Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

320/9–553

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State

secret
SD/A/C.1/431

[Washington,] September 5, 1953.

The Tunisian Problem

the problem

Fifteen Arab-Asian states have placed on the General Assembly’s provisional agenda the “Tunisian Question”, and will charge that France has failed to conduct its relations with Tunisia in accordance with the 1952 General Assembly resolution, describe the situation as a potential threat to peace and security, and ask the Assembly to consider steps necessary “to prevent the further deterioration of the situation.”

united states position

1. The United States should support inclusion of the Tunisian problem in the Assembly’s agenda. (This position must be kept in strictest confidence and must not be revealed to anyone without explicit authorization by the Secretary.)

2. The United States should concert with the French mutually acceptable plans on the place which the Moroccan and Tunisian items should be given on the Committee’s agenda.

3. The United States should oppose any move to provide a hearing for a representative of the Bey or for any unofficial Tunisian spokesman.

4. Assuming that discussion of the Tunisian problem will take place after the Moroccan debate, the United States should express the following views: (a) Discussion of the Tunisian problem, allowing for certain differences between it and the Moroccan question, might well be shortened to avoid undue repetition and to avoid undue tension over these issues, (b) While there is international interest in the progress of Tunisia toward self-government, the situation hardly endangers international peace and security, (c) It will not help for the Assembly to sit in judgement on the conduct of France and Tunisia in their negotiations of the past year, (d) As in the case of Morocco, we are deeply interested in the orderly development of self-government for Tunisia; we note that certain reforms have already been applied in Tunisia and expect that France will work out additional steps in that direction.

5. While the United States would prefer to have no Assembly resolution on the subject, we are prepared to support a resolution expressing the continued hope that the parties will move forward on the path of direct negotiations toward agreed solutions, in line with last year’s resolution. The United States would strongly oppose any resolution condemnatory of French conduct, providing for the establishment of any United Nations machinery to deal with the problem, or calling for a report of the parties to the General Assembly on the progress of their negotiations.

Comment: The United States supports the continued French presence in North Africa and we are committed to France in that respect. While Tunisia is not, perhaps, as directly important to us in terms of strategic air power, it does play an important part in the over-all French defense position in the Mediterranean. At the same time we wish to preserve as far as possible the friendship and confidence of the North Africans themselves, and demonstrate to the Arab-Asians and to the world generally our support for the orderly progress of dependent peoples toward self-government, as the Secretary pointed out in his June 1 address on the Middle East.

There appears to be little doubt but that the Assembly will approve inclusion of the Tunisian question on its agenda and that the matter will be discussed, though some effort should be made to avoid having as extensive a debate as on the more crucial Moroccan problem. Given the Assembly’s wide competence under the Charter, which we recognized last year, we could not argue that mere absence of danger to international peace and security should rule out discussion of the Tunisian question. If we are to be in a position to help guide Assembly discussion toward a moderate conclusion, we can hardly oppose, or even abstain, on the vote on inclusion of the question on the agenda. Not only the Arab-Asians but many of our Latin American neighbors will certainly regard the question of inclusion as a test of the principle of freedom of discussion in the “town meeting of the world.”

United States opposition to inviting a representative of the Bey or of the Tunisian Nationalists should be based on the following grounds: (a) It is undesirable for the Assembly to give the appearance in its discussion of making an investigation or of involving itself in controversy concerning representative Tunisian spokesmen. (b) An invitation to a Tunisian spokesman by the Committee might stimulate disorders and increased tension in the area.

It must be anticipated that, as last year, the French Delegation—after protesting the accusations made against France by the Arab-Asians—will refuse to participate in further discussion of the Tunisian question, basing its position on the ground that this problem lies beyond the competence of the General Assembly because of Article 2/7 of the Charter.¹

1. The question of Tunisia was taken up by the UN General Assembly, but an Arab-Asian draft resolution calling for steps to insure the realization of Tunisian sovereignty and independence failed of adoption by a vote of 31 to 18 (U.S.), with 10 abstentions, because it did not receive the ⅔ majority needed for an important question. The United States opposed the resolution because it felt that passage might exacerbate relations between France and Tunisia.