S/S–Jessup files, lot 53 D 65, “Tunisia”
Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly at New York, October 23, 19521
US/A/M (Chr)/244
Present:
- Secretary Acheson
- Ambassador Austin
- Mrs. Roosevelt
- Senator Green
- Senator Wiley
- Ambassador Gross
- Ambassador Jessup
- Ambassador Cohen
- Mr. Sprague
- Mrs. Sampson
- Mr. Lubin
- Mr. Charles Allen
- Mr. Ward Allen
- Colonel Babcock
- Mr. Bancroft
- Mr. Barrett
- Mr. Bechhoefer
- Mr. Kitchen
- Mr. Meeker
- Mr. Mills
- Ambassador Muccio
- Mr. Plitt
- Mr. Pollak
- Mr. Popper
- Mr. Richey
- Mr. Roberts
- Colonel Rodieck
- Mr. Ross
- Mr. Brown
- Mr. Byington
- Mr. Cook
- Mr. Dreier
- Mr. Gerig
- Miss Gough
- Mr. Hall
- Mr. Hickerson
- Mr. Hyde
- Ambassador Key
- Mr. Sanders
- Mr. Sherer
- Mr. Shulman
- Mr. Stein
- Admiral Struble
- Mr. Taylor
- Mr. Wilcox
- Mr. Winslow
- Mr. Witman
Agenda
1. The Tunisian Question. (Document SD/A/C.1/394)2
After Ambassador Austin opened the meeting, Mr. Taylor commented on the Plenary agenda for the following day. He said that there were three subjects. The first would be the Secretary General’s report on ways for shortening Assembly Sessions. This item was noncontroversial and should present no difficulties.
The second item was the Council elections. For the three seats on the Security Council, the United States had moved early in order to clarify the matter. Our position had already been given to the candidates we would support for these seats: Denmark, Lebanon and Columbia, which was now the definite choice of the Latin-American caucus. For ECOSOC, we would, of course, support our own re-election and also the candidacies of Turkey, Australia, Yugoslavia, Venezuela and India. For the Trusteeship Council, the United States would vote for El Salvador to succeed itself and for Syria to replace Iraq.
The third item in the Plenary would deal with the report of the Negotiating Committee for extra budgetary matters. This too, it was expected, would be non-controversial.
i. the tunisian question
Ambassador Austin welcomed Mr. Richey, from the Bureau of African Affairs, to make a statement on the background facts. Mr. Richey began by recalling that Tunisia was a sovereign State under the protection of the French. He described the geography of Tunisia and listed its economic aspects. In describing the political history of Tunisia, he noted that the rights of the French and of the Bey were regulated by the protectorate treaty. French authority was exerted through a Resident-General, while the Bey was represented by the Prime Minister. In effect France was in control of both the internal and external affairs of Tunisia.
He described the Nationalist Movement, noting that it was non-Communistic, although for a short period of time it had collaborated with the Communist Party which had legal status in Tunisia. The [Page 830] Tunisian Labor Union, UGTT, which was affiliated with the ICFTU, was a very strong union.
The ultimate aim of the Tunisian Nationalists was complete independence, but their immediate objective was internal autonomy.
The present crisis in Tunisia had its beginnings in 1950 when reforms were sought by the Tunisians from the French. Unsatisfied with the French position, the Tunisians had sent a delegation to Paris to make certain demands. These were rejected by the French with the implication that the existing arrangements were permanent. After negotiations broke down in the fall of 1951, local disorders occurred throughout Tunisia which required the presence of French troops to put them down and restore calm. The French refused to discuss their reform program with the existing Tunisian cabinet. They put all its members in jail and appointed a new cabinet. Further attempts at negotiation on a reform program with this group led to the appointment by the Bey of an advisory group which ultimately rejected the French proposals. However, the Bey apparently left the door open to further negotiations.
Mr. Richey then commented briefly on the substance of the French reform proposals. There would be a majority of Tunisians in the Council of Ministers, an increase in the Tunisian membership in the Civil Service, an all-Tunisian legislative council limited to consultative functions, and local councils with equal representation for the French and the Tunisians.
The Tunisians asserted that these proposals did not meet their desires, were merely paper proposals which, in fact, assured French control of Tunisia and that the decrees for implementing them obscured their real purposes. Senator Green inquired as to what the real purposes were. Mr. Richey indicated that the Tunisians felt that the details of the reform decrees sometimes went counter to their supposed reform purpose.
Ambassador Austin thought that the outline presented by Mr. Richey of the background situation had been well stated. He suggested that there would be an opportunity for fuller discussion later after Mr. Popper had gone into the UN aspects of the case.
Mr. Popper recalled that there had been a tendency to submit various matters for consideration in the UN as a result of the nationalist ferment throughout the Arab-Asian world from as far back as 1946 when the item on the treatment of Indians in South Africa had first been presented. Last year, in Paris, the Asian-African group had proposed an item concerning the alleged violation of human rights in Morocco. Consideration had been postponed on this item as a result of a Canadian proposal. Then, in the Spring of 1952, the Tunisian case had been submitted to the Security Council. It was kept off the [Page 831] agenda only after a bitter debate in which the United States had abstained from voting.
A series of critical dilemmas were presented to the US. The traditional deep-seated feeling of the right of all peoples to self-government ran up against the dangers of “over-rapid development” in the face of the Soviet menace in the world. The Department had believed that it was inappropriate to discuss these matters in the Council, as well as in the Assembly where they had first arisen. The right to discuss such matters, however, had never been opposed and the US had specifically reserved its position on this point. The position we had thus taken brought attacks both from those who favored the cause of the Nationalists, as well as from those who argued simply for the right of free discussion.
