Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1

Truman Library, PSF Subject file, “Tunisia”

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President¹

secret

Washington, April 9, 1952.

Subject:

• Your Conversation with Mrs. Roosevelt on Tunisia

Mrs. Roosevelt may raise the subject of Tunisia with you when she sees you at noon, April 10.² Should she do so, she will very probably argue that our decision to abstain in the impending Security Council vote on the question of inscribing the Tunisian item on the Council’s agenda is a grave mistake. She may refer to the strong position which you took in the speech I read for you on April 8 in favor of political freedom for the peoples of Asia and Africa.³

If this subject is raised, it would be most helpful if you could explain to Mrs. Roosevelt the objective we have in mind in our Security Council tactics on Tunisia. Our purpose is to foster agreement through negotiations between the French and Tunisians, leading to the attainment of Tunisian self-government. This is what the Tunisians say they desire, and it is an objective fully in keeping with the philosophy underlying your speech of April 8.

To facilitate negotiations it has seemed best to us to avoid Security Council consideration while the parties are seeking to start discussions. Security Council consideration at this stage would inflame emotions on both sides and harden their extreme positions. The United Nations Charter (Article 33) recognizes that the parties to a dispute should seek a settlement by direct negotiations before they bring the matter to the Security Council.

In abstaining on the motion to put the Tunisian matter on the Security Council agenda, we shall make it clear that we are not departing from our general willingness to consider in the United Nations problems which cause serious international friction. We shall simply state that we think that this is not the proper time to raise the matter in the Council and we will reassess the situation if at any time the subject should again be presented for Security Council consideration. We do not condone acts of violence by either side.

Meanwhile, although for obvious reasons we would not wish for this to be known, we are applying great pressure in Paris, to induce the French to carry through a serious program of reform looking towards Tunisian self-government. Tunisia is of vital importance to the French because the loss of any part of North Africa would shake France’s position as a Great Power. It might also endanger our strategic position in the North African area. Our own national security demands that we do everything humanly possible to avoid exacerbating our relations with the French, while at the same time seeking to persuade them that in their long-run interest they must satisfy legitimate claims made by the Tunisians.

Our position in the Security Council is based on considerations of timing and is not a compromise of principle. We think that Security Council consideration now might hinder negotiations, and would make it more difficult for both sides to take a moderate position. We have made it clear to the French that, should the prospect of negotiations on their reform program prove illusory, we will very likely revise our position in the Security Council.

I may say that this is one of the most difficult decisions I have had to make in the Department of State. I made it only after the most exhaustive consideration of all the factors involved.

Dean Acheson

1. A copy of the source text in Department of State files was attached to a memorandum by Hickerson to the Secretary of State, dated Apr. 9, stating that the Secretary might want to send it to the President for his use when he spoke with Roosevelt on Tunisia the following day. (330/4–952)

   The source text was drafted by Popper and Wainhouse (UNP) on Apr 9.

2. A memorandum drafted by Elting, dated Apr. 11, read as follows: “It appears Mrs. Roosevelt spoke to the Secretary about Tunisia but not to the President.

   “She was quite upset over the case but after the Secretary had informed her of the statement we intended to make and indicated his intention to take a new look at the matter if the French do not get negotiations started and if the case is brought to the UN again, she went away quite happy. It appears that she commented on the fact that our position is sometimes better than we can make known publicly.” (330/4–1152)

   No memorandum of the conversation between Roosevelt and the Secretary of State has been found in Department of State files.

3. A memorandum by Wainhouse to Hickerson, dated Apr. 9, noted that the New York Times of that date carried the text of the President’s address of Apr. 8 on the Point Four Program. In the absence of the President, it had been delivered by the Secretary of State to the National Conference on International Economic and Social Development. For text of the address, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 21, 1952, p. 607.

   Some excerpts from the address were quoted in the memorandum, which noted that they expressed the traditional policy of the United States toward colonial peoples. It went on to say, however, that while technically the U.S. position in the United Nations with regard to Tunisia was not in contradiction with that policy, it might be so regarded. It was feared that the quoted excerpts might be used to embarrass the United States in the Security Council.

   The final paragraph of the memorandum read: “I don’t know who wrote this speech and whether it had been cleared with others in the Department. I do know that UNP was not consulted.” (330/4–952)