330/5–252: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State
6739. Deptels 6352,1 and 6353, April 29.2 In accordance with instructions reftels I called on Maurice Schumann and, after outlining Dept’s views, left with him memo containing US position on Tunisian issue contained in three numbered paras 6353.
Schumann expressed surprise that US Govt showed lack of understanding of French position and difficulties they are having. Also that we should become party to Asiatic-Arab drive which was purely propaganda, results of which could only benefit Stalin. In this connection he stated that French have reliable info that Kremlin has given orders to agents everywhere that demonstrations against France should continue.
US position of non-abstaining, if known, would cause dangerous reaction, according to Schumann, on French public opinion and more particularly on reps in Parliament. It would raise question in latter’s minds how far solidarity of Atlantic nations could be maintained in solving particular problems. He foresaw serious effect on NATO and possibility even of defeat of EDC, if US broke solidarity over Tunisia, an issue where France considered it right to expect solidarity. He digressed here on French accomplishments in North Africa and importance of French control over Morocco to NATO.
I told Schumann that our feeling re NAT meant solidarity in fact in all its deepest meaning, including defense, security against aggression and in political matters, and increasing our mutual strength through improving econ and social conditions. My understanding of this solidarity was that it did not mean blind acceptance by one govt of actions taken by another without consultation. It could only be [Page 743] reached if we were all frank with our friends and explained to them positions we intended to take. In this case, US Govt had real problem of public opinion to deal with and solidarity could be achieved only by policy which took it adequately into account.
I made point of stressing how difficult it was for our people to understand internment of Chenik and his ministers. He made no comment regarding promised liberation these Tunisians. Re Bourguiba, Schumann remarked that Tunisian leader could have been shot as traitor at end of war, in view his connivance with Axis. This was not done and Schumann stated that French now wish only to work with him.
After being resistant to my representations, Schumann cooled down and wound up by assuring me that French Govt just as anxious as US to speed up solution to Tunisian crisis. He made no promises but said he hoped to be able to discuss matter with me in few days.
Schumann then described difficulties French were having in Tunisia, and stated that Bey and Baccouche really didn’t want reforms at all. French, he maintained, were in position of “imposing” reforms, and were determined to go forward along lines of published program. He told me that he would give me complete text of this program.
Schumann’s temperamental reaction is typical of the man, and we are following up closely on the working level, where we shall show copy of reftel and where effect of our position will receive more measured consideration.
- Not printed. It instructed the Ambassador to show telegram 6353 to the highest levels of the Foreign Ministry and leave there a copy of the last three numbered paragraphs. It suggested that, at the initiative of the Embassy, it might be advisable to leave a copy of the whole message. It also informed the Ambassador the Under Secretary of State had discussed Tunisia with Jean Monnet along the lines of telegram 6353. (330/4–2952)↩
- Ante, p. 735.↩