Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

772.00/10–452

Position Paper Prepared for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

secret
SD/A/C.1/394

[New York,?]¹October 4, 1952.

The Tunisian Question

the problem

To determine the United States position in the General Assembly on the Tunisian question.

recommendations

1. The United States should support inclusion of “The Tunisian Question” submitted by the Arab-Asian States on the agenda of the Seventh Session. In the General Committee, the United States Delegation should speak on the question after the French have spoken, and should refrain from taking a prominent part in the discussion.

2. The United States should oppose having the General Assembly vote specifically on the issue of its competence and should discourage any efforts to have this issue pressed to a vote. However, if the question of competence becomes an issue, the United States while supporting the view that the Assembly is clearly competent to inscribe the question on its agenda, discuss it and make recommendations with regard thereto, should attempt to minimize the importance of the issue of competence and avoid exaggerating our differences with the French and British.

3. If there is a general desire to hear Tunisian representation, the United States should favor a hearing for a representative of the Bey of Tunis rather than of unofficial Tunisian groups.

4. The United States should take the position that the purpose of discussion in the General Assembly should be a calm and sympathetic consideration of the basic issues so as to encourage progress in direct negotiations between the parties.

5. The United States should take the position that while General Assembly discussion can be helpful in encouraging an agreed bilateral solution, there may be no need to have any resolution adopted by the Assembly. If, however, a resolution is desired by other members, we should use our influence to ensure that it not seek to prescribe a solution nor to interject UN machinery into the negotiations but be directed to encouraging the parties themselves to reach a negotiated solution. Accordingly, the United States should support a resolution which would express the hope that the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis with a view to bringing about self-government for Tunisia in accordance with the relevant treaties and provision of the Charter of the United Nations.

6. The Delegation should seek to discourage any proposal which would have the effect of automatically retaining the issue on the agenda beyond the Seventh Session. If such a proposal is pressed to a vote, the Delegation should oppose it. If it appears possible to head off such a proposal by substituting a provision inviting the parties to advise the Secretary General of the results of the negotiations, the Delegation should support such a provision.

7. The Delegation should make every effort to impress on the French delegation privately the desirability of presenting the French case most effectively by:

a. explaining fully what the French have done, both since the inception of the Protectorate and recently, to develop Tunisia economically, socially and politically;

b. explaining what the proposed reforms consist of and emphasizing that they are only a first step in a plan of political development toward self-government;

c. outlining what future steps they plan to take in this direction and stating at least a provisional timetable leading to self-government.

8. The Delegation should be prepared, depending on developments and the course of the debate, to make a statement which would contain the following ideas:

a. France has contributed greatly to the development of Tunisia;

b. As a result of this development, it is generally recognized that Tunisia has advanced to the point where the Tunisians can assume a greater degree of responsibility for the management of their own internal affairs.

c. Tunisians have declared their desire to respect French economic rights as well as French treaty rights in matters of foreign affairs, defense and security.

d. Consequently the United States has every confidence that the parties can reach an agreement which will satisfy legitimate Tunisian aspirations for self-government and safeguard legitimate French interests.

[Here follows a 15-page background section, giving a history of Franco-Tunisian relations to 1952.]

1. There is no indication on the paper, prepared for the Seventh Regular Session of the General Assembly, whether it was prepared in Washington or New York. Officers of the Department in Washington, as well as members of the Delegation in New York, worked on position papers; but presumably this final copy was typed in New York.