330/5–552
Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert McBride, Office of Western European Affairs
Subject:
- Tunisia
Participants:
- Mr. Daridan, Minister Counselor, French Embassy
- Mr. van Laethem, French Embassy
- Mr. R. B. Knight—WE
- Mr. Robert McBride—WE
Mr. Daridan and Mr. van Laethem called at our request and read the conclusions of Deptel 6353, April 29,1 to Paris regarding the outstanding points in our Tunisian policy. They were also given a summary of the rest of the message with the indication that this matter had already been taken up by the Embassy in Paris.
Commenting on our policy Mr. Knight stated that our objective was, of course, the maintenance of the French presence in North Africa for, he added, this appeared to be the only intelligent solution to the question, and the problem of French relations with the Moslem peoples of the area must be solved. He added that we were in favor of evolutionary progress in North Africa, while fully recognizing the French public opinion and other problems.
Mr. Knight added that we fear the French lack the sense of urgency on this problem and they must convince us that they are determined to move ahead.
Mr. Daridan stated French public opinion would, under no conditions, accept UN action in this case and that France would leave the UN rather than permit such measures.
Mr. Knight stated that we, of course, wish to be helpful to France in this problem but stressed that before we could undertake any public opinion campaign we must know that we will not be placed in an impossible position by French inactivity.
Mr. Daridan reiterated the French point of view on some of the North African problems, particularly the fact that the reigning dynasties in Morocco and Tunisia could never be used as Bao Dai had been used in Indochina. He concluded that the problem was particularly difficult because France would never go as far in Tunisia, for example, as she had in Indochina, while it was perfectly clear that the Tunisian leaders, such as Bourghiba, wanted full independence for their country with no French presence whatever. He cited the Bourghiba letters recently published in Figaro in this connection.
[Page 747]Mr. van Laethem complained that we had repeatedly asked for a full text of the French reform program for Tunisia and pointed out that such a document could only exist after negotiations had taken place. He said that to publish such a paper would destroy the French negotiating position. He stressed that the Bey of Tunis was opposed to an elected legislature and cited again the fact that the North African rulers were extremely backward and did not wish the democratic reforms which we were urging the French to institute. He said that if the French insisted on an elected assembly, for example, her relations with the Bey would be poisoned forever. He said the basic French view was that political reforms were essential and that they must start at the bottom on the communal level but added that the Bey was even opposed to measures of this kind. In response to a question he said that the idea of an administrative tribunal in the new French reform program did not mean a retrogression from the 1950 program but was merely designed to place a check on the corruption of Tunisian officials in office which had already become apparent during the relatively short period of the Chenik Government. He stressed that merely for the sake of political reform France would not undermine her entire North African position, and that we must give some evidence of trust in the French judgment on this point.
Mr. Knight mentioned that we hoped the French reform program would not give with one hand and take away with the other, and that such a measure as the administrative tribunal might undermine all the good which could be done.
Mr. van Laethem returned to his favorite argument that the United States problem in Tunisia was basically one of educating our public opinion on the entire colonial problem. He said that had this been done there would not have been the adverse reaction to our Security Council vote which had made our present position so difficult. He said if we continue along the present lines France will, within five years, begin to have the same difficulties in West and Equatorial Africa as she now has in North Africa. He stressed that at the present time the situation in black Africa was generally satisfactory from a political viewpoint, but that it would not remain so if the climate continued favorable for extremism in North Africa. Insofar as North Africa was concerned he concluded again that the greatest obstacles to progress were the Bey of Tunis and the Sultan of Morocco.
Finally, Mr. Daridan stated that he hoped the United States would undertake to examine the entire French colonial problem and not just Tunisia. Mr. Knight said that we had tried to do this as early as 1947 but that the French had indicated little interest in having our views at that time, and that unfortunately what would have been satisfactory to the North Africans five years ago would no longer be enough.