmir, strongly urge you consider fol points:

1. Although I cannot guarantee Bajpai’s sincerity in urging extension of Graham mission along line mytel 2273, Dec 29,³ it our belief his attitude genuine. I can see no reason why he shld jeopardize his relationships with us simply to gain brief additional time in negots which have already covered many months. He himself pointed out he cannot guarantee success of negots in advance nor even Nehru’s attitude under all conditions. However, I do not believe Bajpai wld have made this proposal unless he believed there was good chance that Graham cld succeed in securing agreement before Mar 31. We puzzled by London’s 61 of Jan 1 (sent Dept 2935 rptd Karachi 51)⁴ .…

2. It was probably wishful thinking recent months to assume Graham cld have secured agreement between Pak and India on the highly emotional subject of Kashmir while first Ind election were [was] being fought. However, Graham deeply respected here and since UN has been trying nearly four years thru one commission or another to secure agreement, it wld seem unreasonable not make one final effort.

3. As we have pointed out before, res condemning India in which we participated would seriously jeopardize US relations with this country at time when there seems every prospect for steady improvement. More than that, such res wld not serve any purpose in settling Kashmir problem but it will further arouse emotions which have been perceptibly cooling, and in all likelihood make a rational settlement impossible.

4. Altho Pak may be pressing for such action on part SC seems most unlikely that she cld, as a consequence, provide substantial milit assistance which we gather is one factor under consideration in Washington. The increased tension which wld surely result in Pak wld seem likely to tie down Pak Army even tighter.

5. Under the circumstances believe strongly we have everything to gain and nothing to lose from extension of Graham mission under broad gen terms and cannot believe Graham will refuse undertake this final effort in view Bajpai’s statements both to Brit and ourselves. If Graham mission is continued believe it wld be mistake for SC instruct him to open negots directly with the two PriMins. Nothing cld be gained from specific instr this kind and it is possible that either Nazimuddin or Nehru might reject this type of public pressure. In view of Bajpai’s suggestion it likely Nehru wld agree if same proposal was made by Graham privately.

6. Finally let me emphasize none of us here can guarantee what will happen if Graham mission is continued but we are unanimous in our conviction that with patient handling along lines mytel 2273, Dec 29 there fair chance this dispute can be settled, thereby eliminating serious point of conflict and at same time greater strengthening public confidence in the UN.

Bowles

1. This telegram was repeated for information to London, Paris, and Karachi.
2. Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, footnote 2, p. 1928.
3. Ibid., p. 1927.
4. Not printed.