Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

USUN files

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs (Knight)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 15, 1952.

Subject:

• Forthcoming talk with M. Schuman about North Africa.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Bonnet, French Embassy.
• Mr. van Laetham, French Embassy.
• Mr. Wainhouse, UNP
• Mr. Knight, WE

Ambassador Bonnet called under instructions to prepare the way for a discussion on the subject of North Africa which Mr. Robert Schuman wishes to have with the Secretary later this month in Paris.²

Ambassador Bonnet started the conversation by saying that he had heard that Mr. Schuman was somewhat encouraged about the prospects of having the Contractual Relationships Agreement and the EDC Treaty signed in accordance with the current schedule calling for the “24th and 25th” of May. The Secretary agreed that these prospects had improved and mentioned the dates of the 24th and 26th.

The French Ambassador then referred to Mr. Schuman’s desire to talk with the Secretary in Paris not only about Tunisia but also about North Africa as a whole and said that he had been instructed to cover the subject in a preliminary fashion in order to facilitate the subsequent talks between the Ministers.

Mr. Schuman believes that it is urgent to avoid misunderstandings between the U.S. and France as those are exploited by a minority of extremists in North Africa where they are doing their best to prevent the establishment of reform programs mutually agreed between the French and local population. These misunderstandings also play into the hands of those extremists who are seeking to reopen consideration of the Tunisian question in the UN in the expectation that the U.S. will find itself in a more difficult position to frustrate their maneuvers.

According to Ambassador Bonnet, the French Government is of the opinion that local Communists in Europe and North Africa, backed by the U.S.S.R., are orchestrating a campaign to foment distrust between the free countries of the West and particularly between the U.S. and France as part of their strategy to block conclusion of the Contractuals and of the EDC. He referred to the recent forged documents published in Le Monde purporting to be a report from Admiral Fechteler to the NSC. Other such documents have been recently prepared between Communists in France and elsewhere such as the “Jessup Report”. False news concerning the U.S.S.R. is disseminated so that it can be brilliantly denied by the Kremlin. He also mentioned the French plane and other recent Berlin incidents. In French eyes all these developments point to a concerted effort to divide the West at this crucial time.

The French Ambassador stressed the French Government’s will to carry through reform programs “in Tunis, Morocco, and in North Africa generally”. It is difficult, however, to do so now because of the agitation in the UN which has acted as a deterrent to the North Africas’ willingness to negotiate. However, it would seem that the extremists in the UN may have over-played their hand and that many Latin American countries, for example, are now less ready to go along with the Arab-Asiatic bloc as their real purpose of full independence for Tunisia is gradually coming to light. The French Government hopes that the U.S. and France can agree on sensible reform programs for North Africa which would be supported by a majority of “responsible governments” which would consider these programs in a different spirit then the one now prevailing in the UN.

Referring more precisely to the forthcoming talks between the Secretary and Mr. Schuman, Ambassador Bonnet stressed the extreme complex character of the problem. He mentioned the two million Frenchmen in North Africa who “must be protected”. As to the Jewish minority in Tunis and Morocco, these are already showing signs of fear and some Tunisians are trying to emigrate. According to Ambassador Bonnet it might be somewhat strange for the U.S. to find itself in the position of supporting nationalist governments of such an intolerant nature that important elements of the native population preferred to leave the country. The French policy is one of “association” in Africa, both white and black. It is not a colonial policy nor a policy of oppression or suppression. The French do not wish to see develop a mosaic of small units which, today, would constitute an anachronism. Much time, of course, would be needed for the implementation of France’s policy, but “U.S. understanding” would certainly be of considerable help. The French Ambassador then made a brief reference to the common strategic interest of both the U.S. and France in North Africa. After the Secretary’s return from Europe, it should be possible to decide on the nature and scope of the talks, the purpose of which should be the establishment of a common policy not only for North Africa and in the UN but also for presentation to the U.S. public. An agenda for these conversations would be desirable. Furthermore, there was no reason why it would not be possible to start talks in Paris concerning an increase in the number of U.S. troops to be stationed in Morocco in accordance with current U.S. desires.

The Secretary expressed his great interest in the subject and the hope that Mr. Schuman would be more specific when they met in Paris. We are anxious to arrive at a common policy with France in relation to North Africa but so far French suggestions have been too vague. Before we could decide to support a common policy we would have to have details as to the French programs and the opportunity to study them with care. What, for example, were the specific reforms which the French have in mind in Tunis? Some French officials say that there exists a detailed program, while others say “no”, that the only document in existence is the one with the general terms of reference given to Mr. de Hauteclocque concerning the initiation of conversations with the Tunisians. Before the Secretary could talk usefully with Mr. Robert Schuman, we should receive a paper setting forth the French reform programs for Tunisia and North Africa with both details and reasons. The present situation is worse than a vicious circle as we are making no movement at all. The Secretary referred to the meeting in New York two days ago (Arab-Asian bloc) and pointed out that a special session of the General Assembly would be definitely worse than Security Council consideration and that it was urgent that we move off dead center very soon since time was running out. The Secretary emphasized that he did not need to be convinced as to the undesirability of UN action in the Tunisian case as hampering rather than aiding agreement between the French and the Tunisians and of the dangerous and destructive character of extreme Arab nationalism. Instead, the problem is the drafting of a precise and constructive program of reform which we could all support. The Secretary expressed sympathy with the French position but insisted that the French must provide something acceptable with which we could go to the American people and which the U.S. can support. Time is of the essence.

The French Ambassador concluded by saying that Mr. Schuman believed that a special session of the General Assembly “could lead to a very severe crisis”. One of the troubles seemed to be that both the UN and the Arabs representatives therein do not have much to do. In any event, according to Mr. Schuman, no French Government would be willing to permit the UN becoming primarily a mechanism (“machinery”) for getting the French out of North Africa.

1. A memorandum by Hickerson to the Secretary of State regarding his meeting with Ambassador Bonnet, dated May 15, contained a list of recommended points for the Secretary to mention. According to the memorandum, the U.S. abstention in the Security Council on Apr. 14 was predicated on rapid French progress in negotiating reforms leading to Tunisian autonomy. When the Apr. 24 target date for a mixed commission was not met, the United States was assured that negotiations would be started by May 15. Prospects for the resumption of genuine negotiations on that date appeared even less hopeful than they had previously. The memorandum suggested the Secretary inform Bonnet the United States felt compelled to inform appropriate delegations in New York that, because the threat of a special General Assembly session was real, if the United States had to choose it would prefer another Security Council hearing to a special session. The last paragraph of the memorandum read: “Developments in the last few weeks seem to justify the concern we have expressed repeatedly to the French. We sincerely hope the French appreciate the dangers which lie ahead if there is not an immediate change of course on their part.”

   A memorandum on the same date, by G. Lewis Jones to McBride and Knight, stated that it was in the U.S. interest to pursue a policy of urging the French to accelerate their program for internal autonomy in Tunisia. It added, however, that it was not in the U.S. interest to encourage the Tunisians in an irresponsible position. It suggested the United States take a firm line publicly and privately against the Nationalist boycott of French reforms. The memorandum ended with the suggestion that the United States and other interested powers might make a statement calling on all concerned parties to refrain from agitating the Tunisian question and give the French time to achieve the results they planned. Documentation is in Department of State file 772.00.

2. The Secretary went to Paris later that month for the signing of the European Defense Community Treaty on May 27; for documentation, see volume v, Part 1. pp. 571 ff.