320/10–2352
Memorandum by the Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs (Knight) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins)1
Subject:
- North African Crisis
The action of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly in voting for the Arab-Asian resolution to put the Tunisian and Moroccan items on the GA agenda in second and third position, immediately after the Korean question, has brought to a head with unexpected rapidity the crisis forecast in WE’s memorandum of October 20 on French public opinion on the North African problem.2 As outlined in detail in our memorandum, a whole series of recent events have made us “Public Enemy No. 1” on the North African affair, which is, in turn, the most sensitive problem in the entire French gamut. Our vote against France on the agenda issue added to the already overcharged atmosphere regrettably appears to have led to a real explosion in France.
Last night’s debate finished too late for the French correspondents [Page 825] to file their stories for this morning’s Paris press. Therefore, Le Monde this afternoon will be the first to carry a full report. Maurice Ferro has read to Mr. McBride the text of his article. He apologized in advance for its tone but said neither his readers nor his bosses would permit anything else. We were lucky, he added, that this report would appear before that of Aurore, which will not come out until tomorrow morning. This, he described, as a piece written by a newly-arrived correspondent who had been horrified by the United States North African policy and called virtually for a reorientation of French pro-Western attitudes, and a retreat to neutralism. Ferro’s own article is logical and well-written as always; it contains a strong denunciation of the United States position in general on the North African question.
Ferro does not, however, go into details of what allegedly happened during the vote yesterday in New York. This is left for other correspondents. George-Henri Martin of France-Soir has informed Miss Kirkpatrick that it was his understanding that the United States Delegation had violated its commitment made only a few minutes before to the French Delegation not to vote with the Arab-Asian bloc on this question of promoting the North African items on the agenda, but to abstain. He felt our vote was a direct about-face. The French position on this question, incidentally, was to leave the Tunisian and Moroccan items in fourth and fifth place where they had previously been placed, and where the Secretary-General had recommended they be left. The French reasoning was that they did not wish to have the North African questions come up until Foreign Minister Schuman arrived. He is not coming, to avoid possible embarrassment to us, until after the United States elections. Finally, in the press field, the AFP has a lengthy piece without much comment but also stressing the breaking by the United States of its commitment on this procedural question immediately after we had dragooned the reluctant British and French to vote for an immediate Korean debate which they opposed. The French Embassy has taken the line it prefers not to discuss this unfortunate episode with the Department or anyone else at this time.
From the foregoing it is quite obvious that we will have a major crisis on our hands tomorrow morning in Paris. Unfortunately WE simply cannot guarantee at what point resentment against the United States on this issue may stop, even though the cause of the blow-up was not one of substance (but rather, in the French view, one of good faith). The general atmosphere it is believed was fully outlined in the October 20 memorandum. However, that document did not foresee any such unforeseen event as yesterday’s vote, and it is difficult to see, in the present circumstances, how the forces of moderation can maintain control of French governmental and public opinion on United States policy in North Africa. Furthermore, and what may be more serious, a definite damper has been placed on their willingness to lead France in [Page 826] other policies which they have undertaken in the common interest, such as the EDC. An immediate outcry for withdrawal from Indochina can also be anticipated, and indeed has already been foreshadowed in certain remarks in the Assembly during the past two or three days.
Given this most regrettable set of circumstances, we have been giving urgent consideration to what if anything can be done to redress the French situation. It is apparent that this is no time for half-way measures. It would seem that any “assurances” which we might now give the French on our attitude in the forthcoming UN debate would be useless, because we have already told them that we will, under no conditions, approve anything more than a resolution enjoining the French on the one hand and the Tunisians and the Moroccans on the other to negotiate bilaterally on the problem, and this position has already been deemed insufficient by the Arabs. Furthermore, the damage in the UN insofar as France is concerned has already been done.
Therefore, it would seem that we have now reached the point where, in the overriding interest of our basic policies, such as the EDC and NATO, we are now obliged to issue a statement endorsing the French “presence” and French policy generally in the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia. We would have preferred to issue this statement some months ago when Franco-American relations were less exacerbated than now. However, it was not issued. The present crisis can hardly be rectified by anything else. We have been unable to think of any alternative that would unequivocally prove that United States motives in North Africa did not involve the weakening or even disappearance of French control. As has been repeatedly stated, our policy in North Africa, which is governed basically by vital strategic concepts, decidedly does not aim at the French departure from the area. Therefore, I strongly recommend that the Department now issue immediately a clear statement of our policy vis-à-vis France in North Africa. Without such a statement it is difficult to forecast to what point and how rapidly our relations with France may deteriorate.
There is attached for your consideration a possible draft for such a statement.3