611.91/2–2454: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Allen) to the Department of State1
priority
1342. At my meeting with Nehru at 11 a.m. today, I opened conversation by remarking that he and I had had to discuss many differences of policy between our two governments, but that we had not had to consider one on which wider divergence had been publicly expressed than question I wished to take up today. I wanted to repeat, as on previous occasions, that whatever differences between our two [Page 1738] governments might be, our hand would always be extended to India in dignity and friendship, as long as India chose to accept it.
I then stated that President Eisenhower would announce publicly at noon tomorrow Washington time his decision to grant military aid to Pakistan. I said President desired me to deliver personal letter to him prior to this announcement, to make it clear that this action was in no way designed against India and to express earnest hope that friendly relations between US and India would in no way be impaired.
I referred to two statements in letter which seemed to me especially significant. First was declaration that if aid was misused or directed against another in aggression, President would undertake immediate action, both within and without UN, to thwart such aggression. Second was assurance that request by India for military aid would receive most sympathetic consideration. In regard latter, I said we recognized fully India’s right to decide its own policy and that we were well aware that this policy was opposed to receipt of foreign military aid from any source. Nehru had made this abundantly clear in numerous public statements, and he should in no way construe President’s offer as indicating that we did not accept his statements as settled Indian policy at present time. Speaking personally, I said I had been in some doubt as to desirability of this offer when it first came to my attention since he (Nehru) might have some justifiable ground for replying “in Heaven’s name don’t you accept my clear and categorical statements on this subject?” I said that on further reflection I had concluded that offer to India simultaneous with decision to grant aid to Pakistan was desirable to make it abundantly clear that we were not arming Pakistan against India.
I then handed letter to Nehru. He read both letter and public announcement carefully, taking special note of points I had emphasized. At conclusion he smiled, studied his cigarette for few moments, then said in pleasant and almost confidential tone, “I have never at any moment, since subject arose two or three months ago, had any thought whatsoever that US Government, and least of all President Eisenhower, wished to do any damage to India.” He expressed appreciation for letter and for its clear exposition of President’s motives and point of view. He said what disturbed him was not US motives but possible consequences of this action. Aside from international aspects which he had stated publicly on several occasions, he wished to speak quite frankly regarding certain internal aspects in both India and Pakistan which concerned him. He said vast majority of 40,000,000 Muslims in India were integral parts of the nation. Unfortunately, however, there were relatively small groups of extremists among Indian Muslims who did not conceal their pleasure over Pakistan aid because they hoped it might lead to renewal of Muslim domination of India. He said this feeling in turn aroused Hindu [Page 1739] extremists who were demanding all sorts of military preparations by India. As result, increased tensions were created not only between India and Pakistan but also between Indian religious communities. As regards Pakistan he paid warm tribute to Prime Minister Mohammed Ali and said he hoped very much he could remain in office. However Mohammed Ali did not have strong political organization and might not be able to withstand pressure from extremists who might force into power someone much less reasonable who would listen to adventurers.
I interrupted to refer again to President’s strong statement regarding action to prevent Pakistan aggression and said I was fully convinced that US military aid would make Pakistan aggression less likely. I pointed out that at present time US was giving military assistance of one kind or another to some thirty or forty countries and that not one of them had engaged in aggression. Nehru then reread pertinent portion of President’s letter. He made no comment but appeared to be impressed.
I said we would like to release text of letter simultaneously with public announcement at noon tomorrow (10:30 [10:00] p.m., Delhi time February 25) and that this seemed preferable to me in order to bring whole story out simultaneously and not piecemeal. Nehru said this was matter entirely for President Eisenhower to decide. There was no implication of any objection on Nehru’s part.2
Comment: Conversation was surprisingly pleasant throughout. Nehru made conscious effort to be agreeable. He showed no adverse reaction to President’s offer to consider sympatheticaly any Indian request for military aid, and it is possible that he was rather pleased. I have no doubt he will issue public statement reiterating strong objection to US action, but I hope discussion on this subject will diminish after few days. I do not anticipate serious public demonstrations.
- This telegram was repeated to London as telegram 236 and to Karachi as telegram 176.↩
- On Feb. 28, the Indian Embassy in Washington delivered Prime Minister Nehru’s reply to President Eisenhower to the Department of State with the request that it be delivered promptly to the White House. Nehru appreciated the President’s message, but said that the Government of India would continue to pursue its present policies because of its “desire to help in the furtherance of peace and freedom.” (Presidential Correspondence, lot 66 D 204, “Prime Minister Nehru’s Correspondence with Eisenhower/Dulles 1953–1961”)↩