Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

320/10–2852: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State¹

top secret
niact

Paris, October 28, 1952—2 p.m.

2604. We think idea of letter from Secretary to Schuman (Deptels 2389 and 2418 October 27)² is good. Its main value we believe will be in making clear to French that US position re French presence in NA has not changed since Secretary’s talks with Pinay and other Cabinet Ministers on May 28³ and further that US seeks to be as helpful as possible in handling of Tunisian and Moroccan issues in GA. We believe somewhat briefer message from Secretary than that proposed Deptel 2389, avoiding reference to our position, already well known to French, on competence issue (reiteration of which will not dissuade some elements that we are not seeking to evict France from NA) and making limited reference to our views on type of presentation French should make in GA, will assure more sympathetic Cabinet reaction. Along same line, we would also prefer eliminate oral message. We believe our best hope of leading French to decide on vigorous and effective presentation lies in Schuman’s talks with Secretary after his arrival in NY and his appraisal of prevailing GA atmosphere. Text proposed message from Secretary to Schuman revised along above lines contained my immediately following telegram.⁴

Problem of handling NA at GA discussed yesterday evening in some detail with De Margerie prior to receipt reftels. He began by stating that French have apparently not been very successful in convincing US official and public opinion of rightness of French North African policy. He commented that current FonOff thinking was that the more definite, resolute and realistic a course on NA the French could present, the better the chance they had of securing American and other support. He indicated FonOff thinking along following lines although there is strong pressure in Cabinet and Assembly for something much harsher:

Schuman would seek to speak first in Comite 1, would take firm line on question of competence but also make strong statement as to what French had done in NA and what they hoped to do. After that he wld take no further part in debate.

French case wld be presented against background that Africa began at Sahara, that northern littoral was lower jaw of Mediterranean, that its civilization was Mediterranean rather than African or eastern and that French considered its future dependent on development of Franco–Arab cooperation and common action to advance their common interests. Future would thus be along lines of “blending” rather than separation.

Two things are clear. One is that Schuman is having difficulty obtaining Cabinet support for doing anything other than taking adamant position on question of competence. The other is that French opinion is at best confused over US position and for most part believes we are somewhat hostile to France on this issue. We believe Secretary’s message would strengthen Schuman’s hand in Cabinet meeting tomorrow. We realize problems which public statement at this time would cause in US, nevertheless if we can convince Cabinet we really wish to help rather than injure French on this issue this will undoubtedly be indirectly reflected in press here.

Dunn

1. This telegram was repeated to USUN for the Secretary.

2. Neither printed. Telegram 2389 informed the Embassy the Department of State had been looking for a way to allay French worries about the U.S. attitude on Tunisia and Morocco and to induce them to make a forthright statement about their accomplishments and future plans for those areas so that the United States could publicly support them. The Department had discarded the idea of making a public statement in support of the French and instead preferred to send a letter from the Secretary of State to Foreign Minister Schuman. There followed the draft text of a letter, together with instructions for the Ambassador to add orally when he delivered it. In his oral remarks, the Ambassador was instructed to emphasize the fact that no other country could give effective assistance to the French if they did not make a strong presentation at the United Nations regarding their achievements and programs for North Africa. (320/10–2752)

   Telegram 2418 made some changes in the wording of the draft letter transmitted in telegram 2389. (320/10–2752)

3. The minutes of the May 28 meeting are on p. 766.
4. Telegram 2605, Oct. 28, not printed. (320/10–2852) See the footnotes to the letter to Schuman, Oct. 31, p. 837, for the differences among the original draft text, the version in Paris telegram 2605, and the final letter.