772.00/3–1952

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Wainhouse)1

secret

Subject:

  • Tunisia

Participants:

  • The Secretary
  • H. E. Henri Bonnet—French Ambassador
  • Mr. Jacques Schricke, 2nd Secretary, French Embassy
  • Mr. BonbrightEUR
  • Mr. WainhouseUNP

The French Ambassador accompanied by Mr. Schricke came in at the Secretary’s request to discuss the question of Tunisia. The Secretary began the conversation by stating that there are two aspects to the problem—the substantive aspect which relates to a program for direct French-Tunisian negotiations, and the Security Council aspect. The Secretary stated that we are aware of the French desire to avoid the appearance of a cause and effect relationship between their actions and events in the United Nations. He stated further that he was pleased that the matter is now before the French Cabinet, and hoped that rapid progress would be made in resuming negotiations. The Secretary stated that anything that the French can tell us about the program will [Page 691] help us in acting with a sense of conviction. The Ambassador commented that he did not know much about the program which the Cabinet has today approved and which is going forward to the French representative in Tunisia.2

With respect to the Security Council aspect, the Secretary stated that we are doing our best to hold off the Asiari-Arab agitation in New York for Security Council consideration. He said that our efforts will work for a time but not for very long. If the matter is brought to the Security Council two problems arise:

(1)
the question of inscribing the item on the agenda; and
(2)
if the matter is inscribed, the question of competence.

With respect to (1) the Secretary stated that it would be unwise for the French to oppose and that we ourselves will not vote against inscribing it. On what we do, whether we abstain or vote to put it on the agenda we have, he said, not yet made up our minds. At this point, the Secretary referred to our position on the Moroccan case in the General Assembly and characterized our voting position there as geared to the General Assembly procedures which are different from those of the Security Council. (2) On the question of competence, the Secretary stated that while he has not carefully studied the opinion of the Legal Adviser dated March 10,3 the view held in the Department is that the Security Council is competent to deal with the problem. The Secretary mentioned particularly the opinion of the Permanent Court on the Nationality Decrees Case as a precedent which might control the question of the application of Article 2(7) of the Charter to the present Tunisian-French dispute. The Ambassador intervened to say that he was vaguely familiar with the case, but thought it was an old case and did not have any application to the Tunisian question. The Ambassador stated that the Tunisian question was a purely domestic one.

The Secretary went on to say that if this matter is debated in the Security Council, discussion of the substance would take place in any case whether the French object to the Security Council’s competence or not. The best thing to do would be to have the Security Council adopt a resolution which would reserve the issue of competence, note that both parties are willing to negotiate and express the confidence that negotiations will be resumed; or in the alternative the President of the Council could express “the sense of the Council” that the parties will resume negotiations and the proceedings would be adjourned.

At the request of the Secretary whether Mr. Bonbright or Mr. Wainhouse had any comment, Mr. Bonbright stated that if the negotiations with the Tunisians do not start at once a declaration by the French at this time of their intention to negotiate would be helpful in connection [Page 692] with the situation which we face in New York. Mr. Wainhouse, in order to clarify the difference between an abstention in the General Assembly and in the Security Council which the Secretary alluded to, stated that in view of the peculiar voting procedures in the Security Council where seven votes are required to inscribe an item on the agenda, an abstention is tantamount to a negative vote, and in that respect an abstention in the Security Council is different from an abstention in the General Assembly. The Ambassador agreed that an abstention in the Security Council would perhaps have the same result as a negative vote, but the implications of an abstention are different from those of a negative vote.

Ambassador Bonnet stated that the Cabinet program approved today will be sent to Hauteclocque this weekend. He would put up to his Government the suggestion about a declaration, although he understood that a government spokesman had already today told the press that the Cabinet had considered a new Tunisian program. He stated that this item should not be placed on the agenda of the Security Council and that the French will vote against inscribing it on the agenda. On the question of competence, he expressed the view that this is an internal question with which the United Nations has nothing to do. He agreed with the Secretary that it would be better not to have the matter come up and that he would inform his Government of this conversation. The Secretary reminded the Ambassador again that whatever view is taken—that is whether there is competence or not, the discussion on the substance would still be had and the harm would be done.

With this the Ambassador agreed.4

  1. In the week preceding the meeting between the Secretary of State and Ambassador Bonnet, Bonbright transmitted two memoranda on Tunisia, dated Mar. 12 and 19, to the Secretary. The Mar. 12 memorandum referred to Paris telegram 5399, Mar. 7, p. 687, and suggested the Secretary call in Ambassador Bonnet and discuss the matter with him along the lines suggested in the reference telegram. The Mar. 19 memorandum mentioned some additional information the Secretary should consider when talking to the Ambassador that afternoon. A memorandum by Stein to Gross, dated Mar. 19, informed him the Secretary had called in the Ambassador and made the U.S. position clear along the lines indicated in both memoranda by Bonbright. Documentation is in the UNP files, lot 59 D 237, “Tunisian General Correspondence, 1952–54”.
  2. For a summary of the program, see Paris telegram 5797, Mar. 22, infra.
  3. A copy of this opinion has not been found in Department of State files.
  4. Telegram 5591 to Paris, Mar. 21, transmitted a summary of the source text to the Embassy, and instructed the Embassy to follow up with further working level discussions on Tunisia. (772.00/3–1452)