772.00/4–352
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Barbara Evans, Office of the Secretary of State
Participants:
- Mrs. Roosevelt
- Mr. Acheson
Mrs. Roosevelt telephoned the Secretary about 11:30 this morning and said that she had not intended to bring the Tunisian matter up before she saw him next week (when she has an appointment at 11 a.m. on April 10),1 but in view of the recent development she felt she had to call the Secretary. She urged very strongly that, if it was at all possible, we should not vote against the question going on the Security Council agenda, whatever we do afterwards. She said that if we have to vote to keep it off the agenda she has a very strong feeling that it will do us great harm with the entire Arab group. She said anything we could do now toward helping to settle the Moroccan situation and towards creating a little better feeling toward us among the Arabs is desperately important. She said she realized fully what a dreadfully difficult question it was to decide. She said the feeling that she had found throughout the Arab countries, including Pakistan, on this question was extremely high and she thought that we must try to settle the refugee question and handle the Moroccan one in such a way that more stability in that vital area would be created. She said she understood why we had had to handle the Moroccan question as we did in the General Assembly and she had explained the situation over and over again.
The Secretary said that he appreciated very much indeed her calling him; that the question was a most difficult one; that he had just come from a meeting at which it was discussed in the Department with great divergence of opinion and that he was going to meet on the matter again this afternoon.2 He said he would like to ask her whether she [Page 718] thought it would be helpful if we voted to put it on the agenda and then took a vigorous position against having it discussed in the Security Council until the parties concerned had an opportunity to try to solve the question themselves. She replied that she thought that would help us a great deal. She would not like to see us take a position which which would bar the question coming up eventually for discussion.
She closed by saying that our action in the General Assembly [on Morocco] had done us a great deal of harm; if we repeated that position we would create feeling against us which would take a very long time to overcome, if it could be done at all.
The Secretary thanked Mrs. Roosevelt again for her views.
- Regarding Roosevelt’s meeting with the Secretary on Apr. 10, see footnote 2, p. 725.↩
No memoranda of these conversations have been found in Department of State files. The files do, however, contain memoranda documenting the differing positions of the various bureaus in the Department. A memorandum by Knight (WE) to Perkins (EUR), dated Mar. 27, recommended that the United States vote against inscription of the Tunisian question on the Security Council agenda or, if that position were deemed impossible, abstain. While stating that nothing in the memorandum was intended to condone recent French actions in Tunisia, it urged that the U.S. purpose was to bring about a dialogue between the French and Tunisians rather than to assess rights and wrongs and pass judgment. The memorandum claimed that a vote placing the United States overtly on the side of dependent peoples would stiffen French intransigence and possibly cause serious trouble within NATO. (WE files, lot 54 D 467, “Tunisia”)
A memorandum by Hickerson (UNA) to the Secretary, dated Apr. 3, recommended that the United States vote to place the Tunisian item on the Security Council agenda. The memorandum, drafted by Elting (UNP) and concurred in by NEA, reported that USUN in New York had also strongly recommended that position. The United States had told the French that it could oppose Security Council consideration only if negotiations had started or were imminent, and those conditions did not exist. (772.00/4–352)
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