772.00/4–2252: Telegram
The Ambassador in Turkey (McGhee) to the Department of State
1100. Following is résumé Turk position vis-à-vis Tunisian case posed for consideration SC: Turk FonOff has during period development Turk policy toward Tunisian question in SC, consulted fully this Emb. We have consistently presented and rationalized to FonOff US policy on this question. Turks have without any pressure on our part, followed the policy.
Turk abstention in SC has evoked some direct criticism and no direct support in Turk. Yeni Sabah (Istanbul) Apr 14, regrets Turk delegates adopted neutral stand in Tunisian affair and asks what quid pro quo Turk Govt obtained from France. Cumhuriyet (Istanbul) Apr 16, commenting that discontinuation by US of policy bringing issues such as Tunisian case before SC would only help anti-western campaign sponsored by extremist elements in Medit area. It adds that Franco attempting take advantage this situation to pose as guardian Arab world but Spain can hardly assume leadership role in ME or Medit. Hurses (Ankara, RPP) in edit April 12 asks “How can we remain an abstainer?” Edit notes French using force in Tunis and asks how Turk delegate can believe Franco-Tunisian negots can bring favorable results under such circumstances. Edit asserts: “Colonial mentality is now thing of past …1 we sympathize with every movement for independence.” In long edit Kudret (Ankara, NP) Apr 20, Hikmet Bayur observes that Bey of Tunis has been center polit maneuvers and in order keep throne appointed pro-Fr Govt. Thus no complaint against Fr before SC from Bey or Govt Tunis. If Bey had not yielded to Fr pressure situation cld have been very definite in SC [Page 731] and very difficult for US and Turkey abstain in vote for consideration case. Writer considers reforms now proposed entirely inadequate, ignoring such basic problems as redistribution land now held in large estate by Fr owners. Concludes Tunisian question cannot be easily settled and stresses danger to all western nations of growing collaboration between Nationalist and Communists in North Africa.
Turk abstention has naturally caused adverse reaction on part Arab states, who point to Turk action as additional evidence lack of sympathy with problems and national aspirations their fellow Moslems, as previously indicated by Turk position on Suez and other questions. Iraqi Chargé and Syrian Min have both called on me to express this feeling. At least three Arab reps, including Egyptian and Lebanese, have called on FonOff to make similar representations. This is, of course, to be regretted since it defeats objective of fostering better relations between Turk and other Moslem and ME states and increasing confidence these states in Turks.
It is assumed Dept decision to abstain in SC vote was difficult one and taken after most careful consideration all factors, including of course, our relations with [garble]. Turk position, according to FonMin, was based principally on desire to maintain solidarity with western powers, particularly US. As Birgi of FonOff put it “we looked to you. We wld have voted for consideration if you had”.2 Birgi says Turk decision not popular in Turk; that govt will escape criticism if Fr and Tunisians reach agreement but will be criticized if no agreement reached.
Question I wish to raise with Dept is whether we may not in our relations with Turks and perhaps with other friendly nations put too much stress in solidarity in issues not of vital importance. Is it absolutely imperative Turks vote with us in all such issues or shld Turks not in particular cases follow their own best judgment as affected by their own relationship to problem?3 Perhaps Turks shld in such cases weigh more carefully impact their decisions on their relations with Moslem and other ME states, as well as with western powers? FonMin [Page 732] has frequently complained to me that Turks made error in following western lead in vote on Suez issue,4 which lost much Arab good will for Turks. If Tunisian case reconsidered by SC, perhaps we shld discuss question with Turks along foregoing lines regardless of US position.
In discussions with FonMin on Tunisian case, he stressed necessity for big powers not to abandon their principles in their dealings with smaller nations, otherwise they will lose confidence of small nations. I assured FonMin US dedicated to adherence principles in its dealings with all nations, large or small.
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩
- USUN telegram 786, May 6, reported the Turkish Delegate to the United Nations informed members of the Mission he felt strongly that Turkey should have voted for inclusion of the Tunisian item on the agenda of the Security Council. He thought he had almost convinced his government he should be permitted to vote that way, but was instructed to abstain after the American Ambassador in Ankara indicated to the Foreign Office that the United States would abstain. According to the U.S. Mission in New York, an additional, and perhaps deciding, factor in Turkey’s decision was reluctance to seem to be turning against France so soon after Turkey’s admission to NATO. (772.00/5–652)↩
- Telegram 1010 to Ankara, May 8, informed the Ambassador that in the particular case of Tunisia the United States did not exert pressure on Turkey to follow the U.S. lead in abstaining, and the Turks had been “entirely free if they had wished to vote for inscription.” The last paragraph of the telegram noted that there might be instances where the United States would feel compelled to urge its friends to support positions on important issues, but, in general, its attitude was simply to let the Turkish Delegation know the U.S. decision and let it make whatever decision it thought wise. (720.00/4–2252)↩
- For documentation on Suez, see volume ix.↩