320/1–152: Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly (Roosevelt) to the Department of State2


Delga 811. Re: Kashmir.

Graham3 informed Dec 30 in general terms of contents Gadels 540, Dec 224 and 553, Dec 26.5 He welcomed ideas and timing, with two exceptions:
He thought it inadvisable SC endorse Devers’ plan,6 which would be quite unacceptable to GOI. Confusion in this matter, and apparent Indian endorsement of plan, stems from fact Devers first gave Rau typewritten slip of unsigned paper, which contained first stage of plan, this stage being favorable to GOI. Devers later orally communicated to both parties balance plan which was unfavorable to GOI in that (i) it wld leave approx 11,000 civil police and Azad forces on Pak side cease-fire line and 13,000 forces on Indian side, (ii) it defined powers Plebad to dispose of remaining forces as “final.” According Graham, GOI reference to having largely accepted Devers’ plan refers really to first stage that plan. Re desire bring plan into open (Gadel 559 Dec 28)7 GADel’s guess is that GOP, knowing plan favors GOP in final stages, wants whole plan on record, while GOI referred publicly to plan in order give impression its goodwill in accepting part of plan offered by UN reps mil advisor. Graham recognizes that GOI reference to Devers’ plan leaves him no choice except to reveal plan in entirety to both sides. He contemplates doing this by filing confidential copies with UN Secretary General’s office, for reading and possible retention by both sides. He believes the details of plan will leak, and that it is better to have leak occur from sources such that he and his staff cannot be accused of responsibility. Graham indicated thought plan shld not be made public because was informal confidential effort and because does not want to be tied to it.
While he is willing make quick trip subcontinent and appeal to Nehru agree to his proposals, immed after Indian elections, Graham believes: (i) He shld go only if asked by SC, since otherwise wld have no force behind expedition, which wld appear personal attempt bring home bacon in last hour; (ii) he shld see both Nehru and Nazimuddin appealing to both PriMins rise above power politics and come in person to UN forum with agreement which cld only redound to prestige both countries. Apparently, this is idea which Graham broached tentatively once before to Nehru, who appeared greatly interested.
Re tone his first oral statement before SC, Graham thought wld have to be mere factual explanation reasons behind his “views” set forth in his 19 [18] Dec report. Otherwise, his ability continue mediatory activities by flying trip to subcontinent after Indian elections wld be minimized. While unwilling commit himself on possible success this last-minute appeal to Nehru, Graham said he thought at various times, when he seemed to be coming close to Nehru, that GOI PriMin really wanted to settle Kashmir dispute on reasonable fair terms. He was encouraged by fact GOI appeared bear no resentment against him for views given in 19 [18] Dec report, which were unfavorable to GOI position. This last remark was occasioned by indications GOI willing Graham continue as mediator (Delhi’s 46 to Paris Dec 28),8 which info was given Graham in general terms.

Graham stated wld appreciate any info concerning development in subcontinent re his report, and also wld welcome being provided with argumentation to use with GOI re: (i) argument SC and Graham and not deal with Pak aggression; (ii) reasonableness Graham view that on 15 July 1952, at the end of the demilitarization process, there shld remain on either side of cease-fire line lowest possible number of forces based “in proportion” on number of armed forces existing on each side of line on 1 Jan 1949.

Graham departed evening Dec 30 for Menton, in south of France, and will not return to Paris until SC fixed date for Kashmir hearings. Arrangements have been made for communicating with him.

. . . . . . .

Ross wondered if might have SC mtg about 18 Jan; Graham wld then go to subcontinent for week prior tabling resolution, in effort persuade both PriMins reach agreement, returning end Jan; then [Page 1164] start negots for resolution in SC, tabling resolution and speaking to it before parties interventions, probably around Feb; parties cld then speak about Feb 12. Fowler thought cld not put off Paks this long.
Fowler will report discussions to London, emphasizing new factors presented by Dept thoughts and Graham views.
  1. This telegram was repeated for information to London, New Delhi, and Karachi.
  2. Dr. Frank P. Graham, UN Representative for India and Pakistan, had transmitted his second report to the Security Council on Dec. 18, 1951 (UN doc. S/2448). In the report he indicated that some progress had been made in securing concurrence by the Governments of India and Pakistan to a 12-point agreement involving the demilitarization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir in one continuous process. Two principal points of difference remained: (1) the size of forces to be left on either side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarization period, and (2) the day on which the Government of India would agree to the formal appointment to office of the Plebiscite Administrator.

    The Security Council considered Graham’s second report at its 570th to 572d meetings on Jan. 17, 30, and 31 (UN docs. S/PV. 570–572).

  3. Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, p. 1922.
  4. Ibid., p. 1926.
  5. A demilitarization plan by Gen. Jacob J. Devers, Military Adviser to the UN Representative for India and Pakistan (see footnote 3, p. 1170), released by the UN Secretariat on Jan. 21 (UN doc. S/2485).
  6. Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, p. 1927.
  7. The same as New Delhi’s telegram 2224 to the Department, Dec. 26, 1951, Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, p. 1925.