Now in virtue of our support for inscription of the item in the agenda, the issue had been narrowed and the right of free discussion was no longer involved. An indication of this was the ease with which the agenda phase had been weathered. The US still felt, as the Secretary had said in his Plenary speech, that negotiation by the parties offered the only hope for a solution. There was a limit to what the UN could do. The influence of the United States would be thrown on the side of moderation. It was hoped that the French would go along with a moderate approach and plainly indicate a willingness to reach a negotiated solution.
There were dangers involved in any UN action, Mr. Popper cautioned. Condemnation of the French or the creation of a commission of investigation, or other measures by which the UN injected itself into this controversy, would not be helpful. Mr. Popper said that it was hoped, if a resolution were to be adopted on this question, that it would set the tone and focus of the matter as above indicated and not over-reach itself. We knew that the Asian-African group would want to go farther, but this would appear to be undesirable. The French Delegation apparently did not have its instructions on the substance and could only fall back upon their previous statement that they would not participate in any discussion on this matter.
Ambassador Austin called upon Ambassador Jessup who would be handling this item in the First Committee. Ambassador Jessup thought that Mr. Popper’s statement indicated the lines of the decision which the Delegation should make. He re-emphasized our position as being somewhat in the middle. We would oppose condemnation, mediation, investigation, or any move to bring this item up again next year. The Asian-Africans understood this as our position and “are not excited about it”. The first test, said Ambassador Jessup, would come when the order of the agenda items was decided. He hoped that we could avoid the impression of being a party to a [Page 832] scheme for putting this item so far down on the agenda as to nullify any debate on it.
The UK and France would maintain that the Assembly was incompetent, according to Ambassador Jessup. There was also the chance of a French walk-out. He sympathized with the present position of the French Delegation which did not yet know what their instructions would be. Senator Wiley inquired whether the walk-out would be from the UN itself or simply from a discussion on this item. Ambassador Jessup assumed that it would be only the latter, if it did in fact occur.
There was also the important question, said Ambassador Jessup, of the relation to the South African race conflict item. He reported the existence of stresses and strains within the Asian-African group and differing degrees of enthusiasm therein on the various items. While they maintained a uniformity in public, they should be approached by us in private in order for us to be able to urge moderation wherever possible.
The Secretary recalled a long conversation on the previous night with Dr. Al-Jamali, Foreign Minister of Iraq,3 at which Mr. Plitt had been present. Jamali had urged that Tunisia come first on the agenda of the First Committee. The Secretary had pointed out to him that its present position on the Secretary General’s list would mean that it would come up by November 20 and that this would allow at least a full month’s debate before the target date for adjourning the Assembly. He had also indicated to Jamali the difficult position the Arab-Asians would be in in any conversations they held with the French Delegation in Schuman’s absence. Without him the French Delegation would not get very far. Jamali appeared somewhat impressed by this point. On the substance of the matter the Secretary had also suggested that if they would wait, perhaps Schuman could be persuaded to avoid precipitating a bitter debate over competence. After an inevitable speech by the French on competence, Schuman might be persuaded to get on with the discussion and avoid a French walk-out. The Secretary felt certain that only Schuman could make such a decision. Jamali wanted to think this over too. The Secretary had then re-emphasized his remarks, in the Plenary, of an appeal to reason. He had pointed out the weakness of Schuman’s position vis-à-vis French public opinion and suggested that “kicking Schuman around for the fun of it” would be doing a great disservice to the UN. The Secretary stressed the extreme delicacy of this matter in the light of the tensions that exist in the world today.
The Secretary pointed out to the Delegation the stresses in the North Atlantic Council and our strategic interests in North Africa, which the Joint Chiefs of Staff deem of vital importance to our [Page 833] national interest. “We are walking on egg-shells in this, and must do it with all the wisdom we can”.
Mr. Ward Allen raised a supplemental point which might occur at the outset. It was certain that an invitation would be issued to a representative of the Tunisians. The US would favor a representative of the Bey. The French were extremely concerned since the affirmative action required on their part, such as issuing passports and visas, would cause them great trouble at home. If the French were not to take such action, then any Tunisian representative would undoubtedly be an extremist at present in exile.
Mrs. Roosevelt wondered what we had done or were doing to see that the French were really moving on this matter. She recalled instances in Paris when labor and student representatives of Tunisia had come to see her. She could understand the problems with which they were faced, and hoped that if we supported the French, it would be those Frenchmen who had genuine plans and not just paper proposals.
The Secretary pointed out that the matter of North Africa was as vital a factor in French domestic opinion as the question of Germany. With North Africa the French considered themselves a power. Without it they were not. The French man in the street talks about the problems in North Africa, and it was politically very difficult to do anything with regard to North Africa because the constituents were so irate about the matter. The Secretary recalled that he had met with the French cabinet for a half a day last May. He had told them that we could not support them unless we knew precisely to what we were giving our support. The French had had a preference for “secret dickerings”. They would certainly not go beyond what was contained in the reform decrees when these were properly drafted. We have told the Tunisians that they should accept what the French were willing to give, not necessarily as final, but as something to work from. The French, of course, feared that this was what would happen and that they would have to go further.
Ambassador Cohen raised the question of whether hearing a representative of the Bey might create a situation wherein the Bey would be pulled in both directions. This would cause a breakdown in his own position, which was one of the few weak bridges that we have there. The Secretary said that this was indeed a difficult point. The Bey was glad to side with the Tunisians in their demands for independence from the French. On the other hand, the Bey was an autocratic ruler who wanted no talk of independence from the Tunisians as far as his authority was concerned. This was a real source of trouble, said the Secretary.
The Chairman then adjourned the meeting in view of the lateness of the hour.