Editorial Note

Paris telegram 4338, January 21, reported the French Government was preparing to send the Tunisian Government a message clarifying the French note of December 15, especially on the issue of co-sovereignty between French residents and Tunisians. (651.72/1–2152) Paris despatch 2010, January 31, transmitted a translation of a note from the French Government to the Bey of Tunis, delivered by the Resident General on January 30. The French note, among other points, requested the Tunisians to abandon the idea of bringing a complaint against France in the United Nations so that conversations between the two governments could resume. Tunis telegram 104, February 4, suggested the Department of State urge the French to stop insisting on withdrawal of the United Nations complaint as a prerequisite to the resumption of negotiations.

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Tunis telegram 105, February 6, transmitted a summary, furnished the Consul General by a Neo-Destour source, of a Tunisian reply of February 5 to the French note of January 30. The Tunisian reply reportedly made the following points: that French antiterrorist measures were stronger than necessary to maintain public order; the French note of January 30 was too vague on the issue of the participation of French nationals in public institutions; the French state of siege was contrary to the principle of Tunisian sovereignty; and, for negotiations to be resumed, the French would have to terminate the state of siege and recognize the fundamental indivisibility of Tunisian sovereignty.

Paris despatch 2093, February 8, transmitted a copy and translation of the Tunisian note of February 5. Tunis despatch 270, February 6, commented further on the Tunisian note of February 5. According to the Consulate General, the French note of January 30 had failed to allay Tunisian suspicions on two important points, the nonpermanent character of the present regime and the idea of co-sovereignty, and the Tunisians did not consider it a satisfactory basis for negotiation. The Tunisian note of February 5, on the other hand, was not really a reply to the points made in the French note. It made no mention of a reestablishment of order and ignored the United Nations aspects of the case. Apparently there was no clear agreement at that time on what terms the Tunisians would be willing to accept as a basis for resumption of negotiations. Neo-Destour was apparently committed to a policy of passive resistance plus occasional sabotage. Given that fact, the Consulate General considered it fairly certain France would have to change to a more liberal policy than the one presented in its notes of December 15 and January 30, and in the meantime could maintain order only with a regime openly based on force. Documentation on this topic is in Department of State file 772.00.