772.00/12–253
The Counselor of Embassy in France (Joyce) to the Department of State1
No. 1467
Subject:
- Tunisian Developments
The following are the highlights of recent conversations regarding Tunisian developments between the reporting officer and the two officials in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs most directly concerned with Tunisian problems—M. Geoffroy Chodron de Courcel, Director of Afrique-Levant, and his assistant, M. Jean Basdevant, Chief of the Protectorate Section.
Reform Program
Both informants indicated that no spectacular developments are to be expected in the immediate future. The Resident General has been having very wide consultations in Tunisia, and it is through these consultations [Page 874] and his conversations with the Bey that he expects to be able to arrive at his own conclusions of the nature of reforms which might be feasible. The Bey has indicated to the Resident General that he favors such an approach and that he believes that the problem of working out a Franco-Tunisian understanding should be handled quietly and without fanfare. This, M. de Courcel added, was in fact the approach of Resident General Mons, the predecessor of M. Perillier. Mons had worked quietly and unspectacularly in establishing a good relationship with the Bey and gaining the confidence of nationalist elements. During his regime a number of significant reforms were accomplished. M. Perillier’s approach, he continued, was too spectacular and encouraged ever-increasing demands on the part of the Neo Destour.
M. de Courcel suggested that, viewed in retrospect, the handling of the reform program of June, 1952, was a mistake. The publicity attending it encouraged the Tunisians to reject it. It had not had the result of calling off the U.N. consideration of the problem, the Arab-Asiatic states were dissatisfied with it as not going far enough, whereas the French colons were dissatisfied because it went too far. While the French are not standing on the 1952 program and are prepared to consider modifications and revisions, for all practical purposes, however, the range of possibilities in reform measures at this stage is rather limited. The basic problem to be resolved remains the same: determining the nature and functions of the new institutions to be established, which will recognize Tunisian aspirations for ever-increasing autonomy and which, at the same time, will protect legitimate French interests.
It is expected that after M. Voizard has reached his conclusions as to reform measures which might be taken up with the greatest possibility of success, the Bey will have to determine whether he himself wishes to participate in more detailed discussions on specific measures or whether he will prefer to designate several Tunisians to pursue the problem with the Resident General on his behalf. M. de Courcel did not believe that Neo Destourians would be designated in the latter case. It was anticipated that these designees, while recognized as Tunisian nationalists, would not be identified with the Neo Destour or, on the other hand, known for pro-French sympathies. Responsible Neo Destourians let it be known that they do not wish to participate in the present Tunisian Government or in the anticipated negotiations between the French and Tunisians since they might be forced to take extreme positions and endanger the possibilities of reaching an understanding. M. de Courcel was hopeful that within the next few months the Resident General would have made headway in tackling some of the problems. One of those problems of concern to the Ministry is that of the Tunisian budget. It would like to have the budget for the coming [Page 875] fiscal year examined by a financial council such as that envisaged in the 1952 program. However, it may well be that the Resident General will conclude that this is not a favorable issue on which to reach an understanding at this time.
Bourguiba
Questioned regarding Bourguiba’s status, M. de Courcel said that there were no plans for transferring him from Galite Island, although, of course, the Resident General might make such a decision at a later date. The latter had recently permitted Mme. Bourguiba to visit her husband and the French had assured themselves that his health was satisfactory and that he was not suffering any hardships, despite Cairo reports to the contrary. M. de Courcel made it quite clear that neither the Ministry nor the Resident General viewed Bourguiba as the key to the problem of obtaining Tunisian agreement to reform measures. Even Neo Destourians in Tunisia had told him that Bourguiba was not a satisfactory person to deal with. While he gave the appearance of being a man of reason and moderation, he could not be depended upon to live up to agreements made with him. He could be characterized, M. de Courcel concluded, as unstable and unreliable.
Reported Misunderstanding between Messrs. Voizard and Baccouche
The Paris newspaper, Le Monde, in its issue of December 2, carried a report from Tunis that certain difficulties had arisen between the Resident General and Prime Minister Baccouche, presumably because certain decisions appeared to the latter as a renewal of direct administration. These difficulties, Le Monde added, had been straightened out following a meeting between the two principals.
Questioned about this report, M. Basdevant said that he could throw no light on it. So far as he knew, relations between Messrs. Voizard and Baccouche were very friendly and the former, in his reports to the Ministry, had made no mention of any difficulties with M. Baccouche.
Reported Cabinet Changes in Tunisia
Le Monde, on December 2, also referred to reports from Tunis of a pending change in the Tunisian cabinet, which, however, was not expected to take place before the end of January, that is, after the installation of the new French president and the forming of the new French cabinet which will follow.
Messrs. de Courcel and Basdevant both indicated that no cabinet changes in Tunisia were envisaged for the present. The present cabinet was concerned exclusively with internal administration and it was generally agreed that it should not be burdened with the additional responsibility for negotiation. However, if and when some concrete progress is accomplished in obtaining agreement on reform measures, they felt that cabinet changes would undoubtedly follow and that new [Page 876] appointments would be political in character. It would be premature, they indicated, to elaborate further at this stage.
- This despatch was repeated to Tunis and Rome.↩