330/4–2952: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
6353. (Verbatim text message) Dept increasingly concerned failure Fr move ahead Tunisian program during breathing spell resulting [Page 736] largely from our abstention SC vote. UnderSecy’s Apr 5 talk with Fr Amb2 made abundantly clear our position and our problem. Since then kind and rate of progress we expected have not developed.
US recognizes difficulties Fr internal polit situation in connection with this issue. We wish stress our realization US and Fr both desire Tunisian issue resolved promptly and with minimum further complications.
Fr have not named their reps to Mixed Comm and we wld not normally expect Tunisians name theirs until Fr had done so. In this connection de Boisanger informed Perkins Apr 183 difficulties had arisen naming Fr delegs and that Faure had refused chairmanship Fr group Furthermore Fr Emb informs us preliminary mtg Mixed Comm scheduled Apr 24 postponed “until early May” because inability either side name its reps. Dept has recd Paris desp transmitting FonOff instrs to de Hauteclocque4 from which it appears reform program exists only in outline form with detailed plan not yet worked out and apparently to be evolved in Tunisia. In this connection Amb Gross has stated in SC Fr program appeared constitute basis resumption negots. Accordingly, we hope Emb or ConGen Tunis will get copy finished work when available since we cannot help explain Fr position unless we are fully informed. We trust provisions this program will not give with one hand and take away with other.
In light continued overwhelmingly unfavorable public opinion on US abstention inscription Tunisian item SC agenda coupled with disappointing results to date Dept feels renewed approach to Fr this quest requires explaining once more basis our position. It is feared some feeling exists on Fr part immediate danger avoided and burden now rests US undertake program educate public opinion necessity full support Fr North African policy. US is convinced this shows misconception depth public feeling No African quest US press and congressional circles as well as in Arab-Asian countries. Accordingly far from being able undertake further measures assist Fr, Dept has done its utmost this matter, and Fr must perform substantially to justify position we have taken SC.
What disturbs us most is widespread feeling here and elsewhere that Fr Govt under-estimates urgency Tunisian situation in UN, and in Nor Afr as well as in US, and only gives it substantial attn when crises are red hot relegating it conveniently into background between times.
While negots in abeyance pressure in NY continues mount and there seems considerable likelihood special session GA discuss Tunisian [Page 737] quest. Our info is to effect Arab-Asian bloc can obtain 31 votes required call session with only minimum lobbying necessary.
If special session GA called consider Tunisian problem, so-called colonial powers wld be pitted against Afr-Asian group, Sov bloc and others, with impossibility avoiding adoption resolutions in comite perhaps condemning France and proposing UN investigation Tunisia. Action this type wld strengthen trend toward radical measures Assembly behalf dependent areas and give further impetus Arab-Asian leadership GA.
We still believe Fr committed grave error, though we aware they disagree, in arresting cabinet containing prominent nationalists. Presumably had negots been completed with Chenik, nationalists wld have accepted them since they participated his govt. Nevertheless we think Fr must continue try obtain nationalist representation at least on Mixed Comm possibly by means freeing Chenik and other Tunisian leaders at once as evidence good faith.
In this connection our impression was special precautionary measures adopted last month wld be removed and Chenik cabinet wld be released upon installation Baccouche cabinet. We now see this is not case. We regard this as bad judgment and as rendering creation comm obviously more difficult and virtually precluding meaningful nationalist participation therein. We cannot believe any body without some genuine nationalist reps cld have any effective support from Tunisians generally, or be convincingly represented before world opinion as adequate.
In conclusion fol summary our position shld be conveyed to FonOff at highest levels:
- (1)
- Our position in SC was predicated circumstances prevailing at time Tunisian quest came up. Our decision to abstain taken at highest level only to give Fr time to move ahead. They must move very rapidly. Statements by Secy and Amb Gross have already made it clear our position re advisability UN discussions applied Tunisian problem as we then saw it.
- (2)
- We felt Fr shld have opportunity negot long-term Tunisian settlement on basis program with substantive content for bringing Tunisia along road to internal autonomy. We explained our position in SC on grounds SC consideration at that time might hamper Fr and Tunisians this respect.
- (3)
- If no immediate progress made on program with substantive content in negots with reps of Tunisian groups our decision to abstain which is so contrary to public opinion here and has been so strongly criticized throughout many areas of the world will appear not to have been justified. We wld accordingly be obliged to reconsider our position. Fr shld further realize this whole problem is not merely one of mtg public opinion but involves larger common interest which we share with Fr in terms gen relations with Arab-Asian world.
- This telegram was drafted by McBride (WE) and cleared in draft with the offices of the Secretary, Bruce (U), Matthews (G), Bohlen (C), Perkins (EUR), Byroade (NEA), Hickerson (UNA), Jessup (S/A), Nitze (S/S), and Byington (WE). It was signed by the Secretary and was repeated to Tunis, Cairo, and London.↩
- See telegram 5923 to Paris, Apr. 5, p. 721.↩
- See the memorandum of conversation by Perkins, Apr. 18, p. 729.↩
- Paris despatch 2634, Apr. 4, not printed. (772.00/4–452) See Paris telegram 5851, Mar. 25, p. 695.↩