771.00/6–1654
Memorandum of Conversation, by John Bovey, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs
Subject:
- Moroccan and Tunisian Problem in the United Nations
Participants:
- NEA/P—John A. Bovey, Jr. and
- Mr. Keshishian, New York correspondent of “Al Ahram” and other Arab papers in Cairo, and ex-correspondent of “El Alaam” and “Istiqlal” in Morocco
Mr. Keshishian inquired as to the Department’s position in any forthcoming discussion of the Moroccan and Tunisian problem in the United Nations. I stated that I was unable to answer this and did not believe that any decision had been taken on this matter since the occurrence or circumstances of any such debate were unknown at present. I asked Mr. Keshishian whether he thought that the matter would come up, and if so, who among the Arab states would carry the ball. He replied that it would most certainly come up and that it would probably be by a joint effort of the Arab states. He said his information was that the campaign would be set up at the forthcoming conference in Djakarta. I gathered that this and other statements were based on corridor talk at the UN in New York. Mr. Keshishian appears to be in frequent contact with members of the Near Eastern delegations as well as with Moroccans and Tunisians, though he has never been in North Africa. His principal beat is the U.N.
[Page 881]Mr. Keshishian said that his Moroccan and Tunisian friends were greatly disappointed that Mr. Dulles made no allusion to North Africa in his recent address on colonialism to the Rotarians. I tried to explain that he was speaking specifically of Indo-China and could hardly be expected to enumerate all the areas in the world where this problem existed, not to mention the number of our allies to whom such a catalogue would be offensive.
Mr. Keshishian replied that Moroccans and Tunisians were increasingly restive and disappointed with the United States since the Acheson and Jessup declarations before the United Nations, which had aroused high hopes, had not been followed by any concrete assistance or betterment.
Mr. Keshishian felt that nationalists such as Balafrej and el Fassi were extremely skeptical as to the outcome of the Lacoste mission and were of the opinion that with the best will in the world the new Resident would not be able to survive the onslaught of the colons and the conservative bureaucracy. A change of tack in the metropole was necessary, Mr. Keshishian said, and he agreed that the solution to the problem really lay there. The only ultimate solution, he said, was the independence of the two countries.
He asked whether there was any talk of the return of Moulay Abdullah, the Sultan’s second son, to succeed Ben Arafa. I said that there had been some discussion of it as a possibility and asked whether his friends thought this would really do any good. He stated that the Moroccan masses—he included the rural as well as the urban populations, though at present to a lesser degree—were extremely attached to the ex-Sultan and his family, but said his friends were skeptical that Abdullah would do the trick. The Istiqlal favored a plebiscite, he said, and short of the return of Sidi Mohammed V, he thought the people’s choice would be with Moulay Hassan and that any other change would not materially alter the situation. What the Istiqlal really wanted, he said, was a constitutional monarch along the lines of Feisal in Iraq or Hussein but with a revered figure such as Sidi Mohammed V as the symbol of Moroccan aspirations. I said that I thought that this idea was associated rather with Benjelloun’s Parti Democrate d’Independance and that the Istiqlal had tended to put its eggs in the basket of an absolute theocratic Sultanate. He said he did not think this was the real Istiqlal aim, but admitted that Moroccans as a whole were probably at present more interested in the symbols of sovereignty than in any program of reforms or their direct participation in government.
Mr. Keshishian said that in Tunis where the Bey was less closely associated with the movement and where the degree of evolution was greater, leaders such as Bourguiba could be brought back without the loss of face for the French which could result in Morocco from changing [Page 882] the head of the state. He maintained that El Fassi had a considerable popular following in Morocco.
I asked him whether he thought that El Fassi or Balafrej and other veterans of Moroccan nationalism were sufficiently in control of the movement to be able to influence more extreme elements and halt the present wave of terrorism even if French policy should take a favorable turn for the nationalists. He said he thought they could halt it, but he did not know how long this would be the case. I suggested that in that event they might well have done so in order to give Mr. Lacoste an even break during the exploratory phases of his mission; this would certainly constitute a far more interesting demonstration of power and responsibility for foreign consumption than the stepped-up terrorism which had followed the news of Lacoste’s appointment. He dodged this one by reiterating his own skepticism as a Syrian concerning France’s ability to change course in colonial matters, and spoke rather emphatically of what he considered the scant attention given in the United States and in the Department to Arab opinion, especially that in the dependent areas. He contrasted Arab public relations with those of Israel in this respect.
Mr. Keshishian said finally that while he understood the United States’ embarrassment because of our commitments to our NATO allies, he really didn’t see how we could justify much longer a so completely pro-French stand (particularly in the U.N.) regarding an area which was not threatened directly by Soviet aggression. I tried to explain that Soviet imperialism was an urgent problem which certainly had a bearing on North Africa because of the vital interrelation between Africa and Europe. He said he didn’t see how this interrelationship could be useful to us in the long run except on the basis of independent North African allies, friendly to France and to us.