772.00/5–1352: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Department of State
808. Re Tunisia. Pursuant to Deptel 423, May 7,1Gross and Ross met with Bokhari and Asad at lunch yesterday and communicated our views as set forth in Deptel 2448, May 6,2 to New Delhi. Bokhari indicated he was very glad to get our views before rather than after Asian-African (ASAF) mtg scheduled for May 13.3 He requested that memo setting forth our views be presented to Zafrullah in Karachi.
Bokhari referred to number of signs which he said indicated situation in Tunisia was not at all “healthy”; for example, the “conditional” release of Chenik and other Ministers. (We said we thus far had no confirmation that release was “conditional”.) Bokhari referred also to info indicating Chenik was refused permission go to Paris and to “character assassination” of Bourguiba as Nazi collaborator. (Asad reported indirect info indicating Jules Moch had know Bourguiba very well and had said he was not a collaborator.) Bokhari said also that Tunisians unwilling serve on Negotiating Commission were being arrested.
Bokhari then questioned what would constitute “negotiations.” He said basis for “negotiations” would be formula which no self-respecting nationalist could accept as basis. He had no doubt, however, that French would be able find some group with which they could “negotiate”. These “negotiations” would go on for six months, year or two [Page 750] years. Meanwhile, French would be protected in their position on theory they were “negotiating”.
All of foregoing Bokhari said was “old familiar pattern” in colonial countries.
Recognizing disadvantages of special session from our viewpoint, Bokhari indicated that advantage of GA was broader forum for expression ASAF viewpoint. In considering whether to use SC rather than GA, Bokhari said it would make difference to group if it were known in advance US would not be against competence of SC, this assuming there would be necessary votes to put item on agenda.
Gross made clear that both on question of voting on agenda and question of competence we were not in position undertake any commitment at this time beyond commitment to reappraise situation if after reasonable period, say four to five weeks, negotiations had not started. He expressed view that if after reappraisal US should vote for inclusion on agenda, it would not be logical to argue immediately against competence. He reminded Bokhari of SC practice and US previous positions that question of competence was not prejudiced by inclusion of item on agenda, and that question of competence if raised did not need to be decided until question of action on a res arose.
In course conversation Gross made clear, in response to comment by Bokhari, that we were no less sympathetic to Tunisians and their aspirations than others; that our decision, which was most difficult one to make, involved a conflict between our sympathy and the practical and effective means of achieving a desirable end.
- Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 734.↩
- Ibid. The substance of telegram 2448 is in numbered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of telegram 411 to USUN, Apr. 30, p. 738.↩
- USUN telegram 811, May 13, reported on a meeting of the Asian-African group that morning. The group decided efforts should be made to obtain a special session of the General Assembly, rather than again trying to bring the matter to the Security Council. It decided to hold a meeting with other delegations the following week. (772.00/5–1352)↩