Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

772.00/8–1352: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tunis¹

confidential
priority

Washington, August 13, 1952—6:28 p.m.

28. Daridan Fr Chargé called on me Aug 12 re Tunisia.² First he expressed FonOff appreciation for “excellent” reply US made in New York to Ladgham communication.³ He stated FonOff agrees no publicity shld be given US—Ladgham exchange because of exaggerated importance it wld give Ladgham. FonOff wld be very pleased he said if ConGen Tunis cld be instructed express same views in mtg with Baccouche in Hauteclocque’s office with idea that views wld reach Bey and other Tunisian leaders. I stated Dept wld let Daridan know its decision soon.

ConGen will recognize above course of action as that authorized by Deptels 18⁴ and 26⁵ with important variation that US reply to Ladgham communication wld be made known under Fr auspices. Since Bruce–Daridan mtg Dept has reviewed matter and come to conclusion that having sought Fr opinion we shld follow procedure suggested by Fr. Daridan has therefore been informed that you will follow Fr procedure. In addition Dept likes your suggestion of talk with Boudali or Hached (urtel 46)⁶ and leaves such additional approach in your discretion (Deptel 26). To avoid exaggerated importance Ladgham you need not mention his ltr in your talks unless you wish.

After discussing need for close coop between free states to prevent balkanization Africa Daridan raised question of US public statement re Tunisia, referring in passing to Secy’s unpublished statement to Schuman May 28 (Paris tel 7425 May 29).⁷ He suggested that Fr on verge of important decision re inscription Tunisia UNGA agenda and reluctant favor inscription without some such support as US public statement wld give.

I replied no question re need for mutual coop prevent balkanization Africa but questioned desirability US public statement at this time such statement now wld run risk making Tunisia a campaign issue and revive press controversy on subj. I pointed out such statement, made before conclusion bilateral discussion between Fr and Tunisians, wld be looked upon as US interference in internal affairs of others. I mentioned Fr program still subj to modifications. I said Secy leaving for two weeks and no decision re making public statement can be made during his absence. I said indications are UNGA inscription practically inevitable and it wld seem behoove Fr favor inscription and send her best orator make vigorous presentation Fr case in UN. I expressed view that US public statement wld be wasted before bilateral discussions end and that it wld seem wise save ammunition for UNGA. I stated nationalists have developed exaggerated expectations from UN review, after which disillusionment may well set in. At some such point US public statement re Fr program as reasonable basis for resuming negots might serve useful purpose. I informed DaridanDept already doing what it can to present current Fr position of seeking to institute reforms to US press as favorably as possible.

Paris Embtel 928 Aug 12⁸ noted. Dept believes reasons given above against public statement outweigh reasons in favor of statement. ConGen Tunis may wish to comment.

Bruce

1. This telegram was drafted by Cyr (AF) and cleared by the offices of Jernegan (NEA), Hadsel (S/S), Hickerson and Popper (UNA), Allen (EUR), and Bruce (U). It was repeated to Paris and London.
2. No memorandum of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
3. Not printed, but see the summary of USUNtelegram 89, July 29, in footnote 2, p. 791.
4. Same as telegram 669 to Paris, ibid.
5. Aug. 9; not printed. It authorized the Consul General to communicate the substance of telegram 18 to the Tunisians, after such consultation with the Residency as he deemed appropriate. (772.00/8–952)
6. Aug. 11; not printed. This telegram contained the Consul General’s comments on telegram 18. He suggested the Tunisian Nationalists thought of the United Nations as a stage to parade French shortcomings rather than as a place that could produce a solution. He agreed the Department of State should not publish its views on Ladgham’s communication and hoped he would be given discretion in using the comments transmitted in telegram 18, perhaps discussing it with Boudali and Hached. (772.00/8–1152)
7. Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 766.
8. Not printed; it listed reasons the Embassy believed a statement publicly supporting the French would be desirable. It would be considered a helpful gesture by the French Government and might help moderate the tone of the French press, which had become increasingly critical of the United States. Taken in conjunction with USUN’s comment to Ladgham, an indication of U.S. confidence in the French Government’s intention to work with the Tunisians might help to moderate Tunisian counterproposals to the French. (772.00/8–1252)