Editorial Note
Telegram 90 from Tunis, September 10, reported that on September 9 the Bey had handed the Acting Prime Minister two documents: a letter by him addressed to French President Vincent Auriol and a copy of his Advisory Group’s statement rejecting the French reform proposals, both dated September 9. The Acting Prime Minister then gave the documents to the Acting Resident General. According to the Consulate General, the delivery of the documents on the eve of the Resident General’s return was a strategem designed to lower Hauteclocque’s prestige.
[Page 804]Despatch 77 from Tunis, September 10, transmitted a copy of the Bey’s Advisory Group’s report, which recommended a “pure and simple rejection” of the proposed French proposals. An evaluation of the report by the Consulate General commented that it was likely to become a basic document on the Tunisian problem. According to the despatch, it would be difficult even for a Francophile to refute the general substance of the report, which was that the French reform program was only thin camouflage for legally implanting France and French nationals in Tunisian affairs. The final paragraph of the despatch recommended that the United States remain as aloof as possible from the Franco-Tunisian quarrel. Calling the Tunisian report the obituary of the French reform proposals, the despatch stated it would be doubtful wisdom for the United States to comment favorably on the substance of the French program.
Despatch 78 from Tunis, September 15, transmitted a translation of the Bey’s letter to the French President. In his letter, the Bey told Auriol that he had consulted qualified representatives of the principal Tunisian social groups, in order to associate his subjects in the responsibility for a decision which would bind the future of Tunisia. Those representatives’ investigation disclosed that the proposed reforms constituted a threat to Tunisian sovereignty, perpetuated the principle of direct administration, aggravated the confusion and irresponsibility of powers, and made no progress toward democratizing Tunisian institutions. Since the French program did not constitute progress on the path of internal autonomy, as solemnly promised by the French Government, it did not seem possible for the Bey to put his seal to them.
Telegram 1537 from Paris, September 11, informed the Department of State that members of the French Foreign Ministry had told Embassy officials the Bey’s reply to the French program, while theoretically leaving the door open, was for all practical purposes a rejection of the program. The French considered it clearly designed to serve the Tunisian nationalist cause in the United Nations, and the Foreign Ministry did not intend to reply or reopen negotiations until after the General Assembly session. Now that the Bey’s answer had been received, the French officials personally felt it would be wiser not to press the United States for a statement of support for the French policy in Tunisia until the matter came up in the General Assembly. When an Embassy official commented that the effectiveness of United States support would be determined by French tactics in New York, the French commented that instructions to the French Delegates would be determined by the Cabinet just prior to the Delegation’s departure for New York. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 772.00.