Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

UNP files, lot 59 D 237, “Tunisia, General 1952–54”

Memorandum by the Deputy Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson)¹

secret

[Washington,] June 20, 1952.

Subject:

• Tunisia

Background:

The French have made public their reform program for Tunisia without giving us the promised opportunity to see it in advance in order to make comments intended to make it acceptable to US and world opinion.

The text as transmitted in Paris telegram 7968² reveals that it is the same in substance as the one outlined in the instructions to the Resident General on March 22 and as made public by Prime Minister Baccouche on April 1. The Department did not consider that program satisfactory and continued to urge the formulation of a better one.

Since originally the French were unable to constitute a mixed commission to discuss the program because of broad Tunisian opposition to its terms, there is no reason to suppose that the same program would be any more acceptable to the Tunisians now. Thus, continued Tunisian opposition accompanied by more disturbances can be expected.

The French announcement comes too late to affect the request of the Arab-Asian group for a special session. It is too early to say whether or not the announcement will increase or decrease the chances that a special session will be held. On the one hand those who are inclined to oppose such a session will argue that the program at least be tried out before discussion takes place; on the other hand, those who are critical of the French will say the program’s inadequacy makes a special session more important than ever.

Without a radical change in the French position, the Tunisian item is certain to come up at the 7th General Assembly. If the US should indicate now that the French program should be tried out, the French would claim we had betrayed them if subsequent events confirm our impression that the program is inadequate and if we are forced therefore to assent to some UN action. Moreover, as soon as we publicly support the program, we will have lost a large part of our leverage with the French.

Recommendations:

1. That the Secretary refrain from any public declaration of support for the program since we think it is inadequate and since the French did not consult with us in advance as they had promised to do.

2. That, if politically advisable, we tell the French in what respects the program would have to be altered to obtain our support.

(We wish to stress that in our view the first recommendation should stand even if the Department should feel that the program represents a step in the right direction and that we should encourage its implementation.)³

1. This memorandum was drafted by Popper, Stein, and Elting of UNP.
2. Supra.
3. A memorandum, also dated June 20, by Perkins (EUR) to Bruce (U), summarized the French reform program and stated it was not believed the Tunisian Nationalists would be satisfied with it. Their principal objection was expected to be to the creation of an administrative tribunal, to which they had already objected, and participation of French citizens in the Municipal Councils and one of the Consultative Assemblies. The memorandum concluded, however, that the beginning of elected Municipal Councils and increased participation by Tunisians in the civil service could be important in developing an electorate and administrative cadre, that could lead to further democratic measures in the future. (772.00/6–2052)