320/9–1152
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Sandifer) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)1
secret
[Washington,] September 11,
1952.
Subject:
- Inclusion of the Tunisian Item on the General Assembly Agenda
As the General Assembly approaches, it becomes increasingly difficult to carry forward our preparations in the absence of a decision on the question whether we shall vote to include the Tunisian question in the General Assembly agenda.
From the UNA point of view, it is extremely important that a decision be taken now that the United States will vote in the Seventh General Assembly to place the Tunisian question on the Assembly’s agenda, regardless of the French position. I propose that we inform the French of our decision at once and encourage them to make and announce a similar decision before we communicate our own position to other delegations. A draft telegram for this purpose is attached.2
I make these recommendations for the following reasons:
- 1.
- Resistance by the United States, France, and other so-called “colonial” states to discussion of North African questions in the United Nations has magnified what should be a simple matter of procedure to the status of a major issue of crucial importance (a) to United States relations in the non-European world and (b) to the future of the United Nations. On three prior occasions, the United States has taken a stand which was tantamount to a refusal to discuss such questions: in keeping the Moroccan case off the Assembly’s agenda in 1951; in keeping the Tunisian case off the Security Council agenda in the spring of 1952; and in opposing a special session of the General Assembly on Tunisia in the summer of 1952. Now thirteen Arab-Asian states have placed the Tunisian question on the agenda [Page 808] of the forthcoming General Assembly, and Iraq has reintroduced the Moroccan question. If on this fourth occasion to take a stand on the issue of discussion we do not unequivocally support discussion, we will be bitterly denounced for seeking to prevent the United Nations from serving its intended purpose as a sounding-board for discussion of issues of concern to the Members. We shall be accused of seeking to prevent small states from exercising their right to be heard in the United Nations. When the issue is presented in this form, we are in no position to win majority support for our views. In fact, it is generally conceded that we will not be able to prevent the inscription of the Tunisian case on the General Assembly agenda this fall.
- 2.
- With the approach of the General Assembly the attention of the American public will again be focused on the Tunisian problem. Unless we announce our support for inscription now, we run the very real risk of reviving the press controversy in the United States and having this question injected into the presidential election campaign between now and October 14. If we do not support inscription when the item comes up in the General Committee at the start of the session, the Tunisian problem will be certain to become an issue in the closing phases of the campaign.
- 3.
- I am fully aware of the extremely important strategic and political implications of any development concerning North African questions which would impair the basic stability of the area. We should try to assist the French on North African problems so far as we can without compromising basic principles in our foreign policy. At the present juncture we can be of the greatest assistance to the French by taking a forthright stand on the question of the inscription of the Tunisian item on the Assembly’s agenda. By doing so, we will not only clear away the extraneous issue of “free discussion” and help General Assembly debate to focus on the substance of the problem; we will also avoid the loss of prestige which would result from either a fruitless course of opposition to inscription or a grudging, last-minute assent. With our credit unimpaired, we could then exert our full influence to moderate the debate and to prevent the passage of condemnatory resolutions. With the Latin American countries in particular the influence we will be able to exert in behalf of moderation will depend to an important degree on the position we take on the admissibility of the question for discussion. Generally speaking, the Latins espouse broad discussion but are extremely reluctant to take any action which can be construed as intervention in local affairs. Since the Latin American states comprise one-third of the membership of the General Assembly, their support is virtually essential to block action we oppose or to carry through action we desire.
- 4.
- It may be argued that we should wait for the French to make up their minds before we ourselves decide on our position on this question. Our experience in this matter suggests that the French, torn by internal differences, may not be able to firm up their position until shortly before a vote is taken in the General Assembly. Our own silence in the interim would serve to encourage the more intransigent French element. If the French should finally decide to oppose inscription of the item on the agenda, they will exert great pressure on us to abstain. An abstention would be regarded by the Arab-Asians, United States [Page 809] public opinion, and world opinion as equivalent to a negative vote. If we later decide to vote in favor of inscription in the face of announced French opposition, the reaction in France would be particularly bitter.
- 5.
- Our basic problem has been to balance our desire to support the French against the consequences of that support upon our relations with the “anti-colonial” countries of the world. Through three separate attempts to secure discussion of North African questions in the United Nations, we have given consistent support to the French. There is no denying that in the non-European world we are considered to have abandoned our traditional support for the concept of self-determination as well as free access to the United Nations. As a result, our credit has not only been impaired in the non-European world, but the credit of the United Nations, which is vital to us, has also suffered. As an illustration, Prime Minister Nehru has said that “If the whole of Africa and Asia combined cannot even get a subject discussed in the Security Council because two or three great powers object to it, than a time may well come when these countries of Asia and Africa will feel happy in their own countries and not in the United Nations.”
- 6.
- To the Arab-Asian states, no issue in the United Nations is today as important as their right to obtain a hearing of the Tunisian case. When the Austrians asked the Indian envoy in Vienna if India would sponsor the Austrian item, they were rebuffed with the remark that India considers Tunisian independence at least as important as Austrian independence. India is not alone in this atttude. If, therefore, we should oppose inscription, we would tend to force the Arab-Asian bloc into opposition to us on other issues. The possibility of obtaining support from them for any resolution we might present on the Korean problem would be prejudiced. The support we could obtain from them on other “cold-war” issues would decrease markedly. The difficulties we have been experiencing in connection with non-political issues, such as the character of economic development activities and the role of the United Nations in dependent area affairs would be notably increased. And the Arab-Asian bloc would undoubtedly seek—and obtain—considerable support for its views among other groups including the Scandinavians, Latin Americans, and of course the Soviets.
- 7.
- I am proposing immediate action on the question of inscription because we shall have to initiate within ten days or two weeks the usual intensive consultations with other Member Governments and delegations which must precede every Assembly, if we are adequately to exercise our leadership and control. We can not achieve a meeting of minds with other governments until we are ready to announce our position on this key issue. An early announcement will be favorably received by a large majority of the delegations. It will rob the Soviets of an issue they will otherwise exploit to the full.
We have been careful from the outset to base our procedural position against consideration of the Tunisian problem in United Nations organs on the question of timing. We can no longer effectively postpone discussion on that ground. We can, without embarrasment, announce our decision to support discussion of the Tunisian item in the General Assembly. I hope you will agree that we should do so at once.