Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

772.00/10–852: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, October 8, 1952—8 p.m.

2156. Embtel 2135.² Press and Parliamentary reaction to govt decision on Tunisia and consequent Assembly rejection yesterday of proposal for foreign policy debate has been virtually unanimous in favor of Pinay. Even Socialists who normally criticize govt for too reactionary an approach in negots with Tunisians have shown certain sympathy for position that govt shld take firm attitude re UN interference in this question.

Pinay gets full credit for great skill in handling Assembly as well as (1) pleasing MRP by maintaining solidarity with Schuman (2) pleasing dissident Gaullists whose reason-for-being is belief they can influence foreign policy by cooperation in domestic issues as opposed to De Gaulle’s lack of influence through complete opposition (3) speaking in advance De Gaulle’s chances of rallying opinion on Tunisian issue in foreign policy statement expected today and (4) not only pleasing right-wing parties by firm Tunisian stand, but increasing own stature before all parties by appearance of having acted as real head of govt and having taken situation in hand.

Pinay is being credited with having killed “l’affaire Schuman” by fact that he appeared to have moved in and taken over direction of foreign policy from Schuman, who reportedly favored “weaker” approach of agreeing to inscription and then arguing noncompetence or French case.

Result of this vis-à-vis Parliament is that Pinay, who had succeeded in capturing “confidence” of country in his handling of domestic affairs, has now succeeded at least temporarily in creating large measure of confidence in his ability to safeguard Fr interests in foreign policy matters, a field in which he was previously considered uninterested if not unqualified. If this new feeling persists, it may greatly assist govt in obtaining acceptance of policies which previously have been considered, at least by many Parliamentarians, as strictly “Schuman” policies.

Dunn

1. This telegram was repeated to London.
2. Oct. 8; not printed. According to the Embassy, it seemed clear that the Cabinet decision to take a strong line on North Africa in the United Nations had helped Pinay to avoid a dangerous foreign policy debate in the opening days of the National Assembly. (320/10–852)