651.72/1–1452

The Consul General at Tunis (Jernegan) to the Department of State

confidential
No. 240

Ref:

  • Tunis Confidential Telegram No. 60, January 11, 1952.1

Subject:

  • Expression of Views on French Policy Toward Tunisia.

During the course of a conversation on January 11 (partially reported in my telegram under reference), Acting Resident General Robert de Boisseson asked for my personal views on the Tunisian political situation. Emphasizing that I was speaking personally, I stated them as follows:

1.
I was convinced that the only American interest in the premises lay in having Tunisia remain in friendly hands and, since no other power could be thought of to assume that responsibility, it was in our interest that France should continue its protectorate.
2.
Assuming this, it seemed to me that the next question was how best this continued French control could be assured, what were the best tactics to be employed. One had to take into serious consideration the nationalist movement. Since my arrival in Tunisia I had done my best to determine how strong that movement was, and I had concluded that it really represented popular sentiment. It could not be ignored. Neither could it be put down by force; forceful control of dependent territories was too repugnant to world opinion, especially to the states of the Near East and South Asia. The alternative was the one which had been chosen by the French Government itself: amicable negotiation and concessions to nationalist aspirations.
3.

I thought the basic elements necessary for an understanding between the French and the Tunisians were present. In contrast to other nationalist movements, the Tunisians (that is, the dominant Neo-Destour party) did not demand complete independence. They had expressly said that French control of foreign affairs and national defense was not in question. Both publicly and in private conversations they had repeatedly stated that they did not want France or the French residents of Tunisia to pull out of the country completely. In talking with me, nationalist representatives had recognized that they needed French help and that it would be a disaster for them to be left entirely to their own devices.

Furthermore, I had noticed again and again that whenever the Neo-Destour had hopes of gaining some concession from France, even a relatively minor item, its press and leaders adopted a mild and conciliatory tone. From this, among other things, I deduced that they [Page 667] would accept considerably less than they had asked in the way of political reforms.

4.
However, I felt that France had been too hesitant in granting concessions. It was moving too slowly and might let the opportunity for an amicable settlement slip by. I had been disappointed in the French note of December 15. No answer at all would have been better than this reply to the Tunisian proposals of October 31.2
5.

It seemed to me that it should be possible to find a formula which would give the Tunisians much of what they asked, even including an all-Tunisian cabinet and an all-Tunisian legislature, while at the same time safeguarding essential French controls and French interests. As a beginning, perhaps Tunisian under-secretaries could be appointed as deputies to the French directors of departments (Public Works, Education, etc.), with the understanding that in ten or fifteen years’ time the positions would be reversed. In the crucial Direction [Department] of Finance it might be necessary to make an exception and retain a Frenchman indefinitely at the head, explaining to the Tunisians that so long as France was responsible for economic stability and for making up the deficit of the Tunisian budget and balance of payments it must retain control of that department. Similarly, a compromise might be reached on the legislature. I had seen the suggestion made in a newspaper that a bicameral assembly be established, one house to be exclusively Tunisian and the other, which would consider matters affecting French interests, to have both French and Tunisian representatives.

Reforms of this kind would not fully meet the demands of the Neo-Destour, but they might well go far enough to produce a lasting détente.

6.
Undoubtedly an administration run by Tunisians would be less efficient than the present regime, but it might be the lesser evil to accept a certain amount of inefficiency in order to protect more important interests.

Mr. De Boisseson did not seem shocked by my remarks. On the contrary, he said that his thinking was along much the same lines, although he would probably not go so far as some of my suggestions. He agreed that the note of December 15 had been unfortunate. He also agreed that it was necessary to reckon with the nationalist movement. One great difficulty, however, was the attitude of the French colony in Tunisia. The “colons” had become accustomed to thinking of the present regime as unchangeable and they were greatly upset at the mere idea of change. Perhaps after they had had two or three months to get accustomed to the thought they would become easier to handle. As for turning over the French-headed departments to Tunisian ministers, that involved a very major change and would take much courage. At present those departments were run, by technicians, as technical administrations. If Tunisian ministers were in charge, they would fall under a political regime, like cabinet ministries in other countries.

In reply to my inquiry regarding the possibility of a Tunisian appeal to the United Nations, Mr. De Boisseson said he was not clear [Page 668] how such an appeal could be made, since France is charged by treaty with the conduct of Tunisian foreign relations. If the Tunisian cabinet asked the French Government to present the case. France would of course refuse. What then? A simple petition to the Secretary General of the U.N. would get nowhere; such petitions were received by the thousand. With regard to the suggestion that the Security Council could take cognizance of the dispute, Mr. De Boisseson could see no threat to the peace. There was no fighting in Tunisia. He was emphatic in saying that France would resent and vigorously oppose any Tunisian attempt to go before a United Nations forum.

I said I too was doubtful of the validity of an appeal to the Security Council and also doubtful that the Tunisian cabinet could act directly vis-à-vis the United Nations. I suggested, nevertheless, that the case might be raised in the General Assembly in the same fashion as the Moroccan question. Some friendly U.N. member could act on behalf of the Tunisians. I would regret any such development, because it seemed to me that the western powers had enough problems already on their hands, especially in their relations with the Near East and South Asia, without having to cope with a debate on Tunisia. At the same time, looking at the picture objectively, it appeared quite logical to me that the Neo-Destour should want to go to the United Nations. It would be a positive action which the leaders could point out to their followers to show that they were pursuing the struggle, and they might also hope that it would result in pressure on France which would bring about a softening of French policy.

I believe this conversation is noteworthy because it is the first time a French official of any importance has seriously asked for my views on the local situation. It is even more noteworthy because Mr. De Boisseson received so calmly my frank expression of rather revolutionary thoughts. I should add that it is the first time I have expressed my ideas so specifically to any Frenchman or Arab.

Our whole talk, which lasted an hour, was most friendly and was on a strictly personal basis on both sides. I request that the Department take care that Mr. De Boisseson’s expressed views do not leak back to any French officials as coming from him or through me.

John D. Jernegan
  1. Not printed; it transmitted a summary of the conversation under reference in the source text. (330/1–1152)
  2. See footnote 3, supra.